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It is a standard and generally accepted view that semantics deals with context-independent
truth-conditional meaning and pragmatics deals with context-dependent non-truth-
conditional meaning. This thesis redefines the dichotomy between semantics and
pragmatics on the basis of conventionality of meaning, and provides a theory of semantic
meaning where meanings are described as what a speaker expresses by means of
conventionalised linguistic devices.
In Chapter 1, the standard dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics is introduced from a
historical perspective concerning how the field of pragmatics has been established, and
problems of the dichotomy are discussed. A redefinition of the dichotomy based on the
conventionality of meaning is proposed. In the extended semantic domain, not only does a
speaker express an assertion about the world, i.e., truth-conditional meanings, but also
indicates the speech situation which the speaker shares with the hearer. In the rest of the
thesis, a theory of semantic meanings in this extended domain is developed.
Chapters 2 and 3 develop a theory which concerns the meanings a speaker expresses in
asserting something about the world by means of linguistic conventions. In Chapter 2,
important early theoretical contributions are surveyed and relevant later theories discussed.
It is shown that the traditional dyadic approaches to meanings which are based on the
concepts of reference and predication are not incompatible with triadic approaches where
meanings are described as speech acts a speaker performs in asserting something about the
world using linguistic conventions.
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In Chapter 3, Austin (1950)'s model of communication is developed into a theory for
analysing truth-conditional meaning whereby a speaker refers to an entity or situation by
means of demonstrative conventions and describes it by means of descriptive conventions.
We discuss the demonstrative conventions which correlate words with a particular entity
or situation and the descriptive conventions which correlate words with types of entity or
situation. It is also shown that there are four different types of speech act a speaker
potentially performs by using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions in different
ways.
Chapters 4 and 5 concern the development of the part of the theory which concerns the
meanings a speaker expresses in indicating something about the speech situation. In
Chapter 4 it is shown that non-truth-conditional meanings are conventionally expressed by
linguistic devices. This type of meaning is described as the meanings a speaker expresses
by using the linguistic devices which concern types of speech situation or types of social
relation between a speaker and a hearer.
In Chapter 5 Japanese honorifics are discussed as examples of grammaticalised devices by
which a speaker indicates that a social relation between the speaker and the hearer or the
speech situation the speaker shares with the speaker is of a certain type. Using honorifics
a speaker creates or highlights the speech situation which the speaker shares with a hearer
or a social relation between the speaker and a hearer. There is another type of honorific,
by which a speaker creates or reinforces social relations among participants in the
particular situation described. In the last chapter the general conclusion is presented.
v
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It has for many years been generally accepted within linguistics that the distinction
between semantics and pragmatics is based on the difference between truth-conditional
and non-truth-conditional meaning. This is further reflected in the associated assumption
that semantic meaning is context independent while pragmatic meaning is context
dependent. For example, the following sentence is seen as, taken out of context, a
statement that a car is coming:
(1) There' s a car coming,
This context-independent truth-conditional meaning is semantic meaning. In a particular
context it might be a warning to a pedestrian not to step onto a road, or an expression of
hope that the people invited to a dinner are at last arriving1. The latter context-dependent
non-truth-conditional meaning is pragmatic meaning.
There is, however, meaning which is not incorporated well in the dichotomy between




(2) a. The signboard says 'no vacancy', Sir.
b. The signboard says 'no vacancy', stupid.
(3) a. The old man passed away,
b. The old man died,
c. The old man kicked the bucket.
(4) a. Tu es le professeur,
b. Vous etes le professeur.
(5) a. Yamada san ga





The sentences in each example do not differ in truth-conditional meaning. Both sentences
in (2), for example, mean that there is a particular signboard and it says 'no vacancy'. And
both sentences in (5) mean that there is a particular person called Mr Yamada and he came
at a time prior to the time of utterance. The difference concerns types of social relation
between the speaker and the hearer. The vocative 'Sir' in (2a) shows that the speaker is
formal and respectful to the hearer, whereas the vocative 'stupid' shows that the speaker is
rude to the hearer2. The difference among 'passed away', 'died', and 'kicked the bucket'
in (3) concerns different types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer or
different types of speech situation. 'Passed away' in (3a) shows that the speaker is polite
to the hearer by describing the person's death in a subtle and respectful way. 'Kicked the
2We will discuss vocatives in 4.3.1.
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bucket' in (3c), on the other hand, shows that the speaker is very casual to the hearer by
describing the person's death in a very casual way3.
The types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer are grammaticalised in
some languages, for example, Japanese and French. The difference between the second-
person pronouns tu and vous in French is correlated to different types of social relation
between a speaker and a hearer. Tu in (4a) shows that the speaker is casual and friendly to
the hearer while vous in (4b) shows that the speaker is formal and respectful to the
hearer4. Similarly, the Japanese auxiliary mashi in (5a) shows that the speaker is socially
lower than the hearer, while the absence of mashi in (5b) shows that the speaker is
socially equal to or higher than the hearer5.
These non-truth-conditional meanings are context independent. We know that the speaker
of the sentence in (2a) is formal and respectful to the hearer by the vocative 'Sir' itself, not
by the information which is specific to the particular context where the sentence is uttered.
Similarly, the meaning that the speaker is socially lower than the hearer in sentence (5a)
comes from the honorific auxiliary mashi, not from a particular element of the context.
Should we then analyse these context-independent non-truth-conditional meanings in the
domain of semantics or that of pragmatics? Since the truth-conditionality of meaning is a
dominant criterion in semantics and pragmatics as we will show in the following section
(1.2), many semanticists and pragmatists would agree that these meanings should be
analysed in the pragmatic domain. In the present thesis, however, we will defend the idea
that it is not the distinction between truth-conditionality and non-truth-conditionality of
3We will discuss slang in 4.3.3.1.
4Brown & Gilman (1960). We will discuss this point in 4.3.2.1.
5We will discuss Japanese honorifics thoroughly in Chapter 5.
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meaning but the distinction between context-independency and context-specificity that is
essential and useful for describing the nature of meaning. We will redefine the dichotomy
between semantics and pragmatics accordingly. In the redefined dichotomy both truth-
conditional meaning and context-independent non-truth-conditional meaning are analysed
in the semantic domain, and only context specific meaning is analysed in the pragmatic
domain. This redefinition is motivated by my conviction that the difference between truth-
conditional meaning and context-independent non-truth-conditional meanings is not so
significant. We can describe these meanings as the relations between types (types of states
of affairs in the world, and types of speech situation) and words which are conventionally
correlated to those types.
In the following section (1.2), we will introduce the definitions of semantics and
pragmatics proposed by the linguists from Morris (1938) to Levinson (1983), and discuss
the nature of meaning they try to explicate by distinguishing pragmatic meaning from
semantic meaning. We will also discuss how the dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics
based on the truth-conditionality of meaning is standardised. In 1.3, we will discuss
problems with the standard dichotomy. We will claim that the semantic domain is too
restricted and, therefore, truth-conditional semantics does not give a full picture of
sentence meaning (1.3.1). As for pragmatics, we will claim that the pragmatic domain is
too heterogeneous (1.3.2). In 1.4, we will present our definition of semantics and
pragmatics.
4
1.2 The standard dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics
1.2.1 Early definitions of semantics and pragmatics
The threefold classification, pragmatics, semantics and syntactics (or syntax), is not a
recent idea.
[It] goes back ultimately to Pierce, but was first clearly drawn and made more generally familiar by Morris
(1938). It was taken up by Carnap (1942), ... and it was subsequently reformulated by Morris (1946)
within the framework of his behaviouristic theory of signs (Lyons 1977b: 114).
Morris (1938) was concerned with outlining the general shape of the study of signs, i.e.,
semiotics, and distinguished three distinct branches: syntactics-the study of the formal
relation of signs to one another; semantics-the study of the relations of signs to the objects
to which the signs are applicable (their designata); pragmatics-the study of the relation of
signs to interpreters. The concept of 'usage/users of signs' features in Morris's definition
of pragmatics.
Inteijections such as Oh!, commands such as Come here!, ... expressions such as Good morning! and
various rhetorical and poetical devices, occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the
language (Morris, 1938 (1971:48)).
We can show the distinction between semantics and pragmatics according to Morris
(1938)'s definitions in the following diagram:
Meaning
Relation of signs Relation of signs
to objects to interpreters
(signs and their designata) (signs and usages/users)
Semantics Pragmatics
5
Later Morris (1946) revised his definitions within 'a behaviourally oriented semiotic' as
follows:
Pragmatics is that portion of semiotic which deals with the origin, uses, and effects of signs within the
behaviour in which they occur; semantics deals with the signification of signs in all modes of signifying;
syntactics deals with combination of signs without regard for their specific signification or their relation to
the behaviour in which they occur (Morris, 1946:218-9).
Carnap (1942)'s definitions of pragmatics and semantics are similar to Morris's but there
seems to be a shift of emphasis. Although Morris's emphasis is on pragmatics, where the
relations between signs and usage are studied, Carnap's emphasis is on a restricted field
of semantics, where the relations of expressions to their designata are abstracted away
from language users.
If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or, to put it in more general terms, to the
user of the language, then we assign it to the field of pragmatics. ... If we abstract from the user of the
language and analyse only the expressions and their designata we are in the field of semantics. And if,
finally, we abstract from the designata also and analyse only the relation between expressions, we are in
(logical) syntax (Carnap, 1942:9).
Camap's definition of semantics fits well with semantic theories which are based on
Tarski's correspondence theory (Tarski, 1944). According to the theory, a proposition is
true if and only if it denotes or refers to a state of affairs which actually exists in the world
that the proposition purports to describe. Tarski puts it in his standard example:
(6) 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.
We will discuss Tarski further in Chapter 2 (2.2.2).
It is a logical consequence that Carnap's exclusive definition of semantics and Tarski's
correspondence theory lead to the idea that semantics is the field where we study the
6
relations between sentences and states of affairs they purport to describe when they are
true, while abstracting away from language users. This is how model-theoretic and truth-
conditional semantics is established.
1.2.2 Dichotomy proposed by Gazdar (1979)
Gazdar (1979) states clearly the domain of semantics within truth-conditional theory and
defines the domain of pragmatics in relation to the domain of truth-conditional semantics.
Pragmatics has as its topic those aspects of the meaning of utterances which cannot be accounted for by
straightforward reference to the truth conditions of the sentences uttered. Put crudely; PRAGMATICS =
MEANING - TRUTH CONDITIONS' (Gazdar, 1979:2)6.








This gives a very clear dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics but the divisions of labour
are totally uneven. Semanticists analyse only straightforward truth-conditional meanings,
leaving to pragmatists all other aspects ofmeaning, which include deixis, uses of context-
sensitive contentives, speech acts, conventional implicature, and conversational
implicature. Then a question arises: does the theory which describes only straightforward
6It is interesting to see a parallel between pragmatics and semantics, and semantics and syntax. Just as
many semanticists try to idealise away from language users in their semantic domain, many syntacticians
try to idealise away from meaning in their syntactic domain. In fact, we have witnessed structuralists'
persistent disregard of meaning (cf. Harris (1951)). We can see this structurists' influence on Chomsky's
very early work.
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truth-conditional meanings, from which language users and usage are idealised, give a
proper picture of meaning? The implication which is made in a very restricted area of
meaning might not apply for analysing meaning in a wider range.
However, Gazdar's idea about semantics and pragmatics is shared by many linguists and
his dichotomy has in fact become a standard dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics.
Semanticists do not hesitate to drive out the concept of 'use of a language' from semantics
for the convenience of the theory, in spite of the fact that there is no such thing as 'an
unused language'. This is the same spirit Wittgenstein (1958) was actively attacking with
the well known slogan 'meaning is use'. Semanticists' indifference to language use might
be explained by the tradition of the philosophy of language which is sometimes
characterised by 'a disregard for the use of a language' or 'a distrust of the inaccuracies
and vacuities of ordinary language'. This stems from Frege and Russell7. We will discuss
Russell in Chapter 2 (2.2.1)
1.2.3 Dichotomy proposed by Levinson (1983)
Levinson (1983) discusses in great detail possible definitions of pragmatics and starts with
a Morrisian general definition:
... in one sense there is no problem of definition [of pragmatics] at all: just as, traditionally, syntax is
taken to be the study of the combinatorial properties of words and their parts, and semantics to be the
study of meaning, so pragmatics is the study of language usage (Levinson, 1983:5).
Levinson does, however, present a more specific and workable definition of pragmatics:
7There are, of course, other schools of the philosophy of language which are represented by philosophers
such as Austin whose ideas are traced to a long established Aristotelian tradition of concern for ordinary
language usage at Oxford. See Levinson (1983:227 ff).
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(7) Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are
grammaticalised, or encoded in the structure of a language (Levinson, 1983:9).
By this definition, Levinson makes it clear that there is a type of meaning about context
which is grammaticalised or encoded, which is one of the main points we advance in the
present thesis. Levinson defines this type of meaning as pragmatic meaning, while we
claim it should be analysed as semantic meaning. Levinson, however, rejects this
definition later on the basis that conversational implicatures would lie outside the purview
of a pragmatic theory.
Levinson then adopts the following definition whose scope varies considerably according
to the kind of semantic theory adopted as he himself admits:
(8) Pragmatics is the study of all those aspects of meaning not captured in a semantic
theory (Levinson, 1983:12).
This definition is almost identical to Camap's (1942) and Gazdar's (1979), although
Levinson's emphasis is on the receptiveness of the domain of pragmatics, while Camap's
and Gazdar's definitions emphasise the exclusiveness of the domain of semantics. By this
definition Levinson could specify a reasonable pragmatic domain because it depends on
what semantic theory he adopts. Levinson presents, as follows, a list of the elements of
the communicational content of an utterance, somewhere in which a dividing line between
semantics and pragmatics is to be drawn:
9





6. Conversational implicature-particu 1arised
7. Inferences based on conversational structure
(Levinson, 1983:14).
He suggests the possibility of including l-A above in semantics, leaving 5-7 to
pragmatics:
... if the theorist is determined that semantics should deal with all the conventional content of an
utterance's significance (however exactly that is to be determined), then semantic theory will deal with
aspects 1 and 2, and quite likely 3 and possibly 4 as well (Levinson, 1983:14).
This is very close to our definition of semantics. He then dropped this possibility for the
following reason:
The inclusion of presupposition is awkward, however, for if presupposition is conventional, then it is also
defeasible or context-dependent, and matters of context are best left for pragmatics (Levinson, 1983:14).
Levinson's intention to leave matters of context for pragmatics might be justified to some
degree, but it is doubtful that we could have a coherent theory of pragmatics if we put all
the issues concerning the context in the pragmatic domain. Levinson (1983:14) claims
that, if semantics includes the aspects of communicational content from 1 to 4 in (9)
above, 'such a semantic theory will have to be built on heterogeneous lines to include
phenomena with quite different properties.' But is the heterogeneity of the domain of
pragmatics any better than the heterogeneity of the domain of semantics?
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Finally, Levinson (1983:14-5) comes to the conclusion about the domain of semantics: a
semantic theory is truth-conditional. This makes his definition identical to Gazdar's
(1979). It is noteworthy that these two linguists with two distinctive linguistic interests-
the formal and communicative side of language, agree completely about the domains of
semantics and pragmatics.
1.3 Problems with the Dichotomy between Semantics and
Pragmatics Based on Truth-conditionality
1.3.1 Problems with semantics
On the truth-conditional semantic view, semantics concerns those aspects of meaning of a
sentence which are independent of a particular user in a particular context, and the concept
of semantic content is the link between a sentence and the information about the world
which it succeeds in conveying-its prepositional content8. So, on Gazdar (1979)'s view
crudely expressed by the equation, PRAGMATICS = MEANING - TRUTH
CONDITIONS, pragmatics is left with the aspects of meaning of a sentence which (i)
varies according to a speaker and a context, and (ii) is not concerned with its prepositional
content.
One criticism against this view of semantics is that the prepositional content of a sentence
is not all truth-conditional, as truth-conditional semanticists would like to claim. We are
going to demonstrate this point using the word 'even'.
8See Cann (1993) and Kempson (1986).
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1.3.1.1 Meaning of 'even'
There are some syntactic similarities between the words 'even' and 'only': both can occur
in almost any grammatical position, and which position they occur in significantly alters
the meaning of the containing sentence. Lycan (1991, 133-134) illustrates this, using the
following examples:
(10) (Even, Only) I hit him in the eye yesterday,
I (even, only) hit him in the eye yesterday,
I hit (even, only) him in the eye yesterday,
I hit him (even, only) in the eye yesterday,
I hit him in the eye (only, even) yesterday.
In spite of these similarities, the meaning expressed by 'even' cannot be described truth-
conditionally in a straightforward sense, while the meaning of 'only' can be: it is a
quantifier meaning 'none, except'. For example, the sentence 'I hit only him yesterday'
can be paraphrased as 'I hit him and no-one else yesterday'. So what does the word
'even' mean and how should we describe it?
Francescotti (1995) claims it is generally accepted that the word 'even' makes some
contribution to the meaning in which it figures. When we say:
(11) Even Albert passed the exam,
we imply something more than what is implied by:
12
(12) Albert passed the exam.
Francescotti (1995) says:
The standard view is that whatever contribution 'even' makes, it does not affect the truth-conditions of a
sentence. It is thought that 'even' makes a difference only in conventional implicature in much the same
way that 'but' does over and above 'and' (Francescotti, 1995, 153).
The difference in meaning between the sentences in (11) and (12) above is the unlikeliness
of Albert's passing. This is part of the meaning of the sentence in (11), but it is not a
truth-conditional meaning. The meaning of unlikeliness of 'even' is usually analysed in
terms of conventional implicature: when Albert's passing is not surprising at all in the
above case, the sentence becomes inappropriate, rather than false.
However, it would be better if we could describe the meaning of unlikeliness of 'even' as
a semantic meaning, because (i) the meaning does not vary according to a speaker and/or a
context and (ii) 'even' is syntactically and semantically related to 'only', which is
described in the semantic domain. However, the standard definition of semantics that only
truth-conditional meanings are semantic meanings makes this extremely difficult.
Lycan (1991) tries a truth-conditional account of 'even' on the lines that, whereas 'only' is
a quantifier meaning "none, except", 'even' is a quantifier meaning "every, including".
Lycan claims that a sentence of the form 'Even A is F is true just in case (i) there is some
contextually determined group G that includes A and at least one item other than A, and
(ii) everything in G, including A, is F. According to Lycan's account, 'Even Albert
passed the exam' would be translated as:
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(13) Everyone in the class passed the exam, and that includes Albert.
However, Francescotti (1995) shows that Lycan's account of 'even' does not work in the
following example. Assuming that Granny is much more culinarily reserved than the
average person, it would be felicitous to say:
(14) Even Granny tried the chilli.
On Lycan's account, we should paraphrase this sentence as:
(15) Everyone in the group tried the chilli, and that includes Granny.
However, the sentence in (14) would be true even if there were one or two people in the
group who did not try the chilli. Therefore, the sentence in (15) is not an accurate
paraphrase of the sentence in (14).
According to Francescotti (1995), Lycan (1991) noticed the problem and suggested the
following modification: in the sentence 'Even A is F, the word 'even' does not quantify
over all items in the contextually determined reference-class, but only those that we would
reasonably expect to be F. Having quantified over this more restricted class of item, the
word 'even' is then used to imply that in addition to these items, A is also F. On this
modified account, the sentence in (14) would be paraphrased as:
(16) Everyone in the group whom you would reasonably expect to try the chilli did,
plus Granny tried the chilli.
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However, Lycan's modified account of 'even' is not perfect, either. Berckmans (1993)
presents the following counter-example:
(17) Evans kissed Mary even before he knew her name.
On Lycan's modified account, this sentence should be paraphrased as:
(18) All of the personal-relation-establishing events that you would reasonably expect
to occur after Evans kissed Mary, happened after Evans kissed Maiy, as did his learning
her name.
The problem is that the sentence in (17) does not imply that all of these other events
happened after Evans kissed Mary. The sentence in (17) would be true and felicitous even
if Evans proposed and then kissed her.
Lycan's truth-conditional account of 'even' does not seem to be very promising.
However, we should not hasten to give up the hope of analysing the meaning of
unlikeliness of 'even' in the semantic domain. Lycan, to some degree, succeeds in
specifying the meaning of 'even' truth-conditionally, as a meaning which is independent
of a particular speaker and a particular context. We cannot explain this without
hypothesising a type of meaning which is shared by both 'even' and other words whose
meanings are usually described truth-conditionally. This strongly suggests that we should
find a criterion for semantics which is less restricted than truth-conditionality of meaning
thereby allowing the non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning to be in the
semantic domain. Then we could describe related meanings in the same domain.
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By suggesting this, we are not claiming that truth-conditionality of meaning is an
unimportant criterion. On the contrary, it is an important one because the way a statement
'The cat is on the mat' goes wrong when the cat referred to is not on the mat is obviously
different from the way a statement 'Even Albert passed the exam' goes wrong when
Albert's passing the exam is not surprising at all. The former is concerned with a relation
between a statement and a type of states of affairs in the world, which has been studied,
since Russell, in terms of truth and falsity, while the latter is concerned with a relation
between an indication and a type of context, which has been described in terms of
appropriateness and inappropriateness, or felicity and infelicity. What we are claiming
here is that the difference between these two types of meaning is not so significant that
they can be described in the same linguistic domain. In the present thesis we defend the
idea that truth-conditionality ofmeaning is too restricted a criterion for semantic meaning,
and in 1.49 we will present an alternative criterion which is based on conventionality of
meaning.
1.3.1.2 Numerals: 'at least n' or 'exactly n'
Another criticism on Gazdar's view of semantics and pragmatics is presented by Kempson
(1986, 1988). In Gazdar's view, semantics concerns truth-conditional meaning, which is
prepositional content of a sentence and independent of a particular user in a particular
context. However, Kempson (1986:77) claims that truth-theoretic content of the
proposition that a sentence expresses is not completely independent of a particular context.
9 The tendency to analyse meanings of a wider range than straightforward truth-conditional meanings in the
semantic domain is already obvious in recent literature on semantics, such as Kamp & Reyle (1993) and
their followers.
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One example is in the realm of numerals. According to Kempson (1986:80), numerals
have two interpretations; 'at least n' and 'exactly n'. Consider the following examples:
(19) a. Mark didn't eat three biscuits,
b. John hasn't got two girlfriends.
It may seem that numerals behave as though they merely have the 'at least' understanding
as part of their linguistically specifiable core meaning. However, (20) provides contrary
evidence:
(20) Mark didn't eat three biscuits: he ate four.
To keep the sentence from being a contradiction, only the 'exactly n' interpretation is
allowed for the former numeral in (20) above. Kempson claims that truth-conditional
content of the sentence changes according to which of the two interpretations is to be taken
and it depends on the context.
The fact that sentences which contain a numeral are ambiguous is not an immediate threat
to Gazdar's view on the dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics. There are ambiguous
sentences, as is shown in the following classic example:
(21) John went to the bank.
However, if there are too many sentences whose truth-conditional content depends on the
context, context-independency does not serve as a good criterion for distinguishing
semantics meanings from pragmatic meanings. Kempson posits this is so when she claims
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that the problem extends to the whole set of scalar implicatures resulting in more
ambiguous sentences than semanticists expected, as is shown by the following sentences
(Kempson, 1986:81):
(22) a. Mark didn't eat some of the biscuits: he ate all of them
b. She isn't competent at linguistics: she's masterly at the subject
c. He didn't sleep until noon: he slept until one
d. He isn't patriotic or chauvinistic: he's patriotic and chauvinistic
e. I didn't invite John to supper: I invited John, Mary and Susanna
f. The house is in a terrible mess. We didn't have Lily in to play today—we had the
whole street in (as well as Lily)
g. She didn't lose a finger: she lost an arm
h. It's no longer a crime to hold left-wing views in Colombia: it's a crime to hold
any views whatsoever1 °. (The Times)
Kempson (1986) then comes to the conclusion that to determine a truth-conditional content
of a sentence, contextual parameters should be taken into consideration. She uses
Relevance Theory11 to explain how the truth-conditional content of a sentence is
determined by the interaction between the linguistic meanings of expressions and
contextual parameters.
The problem of context-dependency of the propositional content of a sentence
demonstrated by Kempson has been known to philosophers for years. Austin showed this
point as early as 1962, using the following example:
1 °Horn (1985) calls 'metalinguistic negation' the kind of negation shown in (20) and (22), and claims that
in this type of negation, a speaker is not asserting that some proposition is false, but is rather indicating
his unwillingness to assert something in a given way or accept another's assertion of it in that way.
1 'Sperber and Wilson (1986).
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(23) France is hexagonal.
Is [23] true or false? Well, if you like, up to a point; of course I can see what you mean by saying that it
is true for certain intents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking general, perhaps, but not for a
geographer (Austin, 1962:143).
A similar point is made repeatedly by Putnam. Putnam claims that meanings of words,
such as 'gold', have changed over the years and also they can be different from one
community to another:
Meaning is interactional. The environment itself plays a role in determining what speaker's words or
community's words refer to (Putnam, 1988:36).
The above argument strongly implies that sentence meaning is not exhausted by its truth-
conditional propositional content which is always unambiguous and context-independent,
as Gazdar would like to claim.
1.3.2 Problems with pragmatics
According to the dichotomy of semantics and pragmatics proposed by Levinson (1983),
pragmatics is left with a large area of meaning to cover. Let us show Levinson
(1983:14)'s list of meanings once again:
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7. Inferences based on conversational structure12.
Only truth-conditions/entailments are included in semantics and therefore pragmatics is
burdened by the elements from conventional implicature (in 2 above) to inferences based
on conversational structure (in 7 above). Seeing these different types of communicative
elements included in pragmatics, it is difficult to imagine how we can develop a coherent
theory of pragmatics.
To describe conventional implicature, for example, we should analyse the relations
between words like 'but' and the speaker's interpretation of the unlikeliness of two states
of affairs such as being rich and being unhappy, as is shown in (25) below:
(25) John is rich but unhappy.
Similarly, to describe the conventional implicature shown in (26), the relation between a
word 'Sir' and a speaker's interpretation of the social relation between him and the hearer
should be analysed.
(26) The signboard says, 'no vacancy', Sir.
12As a part of 'inferences based on conversational structure' in 7, meanings which come from discourse
structure might be included.
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Conversational implicature should be handled in a very different way. Consider the
following example:
(27) A: Do you like this music?
B: I've never liked atonal music13.
To describe the meaning speaker B expresses, which is that he does not like the music
speaker A refers to by 'this', we have to analyse the sequence of utterances. The exchange
in (27) belongs to a speech event of asking a question, and the answer to the question
asked is expected in the second turn. The expectation that speaker B's utterance is some
kind of answer to speaker A's question, makes it possible to infer speaker B's meaning,
which is 'no'.
Let us make another point about the differences between conventional implicature and
conversational implicature. Conversational implicature represents general rules about
communication between a speaker and a hearer. Therefore, the violation of these rules
does not immediately cause a speaker to provide incorrect information about the world.
Neither does the violation of these rules mean that a speaker violates the rules of a
language, such as English or Japanese. Let us take one example from Grice's maxims of
conversation (Grice, 1975, 1978). The example in (28) shows that a speaker violates the
maxim of quantity, which is (i) make your contribution as informative as is required for
the current purposes of the exchange: (ii) do not make your contribution more informative
than is required. The speaker himself admits that he is mentioning the information which
13The example is from Blakemore (1992:126).
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is not required for the current purposes in saying, 'for some purposes which are of no
interest to you I'm quite sure'. Nonetheless, the speaker does not provide any incorrect
information about the world by uttering it. And we can hardly say that the speaker violates
the rules of English.
(28) (the hotel reception)
This afternoon I have to visit the town for some purposes which are of no interest
to you I'm quite sure. Nevertheless, I require your aid in getting me some sort of transport
or some hire vehicle to get me to my first port of call14.
The violation of rules which concern conventional implicature, on the other hand, causes a
speaker to provide incorrect information about the world. This clearly shows that a
speaker does not follow one of the rules of the language, such as English or Japanese. If a
speaker says, 'Even Granny tried the chilli' when Granny is very adventurous with food,
the speaker violates the rule between using the word 'even' and the meaning it expresses.
Because of this violation, the speaker provides incorrect information about Granny.
Similarly, if a speaker of Japanese does not use an honorific auxiliary when he is speaking
to his boss on a formal occasion, the speaker violates the rule between using/not using the
honorific auxiliary and the meaning it expresses. Because of this violation, the speaker
provides incorrect information about the social relation between the speaker and the
hearer, and the speech situation.
The way the rules of meanings which concern 'even' or the honorific auxiliary are violated
is very similar to the way the rules of meanings which concern truth-conditional meanings
are violated. If a speaker uses the word 'hexagon' to describe the shape of the building of
14Fawlty Towers, BBC.
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the Department of Defence in the US, the speaker violates the rule between using the word
'hexagon' and the meaning it expresses. Consequently the speaker provides incorrect
information about the world.
Although both conventional implicature and conversational implicature are non-truth-
conditional meanings, they seem to be different types of meaning and so different
approaches are required. It does not seem very promising to regard both meanings as the
same type of meaning and try to develop a theory to explain both meanings in a coherent
fashion.
If, as we claim, the pragmatic domain is too heterogeneous, what makes the domain
heterogeneous? It seems that the heterogeneity is caused by the inclusion in the domain of
all aspects of meaning which concern context. We should distinguish meanings which
concern types of context expressed by conventional linguistic devices, from meanings
which concern a specific context. We will explain the difference in the following section.
1.3.2.1 Meanings of CONTEXTc and context-specific meanings
Consider the following example:
(29) The door is open, Sir.
The propositional content of the above sentence, which is that there is a particular door
and it is open, is not all the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence. The
speaker expresses that a hearer is socially higher than him, by a vocative, 'Sir'. This
might be symbolised as:
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(30) HI(H,S),
where Hi means 'socially higher', S 'speaker', and H 'hearer'. As we will discuss in
Chapter 5, meaning of 'socially higher' is language-specific/culturally specific.
The speaker, by uttering the sentence in (29), does two types of act at the same time: (i) he
refers to a particular door and predicates something of it, and (ii) he indicates that the
hearer is socially higher than the speaker. These two types of act are independent of each
other. That is, referring to a particular door and predicating something of it does not affect
indicating that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, and vice versa. This is to be





The circle on the left symbolises a speech situation shared by a speaker and a hearer, and
the small square on the right symbolises a situation in the world. Uttering a vocative
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sentence like the one in (29), a speaker (i) indicates the type of the speech situation she
shares with the hearer, and (ii) describes a situation in the world at the same time15.
Meanings which concern a speech situation are independent of a particular speaker and a
particular context, just as meanings which concern situations in the world, i.e., truth-
conditional meanings, are. Whoever utters the sentence in (29) and wherever she utters it,
the meaning that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker never changes. We call
'meaning of CONTEXTc' the meaning which concerns a speech situation (a context, in a
wide sense), which is independent of a particular speaker and a particular context.
Meanings of CONTEXTc are highly grammaticalised in some languages. The distinction
between the second-person pronoun tu and vous in French and the so-called T/V
distinction in other languages16 are one of those examples.
(32) Vous etes le professeur.
The meaning of CONTEXTc and the truth-conditional meaning of the sentence in (32) can
be expressed in the following diagram:
15We symbolise the attribute by which the speaker refers to an entity using small letters as in 'door(x)'
and the predication of something of the referent using capitals as in 'OPEN(x)'. We use Kamp and Reyle
(1993)'s idea of showing meanings by symbols and boxes, which we will explain in 4.2.1.






In those T/V languages types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer are
expressed only when the hearer is referred to by either pronoun. In Japanese, on the other
hand, every sentence is marked by the presence or the absence of the honorific auxiliary,
which signifies different types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. The
meaning of the following sentence with the honorific auxiliary mashi is demonstrated in
the diagram in (35):









We will describe Japanese honorifics in full length in Chapter 5.
Meanings of CONTEXTc shown above make a sharp contrast to the following non-truth-
conditional meanings in context-specificity. The meaning of warning to a pedestrian not to
step onto a road in (36) comes from the fact a hearer, i.e., the pedestrian, has stepped or is
about to step onto the road. The meaning of Student Y's rejection of the proposal of going
to the movies in (37) comes from the fact that in the previous turn Student X asked
Student Y to go to the movies. To understand these meanings, one has to have knowledge
about the specific context in addition to the general knowledge about the language, English
in this case.
(36) There's a car coming.
(37) Student X: Let's go to the movies tonight
Student Y: I have to study for an exam (Searle, 1975:61).
The exchange in (37) is an example of so-called indirect speech acts. Searle (1975)
explains indirect speech acts as a case where, while performing a speech act, a speaker
performs another speech act indirectly. In the example in (37), Student Y rejects the
proposal while stating that he has to prepare for an exam.
To analyse these context-specific meanings, we have to describe how a speaker relates a
particular element of a context (or discourse) with her assertion about the world and
expresses more than what she literally says. This needs a very different approach from
analysing meanings of CONTEXTc, where the conventional relations between words and
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types of social relation are described. To regard these meanings as the same type of
meaning and analyse them on the same level only causes confusion.
1.4 The dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics based on
the conventionality of meaning
We have distinguished three types of meaning; truth-conditional meanings, meanings of
CONTEXTc, and context-specific meanings. Traditionally, only truth-conditional meanings
are described in the semantic domain and the other two are described in the pragmatic
domain. Against this tradition, we have argued that the semantic domain is too exclusive
to give a full picture of core sentence meanings, and that the pragmatic domain is too
heterogeneous, including conventionalised or even grammaticalised meanings about types
of context and meanings about particular context.
We redefine the dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics on the basis of
conventionality of meaning. Truth-conditional meanings are conventional meanings: for
example, the sentence 'The cat is on the mat', is correlated by conventions to a particular
type of situation in the world, where there is a particular cat and it is on a particular mat.
Therefore, a speaker cannot utter the sentence to mean that there is a particular dog,
instead of a cat, and it is on a particular mat, except as a very private use of the language
for himself. The connections between sentences and types of situation in the world are
almost undetachable in spite of the fact that they are arbitrarily correlated. A type CAT is
arbitrarily correlated to the word 'cat'.
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Linguistic conventions are arbitrary rules which connect a meaning to a word. They are
like rules of games. There is no a priori reason why the type CAT should be connected to
the word 'cat', nor to the word 'gat' or 'cad'. Neither is there any a priori reason why
salads should be eaten before the main course in, say, Britain or North America, and not
after it, as it is in France17. They are just conventions. However, once conventions are
made, participants must conform to them. Otherwise, there would be confusion18.
The meanings of CONTEXTc are also conventional meanings. A speaker cannot utter the
sentence, 'The door is open, Sir', without meaning the hearer is socially higher than him.
Neither can a speaker utter the sentence 'Yamada san ga ki mashi ta ('Mr Yamada
came')', without meaning that the hearer is socially higher than him. The vocative 'Sir' is
conventionally correlated to a type of speech situation where a hearer is socially higher
than a speaker. So is the honorific auxiliary mashi in Japanese.
Although both truth-conditional meanings and meanings of CONTEXTc are conventional
meanings, they are different types ofmeaning. If there is a discrepancy between the actual
situation in the world and a type of situation a speaker assigns to it, the speaker's
statement is false: the speaker is blamed for giving a wrong picture for the actual state of
affairs in the world. If, on the other hand, there is a discrepancy between the actual speech
situation and a type of speech situation a speaker assigns to it, the speaker's indication is
inappropriate or infelicitous and the speaker is blamed for doing something which
endangers communication between him and the hearer.
Unlike truth-conditional meanings and meanings of CONTEXTc, context-specific meanings
are not conventional meanings. A speaker can utter the sentence, 'There's a car coming',
17Scollon & Scollon (1995).
18See Lewis (1969).
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without expressing a warning to a pedestrian not to step onto a road. Similarly a speaker
can utter the sentence, 'I have to study for an exam', without expressing a rejection.
Our redefined dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics is shown in the following
diagram:
Meaning
Conventional meanings Context-specific meanings
Semantics Pragmatics
We analyse truth-conditional meanings, conventional implicature, presuppositions and
felicity conditions in the semantic domain, and analyse conversational implicature in the
pragmatic domain.
Our goal of describing semantic meaning is to describe linguistic conventions by which
language users asserts something about the world and indicates something about a speech
situation. In other words, we describe how language users communicate with each other
about the world and a speech situation using conventional linguistic devices. In this way
we can incorporate language use in the semantic theory, which Wittgenstein (1953) and
Austin (1962) try to promote.
In the rest of the thesis, we will develop a theory of semantic meaning. In Chapter 2, we
will review traditional concepts of referring and predicating and the debates about them. In
Chapter 3, we will discuss how we incorporate truth-conditional meanings into the theory
of conventional meanings as meanings which concern types of situation in the world. We
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use Austin's concepts of demonstrative and descriptive conventions. In Chapter 4, we will
develop the part of the theory which concerns meanings of CONTEXTc and describe these
meanings in the theoretical framework. In Chapter 5, we will analyse Japanese honorifics
as an example of grammaticalised meanings of CONTEXTc. Chapter 6 follows as a general
conclusion of the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Philosophical and Linguistic Issues about
Referring and Predicating
2.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter we proposed to extend the domain of semantics. In the extended
domain of semantics we describe conventional meaning, which includes truth-conditional
meaning and non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning. To develop a coherent
semantic theory, we have to find a way to describe both types of meaning in a consistent
manner. One problem is that truth-conditional meanings are traditionally described
dyadically between sentences and states of affairs in the world, and the dyadic approach to
meanings does not work for non-truth-conditional context-independent meanings, which
concern types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. We will defend the idea
that these two types of conventional meaning can be described as what a speaker
expresses in 'pointing to' something and giving a particular type to it: truth-conditional
meaning is what a speaker expresses in 'pointing to' a person, thing, or situation and
giving a type to it, while non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning is what a
speaker expresses in 'pointing to' the present speech situation which he shares with the
hearer and giving a type to it. 'Pointing' and giving a type are made possible by two types
of linguistic convention, which Austin (1950) calls demonstrative and descriptive
conventions: the demonstrative conventions correlate words with a person, thing,
(historic) situation and the present speech situation, and the descriptive conventions
correlate words with types of person, thing, (historic) situation and speech situation. To
describe semantic meaning is to describe these linguistic conventions by which a speaker
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asserts something about the world (truth-conditional meaning) and indicates something
about the speech situation (non-truth-conditional context-independent meaning).
In the present chapter and the following chapter, we will develop a theoretical framework
in which we describe truth-conditional meaning as a meaning which a speaker expresses
by conventional linguistic devices. In the present chapter, we will discuss theoretical
issues. We will show what aspect of meaning Russell and Tarski explicate by describing
meaning dyadically between sentences and states of affairs in the world (2.2), and what
aspect of meaning Austin and Strawson emphasise by describing meaning triadically in
terms of language users, sentences and the world (2.3). In 2.2.1.1 we will present the
debates between Russell and Strawson as a conflict between the dyadic and the triadic
approach to meaning. In 2.3.2, by introducing Austin (1950), on which our theory is
based, we will show that truth-conditional meaning can be described as a meaning which a
speaker refers to a person, thing or situation by means of the demonstrative conventions,
and describes it by giving it a type by means of the descriptive conventions. Following
Austin (1953), we will also show that, if we define meaning as a linguistic act which a
speaker performs about the world by means of these linguistic conventions, we can
describe sentence meaning in a wider scope than that of truth-conditional meaning (2.3.3).
According to Austin (1953), a speaker can potentially perform four types of speech act by
uttering a sentence 'X is a Y'. This gives a reasonable explanation to linguistic factors
which concern genericity and attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions. We
will develop this point in chapter 3 (3.3). In 2.4, we will introduce linguists which take an
approach which is in between the dyadic and the triadic approach.
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2.2 Dyadic Approach to Sentence Meaning
2.2.1 Russell's view of sentence meaning
Russell analyses meaning as a relation between sentences and facts. Russell (1959:151)
says:
I think one must say that there are facts and 'truth' consists in one sort of relation to facts while
'falsehood' consists in another sort of relation.
According to the Russellian view, sentences express propositions (since Russell did not
distinguish propositions from propositional contents) and there are two types of relation
between propositions and facts: truth and falsehood. In this view, true propositions are
made true by the facts. In fact, Russell did not distinguish true propositions from facts:
they are one and the same thing for him. For example, the proposition of the sentence,
'John is a bachelor', is correlated with a type of state of affairs, i.e., there is a person,
John, and the person satisfies, 'x is a bachelor'. This type of state of affairs is regarded as
a true fact when the sentence is true.
Although Russell, using the term 'true/truth', succeeds in explaining propositions of
sentences as a relation between sentences and (types of) states of affairs, he cannot explain
false propositions. According to Barwise and Etchemendy (1987), Russell was convinced
that true propositions are made true by the facts, but, since there were no such things as
'false facts' to make false propositions false, he found it hard to give an account of false
propositions. This is an important problem of Russell's theory. We attribute this problem
to Russell's exclusion of sentences as a token, i.e., utterances from his theory.
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Russell analysed only sentences as types. To analyse a meaning of the sentence 'John is a
bachelor' as a type is describe its difference from other sentences. The meaning of the
sentence (as a type), 'John is a bachelor', is different from that of the sentence, 'Peter is a
bachelor', in that the individual referred to is a bearer of the name 'John' and not the name
'Peter'. The meaning of the sentence 'John is a bachelor', is different from that of 'John is
married' in that the individual is in the state of being unmarried.
Because Russell excludes sentences as a token, i.e., utterances, he cannot talk about a
particular person or situation. The problem is that the concepts of truth and falsity
essentially concern relations between a particular person or situation and a type (which is
correlated with a word or a sentence) a speaker assigns to it. A statement is true if a
particular person or situation is of the type which a speaker assigns to him/it, and if not,
false. For example, by uttering the sentence, 'John is a bachelor', I assign a type,
BACHELOR, to a particular person who is John. If this person is in fact of the type
BACHELOR, my assertion is true. And if the person has a wife, my assertion is false.
Russell, however, does not use 'true/truth' and 'false/falsity' in a standard way: he uses
'truth' for the relation between sentences (as a type) and types of situation. This use of the
word 'truth' is itself problematic, and as a result, causes unnecessary confusion among
philosophers and linguists. In fact, a series of debates between Russell and Strawson
(Russell (1905), Strawson (1950), and Russell (1957)), which we will discuss in the
following section, was caused by Russell's use of the term 'truth' for sentences as a type.
Ordinary-language philosophers were totally against the use of the term 'true' in this
sense.
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It is a fashionable mistake to take as primary '(The sentence) "S" is true (in the English language)'. Here
the addition of the words 'in the English language' serves to emphasise that 'sentence' is not being used as
equivalent to 'statement', so that it precisely is not what can be true or false (Austin, 1950:121).
The more serious problem for using the concepts of truth and falsity for the relation
between sentences and types (of states of affairs) is that false propositions cannot be
explained. In fact there is no such thing as false propositions in the sense Russell uses the
term 'false propositions'. According to Russell, a sentence (as a type) is correlated with a
type of state of affairs. The sentence (as a type), 'John is a bachelor' is correlated with a
type of state of affairs where there is a person who is the bearer of the name 'John', and
this person is of a type BACHELOR. The sentence (as a type), 'John is a bachelor', is not
correlated with any other types of states of affairs which make the sentence false.
Sentences (as a type) can be true in the special sense Russell uses the term 'true' but
cannot be false. Only when a sentence (as a token) is uttered to make a statement about a
particular person or situation, and the person or situation is not of the type correlated with
the sentence, the sentence (as a token), more accurately, the statement, can be false. To
explain falsity, a particular entity or situation, as well as a type of entity or situation,
should be hypothesised. Since Russell excludes language use and sentences as a token
from his theory of meaning, he cannot explain falsity.
In the following section, we will introduce the debates between Russell and Strawson.
These debates show that Russell, a philosopher of the dyadic approach to meaning, and
Strawson, a philosopher of the triadic approach to meaning, describe different aspects of
meaning using the term 'sentence', 'true', and 'false' in their own sense.
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2.2.1.1 Debates between Russell and Strawson
According to Russell (1905), every proposition expressed by a sentence whose subject
refers to a non-existent object is false. Therefore, the following sentence is false:
(1) The present king of France is bald.
Russell regards propositions of this type as false because, otherwise, the difficulties
which are bound to occur seem unavoidable. According to Meinong (1904), any
grammatically correct denoting phrases stand for an object. Thus, Russell says:
'The present King of France', 'the round square', etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted
that such objects do not subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a
difficult view (Russell, 1905:303).
However, Russell's main objection is:
... such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that
the existent present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is round, and also
not round; etc. But this is intolerable (Russell, 1905:303).
Therefore, Russell claims definite expressions such as 'the present king of France' in (1)
above are not the logical subjects of the sentences. Only 'logically proper names' can
occur as subjects of sentences which are genuinely of the subject-predicate form.
Therefore, although grammatically the sentence in (1) has a singular subject and a
predicate, it is not logically a subject-predicate sentence at all. The proposition it expresses
is a complex kind of existential proposition, part of which might be described as a
'uniquely existential' proposition. The sentence in (1) expresses the following three
propositions:
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(2) a. There is a king of France,
b. There is not more than one king of France,
c. There is nothing which is king of France and is not bald.
Therefore, the sentence is false: since the conjunction of three propositions, of which one
is false, is itself false, the assertion as a whole would be false.
Strawson (1950) criticises Russell (1905) arguing that Russell is forced to say that
definite expressions are not logical subjects of subject-predicate sentences because Russell
does not distinguish sentences/expressions from uses of them. Strawson's argument is as
follows. The sentence in (3) can be uttered by different people in different times, such as
at the reigns of Louis XIV and Louis XV:
(3) The king of France is wise.
In each occasion of the use of this sentence, an assertion/proposition is either true or false.
But we cannot talk of the sentences being true or false. Similarly, although we can say that
one uses the expression, 'the king of France' to mention, or refer to, a particular person in
the course of using the sentence in order to talk about that person, the expression cannot
be said to mention, or refer to, anything. That is, unless we know who the speaker refers
to in using the expression, we don't know whether the sentence is true or false.
Therefore, the sentences like the one in (3) are truth-valueless, if considered out of any
context of utterance.
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Strawson (1950:321) claims that the truth-valuelessness of the sentence in (3) is an
intuitively correct interpretation. When someone utters the sentence in (3) and asks if the
statement he has just made is true or false, one would most probably say that it is neither
true nor false; the question of whether the statement is true or false simply doesn't arise,
because there is now no such person as the king of France. Strawson (1950:321) then
concludes that to say The king of France is wise' is to presuppose1 that there is a king of
France. According to Strawson, in response to the statement, we say, 'There is no king of
France': we certainly should not say we were contradicting the statement that the king of
France is wise. We are, rather, giving a reason for saying that the question of whether it's
true or false simply doesn't arise.
Russell (1957)'s response is as follows. There are two separate issues about the definite
expressions like 'the king of France': one is the issue of description and the other is the
issue of egocentricity, i.e., which entity is referred to by the expression like 'the king of
France' depends on time and place when/where a sentence is uttered. Strawson (1950)
thinks they are one and the same issue. However, the issue raised in Russell (1905) is the
issue of description, not that of egocentricity, and therefore the problem about description
still remains. The use of a descriptive phrase where egocentricity is wholly absent, which
is shown in (4), still causes one and the same problem which is described by the definite
expression, 'the present king of France' in Russell (1905).
(4) The square-root of minus one is half the square-root of minus four.
The debates between Russell and Strawson did not reach a clear conclusion because they
used the word 'sentence' in different senses and described different aspects of meaning.
1 Strawson did not use the term 'presuppose' until Strawson (1952). However, since 'presuppose' is a
generally accepted term, we use the term henceforth.
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This difference is in fact shown in the titles of their papers. The title of Russell (1905) is
'On denoting' and that of Strawson (1950) is 'On referring'. The issue Russell (1905)
raises is that there is a case where the subject of a sentence (as a type) with a subject-
predicate form fails to denote an entity because there isn't such an entity. However, since
the sentence has a subject-predicate form, one has no choice but to say that there is a
corresponding fact which makes the sentence true. The corresponding state of affairs, i.e.
a fact, is that there is an entity which does not exist, and it is of a certain type. This is
intolerable. To avoid this, one has to say either (i) such sentences are meaningless because
there are not corresponding facts which make the sentences true, or (ii), as Russell (1905)
claims, such sentences are false because they express a complex kind of existential
proposition a part of which is false. Logical positivists took the option in (i). The central
tenet of logical positivism was that 'unless a sentence can, at least in principle, be verified
(i.e. tested for its truth or falsity), it was strictly speaking meaningless' (Levinson,
1983:227).
To Strawson, who takes a triadic approach to meaning, the problem Russell faces is not a
problem. To Strawson, only a sentence as a token which is uttered, i.e., a statement, can
be true or false, and a sentence as a type can never be true or false. When a speaker utters
a sentence as a token, referring to a particular person by a certain expression and
predicating something of him, the statement the speaker makes by uttering the sentence is
true if the person the speaker refers to is of the type the speaker claims him to be. Some
of the statements made by uttering a sentence as a token are true and others are false. If the
speaker refers to someone who does not exist by uttering a sentence (as a token), the
statement he makes is neither true nor false. Since the truth and falsity of a statement
depends on whether the entity referred to is of the type which a speaker claims it to be, the
issues of truth and falsity simply do not occur if a speaker fails to refer to a person. So
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Strawson concludes that the sentence (as a type) like 'The present king of France is bald'
presupposes that there is a king of France, and therefore, if there isn't a king of France,
the sentence (as a token) is truth-valueless.
Strawson (1950) gives an account for what Russell (1957) calls the issue of egocentricity.
The sentence (as a type) 'The king of France is wise' represents a type of state of affairs
where there is a king of France (which is presupposed) and he is of a type wise. Uttering
the sentence (as a token), people make different assertions at different times in history,
and some of them are true and others are false. When a sentence (as a token) is uttered
when there is no king of France, a sentence (as a token) is neither true nor false. This
account is, however, not very different from Russell (1905). Russell uses terms 'true' and
'false' as a technical term to explain a relation between a sentence (as a type) and a state of
affairs, which is generally accepted now. While Strawson says that 'The king of France is
bald' represents a type of state of affairs where there is a king of France (which is
presupposed) and he is of a type bald, Russell (1905) says 'The king of France is bald'
expresses a complex kind of existential proposition, where (i) there is a king of France,
(ii) there is not more than one king of France, and (iii) there is nothing which is king of
France and is not bald.
Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950) emphasise different aspects of meaning. For Russell,
who was engaged in describing true and false propositions throughout his life, the
sentence 'The king of France is bald' (when there isn't a king of France) is false because
there isn't a state of affairs which makes the sentence true. For Strawson, who was
engaged in describing how language users use a sentence to express a meaning, the
sentence, 'The king of France is wise' (when there isn't a king of France) is neither true
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nor false. A speaker fails to refer to a person and, therefore, the speaker cannot go far
enough to make a true or false assertion about the referent.
To emphasise the issue of the description, Russell (1957) presents sentences (as a type) in
which referring to an entity by the expression is impossible in any time in history and in
any place in the world. It is not possible for a speaker to refer to an entity by 'the square
root of minus one' because there is no such thing, and, therefore, the statements made by
uttering tokens of the sentence cannot be true. Strawson can still say that statements made
by uttering sentences like the one in (4) are neither true nor false: if a speaker fails to refer
to an entity, the speaker cannot go far enough to make a true or false assertion of the
referent.
Russell tried to describe true and false propositions rigidly by using a relation between
sentences and (types of) states of affairs, where he uses the terms of 'truth' and 'false' as
a technical term:
Everybody admits that physics and chemistry and medicine each require a language which is not that of
every day life. I fail to see why philosophy, alone, should be forbidden to make a similar approach towards
precision and accuracy (Russell, 1957: 336).
Russell managed to describe meanings of sentences abstracting away from language users
and each case of language use. Strawson thought that a relation between the proposition a
sentence expresses and a particular type of state of affairs must be based on the pre-
theoretic judgment of truth or falsity. However, it was not the case with Russell.
Mr Strawson gives the name 'S' to the sentence 'The King of France is wise', and he says to me 'The way
in which he arrived at the analysis was clearly asking himself what would be the circumstances in which
we would say that anyone who uttered the sentence S had made a true assertion'. This does not seem to me
a correct account of what I was doing. Suppose (which God forbid) Mr. Strawson were so rash as to accuse
his char-lady of thieving: she would reply indignantly, "I ain't never done no harm to no one". ... I was
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concerned to find a more accurate and analysed thought to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which
most people at most times have in their heads (1957: 336-337).
Russell (1957) claims that, if we analyse meaning in a triadic relation among a speaker and
a hearer, sentences, and states of affairs in the world, we cannot analyse meaning
accurately. I am not convinced by that. Meanings develop through use. Meanings are
determined by the use in communication. As Wittgenstein (1958) says, 'meaning is use'.
If we exclude language use from the theory of meaning, we cannot get a real picture of
meaning. We have to find a way to describe meanings in a triadic relation without
compromising accuracy.
2.2.2 Tarski's concept of truth
Like Russell, Tarski believes that a rigid language is necessary to define and describe
issues such as truth. Tarski (1944:585) says:
The problem of the definition of truth obtains a precise meaning and can be solved in a rigorous way only
for those languages whose structure has been exactly specifiedFor other languages—thus, for all natural,
'spoken' languages—the meaning of the problem is more or less vague, and its solution can have only an
approximate character.
Therefore, Tarski (1944) defines truth in the following way:
(T) X is true if, and only if, p.
We shall call any such equivalence (with '/?' replaced by any sentence of the language to which the word
'true' refers, and 'X' replaced by a name of this sentence) an 'equivalence of the form (T)'. ... It should be
emphasised that neither the expression (T) itself (which is not a sentence, but only a schema of a sentence)
nor any particular instance of the form (T) can be regarded as a definition of truth (Tarski, 1944:582).
2Italicised by Tarski (1944).
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A very precise conception of truth is embodied in (T), which is the so-called
correspondence theory. According to the theory, X is true if and only if it denotes or
refers to a state of affairs,/?, which actually obtains. Consider Tarski's standard example:
(5) 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.
The phrase 'Snow is white' on the left side of this equivalence in quotation marks belongs
to an object language and the one on the right without quotation marks belongs to meta¬
language. The sentence of an object language 'Snow is white' is true if and only if 'snow'
designates snow and snow satisfies the sentential function, 'x is white'.
In Tarski's theoretical framework, falsity, with which Russell struggled, does not cause
any problem. The sentence, 'Snow is white' is false when 'snow' designates snow but it
does not satisfy the sentential function, 'x is white'. For example, if 'snow' designates
snow and it satisfies the function, 'x is pink', not 'x is white', then the sentence 'Snow is
white' is false.
A true proposition is correspondence with reality and that a false proposition is not. ... the truth of a
proposition depends upon the existence or reality of something outside the language or system in which
the proposition is formulated (Lyons, 1977b: 168).
Because Tarski hypothesises 'the existence or reality of something outside the language or
system', truth and falsity are defined successfully in terms of sentences and the reality.
Tarski's theory has a problem of regress, because he uses the term 'object language' and
'meta-language' in a relative sense.
It should be noticed that these terms 'object-language' and 'meta-language' have only a relative sense. If,
for instance, we become interested in the notion of truth applying to sentences, not of our original object-
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language, but of its meta-language, the latter becomes automatically the object-language of our discussion:
and in order to define truth for this language, we have to go to a new meta-language—so to speak, to a
meta-language of a higher level. In this way, we arrive at a whole hierarchy of languages (Tarski,
1944:597-588).
Although Tarski does not think that a hierarchy of languages is a problem, it is a problem.
A formula such as, 'X (in LI) is true if and only if X' (in L2)', and 'X' (in L2) is true if
and only if X" (in L3)', and 'X" (in L3) is true if and only if X"'(in L4)', does not
explain the nature of X unless the relations between an object language and a meta¬
language (such as LI and L2) and between meta-languages (such as L2 and L3) are clearly
specified. This problem was solved by Tarski's followers such as Montague.
Before we close this section, Montague's theory should be mentioned. In Montague
(1970)'s, what we call sentences as types is clearly distinguished from what we call
sentences as tokens. In Montague:
... logical relations hold not only between what W. V. Quine is accustomed to call 'eternal sentence'^, i.e.
sentences the meaning of whose utterance does not depend, in general, upon the context and cotext in
which they were uttered ..., but also between certain sentences that are context-dependent (indexical) (Bar-
Hillel, 1970: 211).
For example, the meaning of the sentence (as a type) 'Alice is thirsty' is defined as a type
of state of affairs where there is an entity who is the bearer of the name 'Alice', and the
entity satisfies the function 'x is thirsty'. This meaning of the sentence (as a type) is
context-independent. The sentence (as a token), 'Alice is thirsty', on the other hand, can
be uttered by different speakers to refer to different individuals at different times and
places. The sentence (as a token), 'Alice is thirsty' is true when an entity referred to by
'Alice' satisfies 'x is thirsty'. For example, when my friend, Alice, who is a regular
runner, goes out for a run and comes back, the sentence (as a token) where Alice is
3 See, e.g. Quine (1960: 193f).
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referred to by 'Alice', is true, because she is thirsty. At another time, the sentence (as a
type) is false: when Alice and I are having a drink at home, the sentence (as a token),
'Alice is thirsty' is false, because she is not thirsty.
Montague does not exclude a speaker and a hearer from his theory. As the concept of
'index' shows, Montague hypothesises that sentences are uttered at a specific time and
place, where a particular individual is referred to and something of her/him/it is predicated.
As we explained above, to hypothesise a sentence (as a token), i.e., an utterance, whose
meaning is context-dependent, one has to hypothesise that a speaker utters it to a hearer: it
is because a sentence (as a token), i.e., an utterance, does not come into existence without
someone who utters it. It is only sentences as a type which do not have to be uttered.
In formal semantics which adopts the correspondence theory of truth, 'prepositional
contents' are clearly distinguished from 'propositions'4: a sentence (as a type) expresses a
type of state of affairs, which is a prepositional content; a sentence (as a token) expresses
a particular state of affairs, where a particular person is referred to and something of him
is predicated, which is a proposition. In our triadic approach, we say that a sentence (as a
type) expresses a type of state of affairs (a prepositional content) and a speaker utters a
sentence (as a type) to a hearer, referring to a particular person and describing something
of him: the speaker expresses a proposition.
2.3 Triadic Approach to Sentence Meaning
In the preceding section, we suggested that we can analyse truth-conditional meanings
triadically hypothesising a speaker and a hearer, without conflicting too much with the
4 See Cann (1993: 14, 19).
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framework of truth-conditional theories. However, there is a crucial difference between
the proponents of the dyadic approach to meaning and those of the triadic approach to
meaning. Truth-conditional semanticists believe that a sentence meaning is exhausted by
its truth-conditions, while the proponents of the triadic approach to meaning believe that
truth-conditional meaning is not the only type of meaning which can be expressed by a
sentence. In the following section, we explain Austin's speech act theory (2.3.1) and
Austin's model of meaning (2.3.2 and 2.3.3).
2.3.1 Austin's Speech Act Theory
Austin (1962) first introduces performative sentences as a special type of sentence which
cannot be true or false in a straightforward sense. This type of sentence makes a contrast
to constative sentences which are true or false. Austin (1962) later abolishes the distinction
between perfomatives and constatives, because a speaker performs a speech act in uttering
a constative sentence as well as uttering a performative sentence. This is a very crucial step
in Speech Act Theory. The speaker promises something by uttering the sentence in (6):
(6) I promise to be there by 6 o'clock.
The speaker makes an assertion about the weather in Tokyo by uttering the sentence in (7):
(7) It is hot in Tokyo.
In both cases, the speaker does things by saying something. Austin (1962) describes both
types of meaning as illocutionary acts. Austin (1962) does not show how 'performative'
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sentences are different from 'constative' sentences in his extended idea of speech acts,
i.e., illocutionary acts. However, considering Austin (1950) and Austin (1953), which we
will show in the following sections (2.3.2 and 2.3.3), we can explain the difference in
terms of referring and describing. When a speaker utters a 'performative' sentence, the
speaker refers to the act which is brought out by the very act of referring and describing it.
When a speaker utters a 'constative' sentence, on the other hand, a speaker refers to a
thing in the world and describes it, where referring/describing does not affect how the
thing is in the world. If we interpret 'constative' and 'performative' sentences in this way,
Austin's model of illocutionary acts can be incorporated into the models of philosophers
and logicians where meanings are described in terms of referring and predicating. Austin
(1962) shows that just as an entity in the world is referred to and predicated, so can the
action a speaker is doing to a hearer in the speech situation be 'referred to' and described.
We will develop this idea in Chapter 4 (4.4.1).
It is generally accepted that Searle (1969) developed Austin (1962)'s Speech Act Theory.
We, however, claim that Searle (1969) misrepresents Austin (1962)'s theory. Austin's
theory was driven by the conviction that language users use a language to express
different types of meaning, not only truth-conditional meanings. To describe these
different types of meaning, Austin needs a concept of 'acts': by using it, Austin (1962)
shows that language users use language to express different types of meaning. Owing to
the concept of acts, meaning is successfully described triadically: the fact that a speaker
communicates with a hearer using a language is successfully described in the model where
a speaker performs a speech act to a hearer about the world by using a language (by
uttering a sentence). In this framework, to analyse meaning is to describe linguistic
conventions by which a speaker performs different types of speech act to a hearer about
the world.
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However, in Searle (1969), a speaker and a hearer are not emphasised as much as they
should be, and therefore meaning is not described triadically. Searle (1969) focuses on
describing sentence meaning by classifying sentences according to the types of speech act
a speaker can perform by uttering them. Therefore, Searle essentially describes the relation
between sentences and potential speech acts which can be performed by uttering the
sentences, i.e., illocutionary forces, abstracting away from a speaker who performs a
speech act and a hearer to whom a speech act is performed. This is why Searle (1969)'s
Speech Act Theory does not serve to explain how a speaker communicates with a hearer
by using a language. In this way, Searle (1969) misrepresents Austin (1962)'s Speech Act
Theory. We will come back to this point in 4.4.2.
2.3.2 Austin's demonstrative and descriptive conventions
Austin (1950) presents a general model of meaning and communication. According to the
model, two sets of conventions, together with a stock of symbols and the world,
comprise communication.
If there is to be communication of the sort that we achieve by language at all, there must be a stock of
symbols of some kind which a communicator ('the speaker') can produce 'at will' and which a
communicatee ('the audience') can observe: these may be called 'words' ... There must also be something
other than the words, which the words are to be used to communicate about: this may be called the
'world'. ... And finally there must be two sets of conventions:
Descriptive conventions correlating the words (= sentences) with the types of situation, thing,
event, &c., to be found in the world.
Demonstrative conventions correlating the words (= statements) with the historic situations,
&c., to be found in the world (Austin, 1950: 121-2).
Let us explain the two types of conventions, and types of situation and historic situations
correlated by the two types of convention. The distinction between 'the words (=
sentences) which are correlated by descriptive conventions with types of situation, thing,
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event, &c.\ and 'the words (= statements) which are correlated by demonstrative
conventions with the historic situations, & c.', is like the distinction between sentences as
types and sentences as tokens. The aspect of the meanings of sentences correlated by
descriptive conventions express types of situation. For example, 'the cat is on the mat'
expresses a type of situation where there is a cat and it is on the mat, where it matters how
this type of situation differs from other types of situation, such as 'the dog is on the mat',
'the cat is under the mat' or 'the cat isn't on the mat', and so on. Since it is a type that this
aspect of the meaning of the sentence relates to, questions such as 'Which cat do you
mean?', and 'Where is the mat?' are not relevant to this aspect of meaning.
We use sentences to make a specific claim about the world. Owing to the demonstrative
conventions, we can talk about a specific situation, thing, event, and so on, by uttering the
sentence. In this case we talk about not a type of situation but a specific, actual situation
which is at a particular time and place; a historic situation. I have used the sentence, 'the
cat is on the mat', many times in my life to make different statements. Often I utter it in
referring to my landlady's cat, Silver, and state that the cat is on the mat, which happens
to be a green and blue Persian mat my landlady bought at the flea market. By uttering the
sentence, 'the cat is on the mat', I refer to a historic situation at a particular time and place
where Silver is (owing to demonstrative conventions) and state/assert that it is of the type
of situation which is correlated (by descriptive conventions) with the sentence, 'the cat is
on the mat'.
Austin (1950) admits that some words can be used for both a particular entity or situation
and a type of entity or situation:
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The trouble is that sentences contain words or verbal devices to serve both descriptive and demonstrative
purposes (not to mention other purposes), often both at once (Austin, 1950: 122n).
For example, the word 'dog' is correlated with a type of entity which is canine but it is
also used for a particular entity which is of the type. The word 'she' is correlated with a
particular third-person which has been introduced or is salient in the speech situation, and
a type of feminine is also attached to it. It seems that most words are either dominantly
correlated with a particular entity (or situation) and, to a much lessor degree, correlated
with a type of entity (or situation), or dominantly correlated with a type of entity (or
situation), and, to a much lessor degree, correlated with a particular entity (or situation).
According to Austin (1950: 122):
... a statement is said to be true when the historic situation which is correlated by the demonstrative
conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is
correlated by the descriptive conventions.
In the above example, my statement, 'the cat is on the mat' is true when the historic
situation (where Silver is) which is correlated (referred to) by the demonstrative
conventions is of a type with which the sentence 'the cat is on the mat' is correlated by the
descriptive conventions.
This is a new interpretation of 'true/truth'. 'Truth' is not a relation between a sentence (as
a type) and a state of affairs as Russell claimed, but a relation between a sentence which
represents a type of state of affairs and an actual state of affairs in the historic situation a
speaker describes. The statement is true if an actual state of affairs in the historic situation
which (correlated by demonstrative conventions) a speaker refers to is of the type (of
situation) which is correlated by descriptive conventions. As Austin (1950) points out, we
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fail to see the difference between an actual state of affairs in the historic situation a speaker
describes by uttering the sentence, and the type of state of affairs the sentence stands for,
especially when the actual state of affairs in the historic situation is of the type the sentence
stands for. However, the fact that I have a pain in my stomach can never be the same as
saying 'I have (Etsuko has) a pain in my(/her) stomach', even though the actual state of
affairs is of the type the sentence stands for. Uttering a sentence, a speaker refers to a
historic situation and states/asserts to a hearer that an actual state of affairs in the historic
situation is of the type which the sentence stands for.
Because we are interested in aspects of meaning that involve referring to factors of the
speech situation, we will adopt Austin's theory of meaning in this thesis.
2.3.3 Austin's model of communication in Speech-situation So
In this section, we will introduce Austin (1953). Austin claims that even uttering a
sentence as simple as 'X is Y\ a speaker can potentially perform four types of speech
acts. To explain basic speech acts Austin (1953) hypothesises what he calls 'Speech-
situation S0'- a simplified model of a situation in which we use a language for talking
about the world. In S0, the world consists of numerous individual items and each is of
one definite type. Imagine the world consisting of numerous colour patches of the same
pure red, the same pure blue or the same pure yellow, each of which has a number applied
to it. Or imagine the world consisting of numerous pieces of paper in the shape of the
same triangle, the same oval or the same rhombus, each of which has a number applied to
it. The language in S0 permits only sentences of one form S:
(8) I is a T,
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where 'I' stands for an item and 'T' stands for a type. The language contains an indefinite
number of words inserted in the place of the 'I' or the 'T' in form S. Each of these words
is either an I-word or a T-word in the language. For example, the following sentence is a
grammatical sentence in the language:
(9) 1227 is a rhombus.
There are also two sets of semantic conventions. One is an I-convention, or a convention
of reference, which fixes the item to which an I-word is to refer. The other is a T-
convention, or a convention of sense, which correlates a T-word with the item-type5.
We may inaugurate T-conventions by one or other of two procedures of linguistic
legislation: name-giving and sense-giving. Name-giving consists in allotting a certain
word to a certain item-type as its 'name'6. Sense-giving consists in allotting a certain item-
type to a certain word as its 'sense'. For example, we might give a word 'dog' to an item-
type which is a canine as its 'name'. This is name-giving because the name 'dog' is given
to the item-type. We might give an item-type, 'an animal of canine type', to the word
'dog' as its sense. This is sense-giving because the sense, 'an animal of the canine type',
is given to the word7.
When either procedure has been gone through, a specific type is attached by convention to
a certain word, i.e., a T-word, and its 'name' as the 'sense' of that word. Then a
5 I-conventions are simplified demonstrative conventions and T-conventions are simplified descriptive
conventions (Austin, 1950).
6The usage of name in Austin (1953) is not the standard usage of the word. We more often use the word to
mean a proper name. It is a little confusing to use name or name-giving in Austin's sense. We, however,
use the word in Austin (1953)'s original sense to explain his model of communication.
7 These examples are not original examples from Austin (1953).
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satisfactory utterance (assertive) on any particular occasion will be one where the item
referred to by the I-word (in accordance with the I-conventions) is of the type which
matches the sense which is attached to the T-word (by the T-conventions).
Austin (1953) distinguishes four different speech acts, which are performed by the whole
utterance of an assertion in the Speech-situation Sa: placing (c-identifying or cap-fitting),
stating, casting (b-identifying or bill-filling), and instancing. How does this complexity
arise? There is first a difference in direction of fit between fitting a name to an item and
fitting an item to a name. The differences of fit here are as different as fitting a nut with a
bolt and fitting a bolt with a nut. We may be given an item, and purport to produce a name
with a sense which matches the type. Conversely, we may be given a name and purport to
produce an item of a type which matches the sense of that name. There is also another
distinction to be drawn. We fit the name to the item or the item to the name on the grounds
that the type of the item and the sense of the name match. But in matching X and Y, there
is a distinction between matching X to Y and matching Y to X. Austin calls this the
difference in the onus of match.
These two distinctions generate four different performances in uttering the sentence, '1227
is a rhombus'. To explain first the choice of terms, we use the useful word identify in two
opposite ways. We may speak of 'identifying it (as a daphnia)' when you hand something
to me and ask me if I can identify it. We also speak of 'identifying a daphnia (or the
'identifying the daphnia') when you hand me a slide and ask me if I can identify a daphnia
(or the daphnia) in it. In the first case we are finding a cap to fit a given object: hence the
name 'cap-fitting' or 'c-identifying'. In other words, we are trying to 'place' it. But in the
second case we are trying to find an object to fill a given bill: hence the name 'b-
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identifying' or 'bill-filling'. In other words, we 'cast' this thing as the daphnia. We will
explain the terms 'stating' and 'instancing' in the following.
Placing and stating have the same direction of fit, i.e., fitting names to given items. Also
instancing and casting have the same direction of fit, i.e., fitting items to given names.
Placing and instancing have the same onus of match: the type of the item is taken for
granted and the question might be whether the sense of the T-word is such as really to
match it. In both stating and casting the sense of the T-word is taken for granted and the
question might be whether the type of the item is really such as to match it.
We will explain each of these speech acts, stating, placing, casting, and instancing. Let us
start from the act of stating. Imagine someone asks: 'what is 1227?'. The speaker asks
himself what item-type this item has.
Uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker refers to the item by '1227' and asserts that it is
of the type on the right, which is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense. If
someone disagrees with the speaker, the point of the dispute is that 1227 is not of this
item-type but of another item-type.
(10)
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When a speaker performs a speech act of placing by uttering the sentence in (9), the
speaker refers to an item-type, not an item, by '1227' and, the question is: what T-word is
correlated with this item-type, as in (11):
The speaker asserts that the word which is correlated with the item-type as its sense is
'rhombus'. If someone disputes the speaker, the point of the dispute is that it is not the
word, 'rhombus', but the word, say, 'square', which is correlated with the item-type as
its sense.
When a speaker performs a speech act of stating or placing, the direction of fit is
producing a T-word to match the given item or item-type. In the act of casting and
instancing, however, the direction of fit is the opposite: the speaker produces an item to
match the given T-word. Let us start from casting. If someone asks: 'what is a
rhombus?', the speaker asks himself what item-type is correlated with the T-word




By uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker asserts that the item-type which is correlated
with the word 'rhombus' as its sense is the diagram on the right, which is referred to by
' 1227'. If someone disputes the speaker, the point of dispute is that it is not the item-type
shown in the diagram on the right in (12) above, but another item-type (say, the one on
the diagram on the left) that is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense.
The last one is a speech act of instancing. Imagine someone asks the speaker, 'Which is a
rhombus?' By uttering the sentence in (9), the speaker refers to an item by '1227' as the
one with an item-type which is correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense. If
someone disputes with the speaker, the point of disputes is that it is not the item, which is
referred to by '1227', but another item (say, the one which is referred to by '3327') that
has the item-type correlated with the word 'rhombus' as its sense.
Austin (1953) restates these four speech acts as follows:
To state we have to find a pattern to match this sample to.
To place we have to find a pattern to match to this sample.
To cast we have to find a sample to match to this pattern.
To instance we have to find a sample to match this pattern to.
Since Austin (1953) does not clarify these four types of speech act any further, let us try
to clarify them in the following diagram.
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'1227 is a rhombus'
A particular individual is described
stating
(answer to: 'What is 1227?')
instancing
(answer to: 'Which is a rhombus?)
A particular attribute is described
placing
From subject to predicate
casting From predicate to subject
(answer to: 'What is a rhombus?')
In 'real life' we are in a more complicated speech situation than Speech-situation S0, but
one of the important implications is that by using a referring expression, a speaker refers
to an entity (in the case of the speech act of stating and that of instancing) and also to the
type of entity (in the case of the speech act of placing and that of casting). For example,
when a speaker utters the following sentence:
(14) The cat is a friendly animal,
the speaker can refer to a particular entity by 'the cat', and assert that the item-type this
entity has is of a type which is correlated with the words 'friendly animal' (a speech act of
stating). Uttering the same sentence, a speaker can also refer to the type, CAT, by 'the
cat', and assert that the type is correlated with the words 'friendly animal' (as a speech act
ofplacing). The sentence, 'The cat is a friendly animal' when it is uttered to perform the
act ofplacing, is usually called a generic sentence. What a speaker refers to by 'the cat' is
the type of character which is applicable to the majority of individuals which are cats.
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It does not seem to be the case that by uttering any sentence of the form of 'X is a Y\ a
speaker can perform four different types of speech act. For example, uttering the
following sentence, a speaker can perform the act of stating, but it does not seem to be
possible for the speaker to perform the act ofplacing:
(15) John is a philosopher.
In the act of stating, a speaker refers to a particular individual by 'John', and asserts that
the item-type this individual has is of the type which is correlated with the word
'philosopher' as its sense, i.e. the type PHILOSOPHER. However, it does not seem to be
possible that a speaker refers to an item-type by 'John' and asserts that the item-type is
correlated with the word 'philosopher'. Although 'the cat' (14) expresses not only a
particular individual but the item-type which is the attribute that applies to the majority of
individuals which are cats, 'John' only expresses an individual who is the bearer of the
name 'John'. It is most probably because there is no item-type which is the attribute that
applies to the majority of individuals who are bearers of the name 'John'8. It is generally
true that the majority of individuals who are bearers of the name 'John' are male
Westerners, but this is not the characteristics of the people who are John, but the
characteristics of the name 'John': the name 'John' is mostly given to male Westerners.
We will describe sentence meaning in Chapter 3 using Austin's two types of convention
(Austin, 1950) and different types of speech act (Austin, 1953).
8 Kripke (1972) says that proper names are 'rigid designators'.
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2.4 Linguists who are in between Russell and Tarski, and
Austin and Strawson
Many linguists (as well as philosophers) are influenced by both the Russellian and
Tarskian concepts of truth, and the Austinian and Strawsonian concepts of truth. In this
section, we describe how those linguists develop referring theories using Russellian and
Tarskian, and Austinian and Strawsonian concepts of truth. In 2.4.1, we discuss Lyons
(1977b) and in 2.4.2, we discuss early Situation Semantics.
2.4.1 Lyons' concept of referring
Lyons (1977b)'s definition of reference is based on Strawson (1950), but he also follows
Russell (1905). Lyons follows Strawson (1950) in that it is a speaker, not an expression,
who refers to an entity:
It should be noted that, according to this conception of the relation of reference, it is the speaker who refers
(by using some appropriate expression): he invests the expression with reference by the act of referring
(Lyons, 1977b: 177).
Lyons, like Strawson, uses the term 'sentence' in the sense of sentence as a token, and, as
we will describe below, describes clearly the context-dependent nature of the act of
referring. However, for terminological convenience, Lyons allows the following way of
saying: 'an expression refers to its referent (when the expression is used on some
particular occasion and satisfies the relevant conditions)' (Lyons, 1977b:177)9.
9It is, however, doubtful whether terminological convenience is good enough a reason to allow this usage
of reference. It is, at least, misleading.
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Lyons (1977b)'s contribution to the description of the nature of reference/referring
concerns two points. The first point concerns the existence of a referent. In Russell
(1905), the existence of a king of France is entailed, and, therefore, the non-existence of a
king of France makes false any utterance made by uttering the sentence, 'The king of
France is bald'. In Strawson (1950), the existence of a king of France is presupposed
and, therefore, a speaker must believe the existence of a king of France. However, Lyons
(1977b) claims that the existence of a king of France or even the speaker's belief in it is
not a necessary condition for a statement to be true. We can refer to, say, characters in
fictions. It is quite possible for the following statement to be true, even though Sherlock
Holmes' wife did not exist and a speaker does not believe that Sherlock Holmes' wife
existed:
(16) Sherlock Holmes' wife went to school with my great-grandmother10.
Existence is a tricky concept, as Lyons admits. It depends on the definition of existence as
to whether Sherlock Holmes' wife existed or not. However, the interesting point is that
there is something which is not exactly an actual entity but not an entity-type (item-type in
Austin (1953)), either. Characters in novels are not real people, and, in that sense, they do
not exist. However, they are not purely types, i.e., they do not represent types, such as
DOG, BACHELOR, or CHILDREN FROM MIDDLE-CLASS FAMILIES.
The second point concerns the context-dependent nature of referring. In Russell (1905), to
utter the sentence, 'The king of France is bald' is to mean that there is not more than one
king of France. However, Lyons (1977b: 184) claims that, when someone utters the
following sentence:
10 See McPherson (19%: 199).
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(17) The cat has not been in all day,
he is by no means committed to the belief that there is only one individual that he can refer
to by means of the expression, 'the cat'. According to Lyons, the speaker assumes that he
will be understood to be referring to a definite individual and that the description he offers
will be sufficiently specific, in the given context, to identify uniquely for the hearer the
referent the speaker has in mind.
Therefore, Lyons (1977b: 184) concludes that referring is relative to context. Lyons also
claims that proper names are like definite descriptions, because they may be borne by
several individuals, and, therefore, their uniqueness of reference is also relative to context.
And so are the expressions like 'the Pope'. This is a very important point. It is true that
when we refer to an entity as something unique, we assume that the entity is unique
enough in the present speech situation, but not that it is unique in every speech situation.
Lyons (1977b) gives a new interpretation of the concept of referring. In Russell (1905)
referring to an individual by a certain expression expresses that the individual who is
correctly referred to by the expression exists. In Strawson (1950), to refer to an individual
by a certain expression is for a speaker to select an individual who is correctly referred to
by that expression. In Lyons (1977b), to refer to an individual by a certain expression is
to select an individual who is correctly and/or successfully referred to by the expression:
If a distinction is drawn between correct reference and successful reference, one can perhaps maintain the
general principle that we can refer correctly to an individual by means of a definite description only if the
description is true of the individual in question. But successful reference does not depend upon the truth of
the description contained in the referring expression. The speaker (and perhaps also the hearer) may
mistakenly believe that some person is the postman, when he is in fact the professor of linguistics, and
incorrectly, though successfully refer to him by means of the expression 'the postman' (Lyons,
1977b(vol. 1): 181-2).
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Correct and incorrect referring, which is explicated in Strawson (1950), depends on
whether or not a speaker selects an individual by an expression which is true of the
individual. For example, the individual has a type, as in 'the gentleman' or 'the Prime
Minister', or the individual is the bearer of a name, as in 'John'. Successful and
unsuccessful referring depends on whether or not a speaker can select an individual by a
certain referring expression so that the hearer can identify the individual. Correct referring
can be unsuccessful when a speaker selects an individual by the expression which is true
of the individual but is not specific enough for the hearer to identify the individual. For
example, if a speaker refers to an individual by 'the gentleman' when the room is full of
gentlemen, most probably referring is correct but unsuccessful: the hearer would ask:
'Which one?'.
Incorrect referring can be successful when a speaker selects an individual by an
expression which is not exactly true of the individual but near enough, or by the name
which is not exactly the name of the individual but near enough, and the hearer manages to
identify the individual. Imagine a speaker referring to an individual by 'the man over there
with the champagne in his glass', though he actually only has water in his glass.
Now, even though there is no champagne is his glass, and there may be another man in the room who
does have champagne in his glass, the speaker intended to refer, or maybe, in some sense of 'refer', tSd
refer, to the man he thought had the champagne in his glass (Kripke, 1972: 25).
In this case, it is more than possible that referring is incorrect but, nevertheless,
successful: the hearer can identify the individual. Imagine also a speaker referring to an
individual who is the bearer of the Japanese girl's name 'Yuko' by 'Yucca'. Since they
sound similar, the hearer could identify the individual: referring is incorrect but
successful.
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In Chapter 3, we will describe the issue of referring at full length.
2.4.2 Early Situation Semantics: Austinian Truth
Early Situation Semantics is based on the wider concept of truth, by adopting Austin
(1950)'s concept of truth, which we explained in 2.3.2 above. Barwise and Perry (1983)
say:
Suppose my wife and I collaborate on cooking for a party. And suppose that at a certain point in the party
I say, 'I am the cook', referring to /. Is what I have said true or not? The answer is, 'It depends on which
situation I am describing' (Barwise and Perry, 1983: 159).
Situation Semantics, following Austin (1950), provides the interpretation that a statement
is true when the historic situation sa which the statement is about, is a type of situation TA.
According to Russell, the truth of a sentence, 'x is y', is that there is an entity which is
correctly picked out by the referring expression, 'x', and the entity is of the type y.
According to Austin, on the other hand, the truth of a sentence, 'x is y', is that the historic
situation which is correlated (by demonstrative conventions) with the statement is of a type
which is correlated (by descriptive conventions) with the sentence. Situation Semantics
hypothesises that a historic situation and a type of situation are two components of a
proposition.
While Austin did not use the term 'proposition', it seems in the spirit of his account to identify what we
will call the Austinian proposition expressed by A with the claim that situation sa is of type TA, and to
individuate such a proposition by its two components, the situation referred to and the type of situation it
is claimed to be. We call the first component the situation the proposition is about, About (p), and the
second component the proposition's constituent type, Type (p) (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987: 29).
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A type of situation TA is identified with a Russellian proposition: there is an entity x and it
is of a type y. In addition to Russellian propositions, Situation Semantics hypothesises
propositions which 'contain an additional contextually determined feature, namely, the
situation they are about' (Barwise & Etchemendy, 1987: 29), i.e., sa- They call this type
of proposition Austinian propositions.
As we explained in 2.3.2, Austin (1950) hypothesises a speaker and a hearer: a speaker
refers to a historic situation (by demonstrative conventions) and describes the state of
affairs there by assigning a certain type to it (by descriptive conventions). The state of
affairs in the historic situation is independent of the type assigned to it. For example, that I
have a pain in my stomach is independent ofmy describing it by assigning a type to it by
saying, 'I have a pain in my stomach' or 'I have a stomach-ache'. The actual state of
affairs in the historic situation, i.e., my having a pain in my stomach is only
conventionally correlated with the type of state of affairs expressed by the sentence, 'I
have a pain in my stomach' or 'I have a stomach-ache', which is independent of a
particular use.
Since a speaker and a hearer are not hypothesised in Situation Semantics, it claims that
propositions include both a state of affairs in the historic situation ('an additional
contextually determined feature') and a type of state of affairs. This is a difficult view:
something is about a particular and, at the same time, it is a type which is independent of
each instance.
It does not seem to be possible to explain the Austinian 'truth' without hypothesising a
speaker who refers to a state of affairs in a particular historic situation and connects it to a
type of state of affairs. However, the intention behind not hypothesising a speaker (and a
65
hearer) is obvious: Situation Semanticists wants to analyse historic (or actual) situations as
an issue of propositions, not as an issue of language use. Because of this, Situation
Semantics allows sentences to be sentences as types and sentences as tokens (i.e.
utterances) at the same time. For example, the sentence 'Etsuko had a good party on 17th
August' expresses a type of situation where there is a person who is a bearer of the name
Etsuko and she did an action which is of a type have a good party (Russellian
proposition), and also a past historic situation on 17th August where /, Etsuko Oishi,
existed and I had a good party (Austinian proposition). This is a difficult view, because
the sentence, 'Etsuko had a good party on 17th August', expresses a type of situation
which is not correlated with a particular instance, and at the same time expresses a
particular historic situation.
The contribution early Situation Semantics has made is to make it clear that the truth or
falsity of a speaker's statement depends on which historic situation the speaker refers to.
Just as we cannot decide whether the statement the speaker makes is true or false unless
we know which individual the speaker refers to by, say, 'John', we cannot decide
whether the statement the speaker makes is true or false unless we know which situation
the speaker refers to/talks about by uttering, say, the sentence, 'it is very hot'. If the
speaker refers to the state of affairs in Tokyo on the 20th ofAugust, 1998, the statement is
true. If the speaker refers to the state of affairs in Edinburgh on the 20th of August, 1998,
it is not. This is an interesting claim about the nature of referring. However, to explain this
nature, it is necessary to hypothesise a speaker who connects a particular state of affairs
with a type of state of affairs. It is too unrealistic to hypothesise that a proposition by itself
expresses these two types of state of affairs.
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2.5 Another issue involving referring: Donnellan (1966)
There is another important claim about the nature of referring made by Donnellan (1966).
Donnellan (1966) distinguishes 'attributive use' from 'referential use' of definite
descriptions. By using a definite description, a speaker either refers to a particular actual
entity or whoever/whatever is of the description. Consider Donnellan's famous example:
(18) Smith's murderer is insane.
Donnellan (1966) explains the referential use of the description 'Smith's murderer' as
follows:
Suppose that Jones has been charged^ with Smith's murder .... Imagine that there is a discussion of
Jones's odd behaviour at his trial. We might sum up our impression of his behaviour by saying, 'Smith's
murderer is insane'(Donnellan 1966:103).
In the referential use of the definite description of 'Smith's murderer', a speaker refers to a
particular person, say, Jones, by 'Smith's murderer' and claims that he is of the type,
INSANE.
There is another use of the definite description of 'Smith's murderer', which Donnellan
(1966) calls the attributive use:
Suppose that we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing and the
fact that Smith was the most lovable person in the world, we might exclaim, 'Smith's murderer is insane'
(Donnellan 1966:102).
11 It is inappropriate to call Smith's murderer someone who has been charged with Smith's murder.
Presumably, Donnellan meant' ... Jones has been convicted of Smith's murder.'
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Donnellan's referential and attributive uses of the definite description show that we can
refer not only to a particular entity but also to a type of entity. The attributive use of
'Smith's murderer' is more clearly brought out by paraphrasing the sentence in (19) as:
(19) Whoever killed Smith is insane12.
Donnellan (1966) points out an interesting consequence when these two types of referring
fail. When the first type of referring, i.e. referential use, fails, the statement might still
hold, but when the second type of referring, i.e. attributive use, fails, the statement does
not hold. Suppose that the person who is referred to by 'Smith's murderer', i.e., Jones, is
in fact not Smith's murderer. It is incorrect referring in the sense of Lyons (1977b): the
entity is not Smith's murderer. However, it can be successful referring. Incorrect referring
can be successful when a speaker refers to an entity by the description which is not true
but close so that a hearer can identify the entity. If a hearer identifies the entity the speaker
intended to refer by 'Smith's murderer' and the entity is in fact of the type INSANE, the
statement the speaker makes by uttering the sentence in (18) is true.
However, the situation is different if referring to a type of entity, i.e. attributive use of the
definite description, fails. Suppose the police found out that Smith had killed himself. The
speaker then fails to refer to a type by 'Smith's murderer'. The type of person who kills a
lovable person in a brutal way cannot be referred to by 'Smith's murderer' because Smith
killed himself. As a consequence, the statement is about nothing. Russell would say the
sentence is false because a type referred to does not exist: this is a similar case to 'The
square root of minus one is half the square-root of minus four' (Russell, 1957). Strawson
12See Lyons (1977b: 185-186).
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would say that the sentence is neither true nor false because a speaker failed to refer to a
type and, therefore, cannot go far enough to describe it.
We will explain Donnellan's two types of use of a definite description in terms of two
types of speech act, i.e., the act of stating and the act ofplacing in Chapter 3 (3.3.1).
2.6 Conclusion
Russell and Strawson explained two different aspects of sentence meaning. Russell
explained successfully one aspect of sentence meaning, which concerns a type of state of
affairs. A sentence expresses a type of state of affairs, which is differentiated from other
types of state of affairs expressed by other sentences. The sentence, 'the cat is on the mat'
expresses a type of state of affairs, and more or less the same type of state of affairs can
be expressed by the Japanese sentence, 'neko ga matto no ue ni iru' (although Japanese
does not have a definite/indefinite article). This type of meaning is independent of a
particular use. That is, the sentence, 'the cat is on the mat', expresses the type of state of
affairs, which is not connected to a particular actual cat or situation. Russell used the term
'truth' to explain a relation between a sentence and a type of state of affairs.
Strawson explained another aspect of sentence meaning which concerns communication: a
speaker refers to a particular actual entity or situation and describes it by uttering the
sentence. When we utter the sentence, 'The cat is on the mat' typically we make a
statement/assertion about a particular actual entity in the particular actual situation. In this
case we connect 'the cat' to a particular actual entity which is a cat, and assert that it is in a
particular state, i.e., being on the mat.
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We can describe both aspects of meanings successfully by using Austin (1950)'s concept
of communication: a speaker refers to an entity or situation (by means of the demonstrative
conventions) and states/asserts that it is of a type (by means of the descriptive
conventions). The demonstrative conventions correlate words with a particular entity or
situation, and the descriptive conventions correlate words with types of entity or situation,
although the same words often serve for both purposes. In this framework, we can
describe the aspect of meaning which is about a particular entity or situation (which
Strawson tries to describe) and the aspect of meaning which is a type of entity or situation
which is not correlated with a particular instance of language use (which Russell tries to
describe). In addition, we can describe meaning in use: we describe meanings as what a
speaker expresses to a hearer by means of two types of linguistic convention.
In Chapter 3, we will develop Austin's model of communication into a workable model
for linguistic purposes. We will make clear the concepts of the demonstrative and
descriptive conventions by clarifying what types of word are correlated with a particular
entity or situation, or a type of entity or situation by the demonstrative and descriptive
conventions.
As Austin (1953) shows, the act of stating where a speaker refers to a particular entity (by
the demonstrative conventions) and states/asserts that it is of a certain type by assigning
the type to the entity (by descriptive conventions) is not the only type of speech act a
speaker can perform by uttering a type of sentence, 'x is a y\ We will also develop four
types of speech act in the following chapter.
As we have shown in the present chapter, meaning has different aspects. Philosophers
and linguists tend to explicate one aspect of it and develop the theory of meaning in
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general from it and try to explain everything in the theory. This does not seem to be a
realistic approach to meaning. The reason Austin's theory is attractive is that different
aspects of meanings are described as different types of speech act: using a language, i.e.,
linguistic conventions, a speaker performs to a hearer different types of speech act. In this
theoretical framework, by describing what types of speech act a speaker performs and




Demonstrative and Descriptive Conventions
3.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we developed the framework of the semantic theory where both
Russellian/Tarskian sentence meanings, i.e., truth-conditional meanings, and Strawsonian
sentence meanings, i.e., meanings by which a speaker makes an assertion about a specific
entity or situation, can be analysed. Following Austin (1950), we defined sentence
meaning as what a speaker expresses to a hearer by 'pointing to' (referring to) something
by means of the demonstrative conventions and describing it by means of the descriptive
conventions. In the present chapter, we will explain the demonstrative and descriptive
conventions, and describe how a speaker performs speech acts about entities and
situations by using them. In 3.2, we will explain the demonstrative conventions which
correlate words with entities (3.2.2) and the descriptive conventions which correlate
words with types of entity (3.2.3), and describe how a speaker performs an act about a
particular entity by using these conventions. In 3.3, we will discuss how a speaker
performs an act about a particular historic situation by means of these conventions. To
avoid confusion, we will only describe acts of stating in 3.2 and 3.3, and describe four
different types of speech act, i.e., stating, placing, casting, and instancing about entities
and situations in 3.4.
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3.2 Speech Acts about Entities
3.2.1 Demonstrative conventions
Austin defines the demonstrative conventions as follows:
Demonstrative conventions correlating the word (= statements) with the historic situations, &c., to be
found in the world (Austin, 1950:122).
Using these conventions, a speaker 'points to' an entity in the historic situation or a
historic situation itself so that a hearer can identify it. To 'point to' an entity is to refer to
him/her/it: for a speaker to 'point to' a particular entity by 'John' by uttering the sentence,
'John is a bachelor', is to refer to the entity by 'John'. Since there are cases where a
speaker 'points to' a particular historic situation, an attribute of a thing or situation, or a
speech situation he shares with the hearer, for which we cannot use the term 'refer to' in a
standard sense, we use the term 'point to' rather than 'refer to'. The slight problem is that
the usage is somewhat metaphorical, i.e., the speaker does not actually point to
something, but, by uttering words or sentences, the speaker specifies what he is talking
about as if he is physically pointing to it. However, since the term 'point to' does not
seem to be ambiguous or misleading, we use it throughout the present thesis. For
example, I 'point to' a particular entity, say, my friend Hideko, by an utterance of the
word 'Hideko' so that the hearer can identify her. Or I 'point to' a particular historic
situation, which is in Tokyo in the summer of 1998, by uttering the sentence, 'It is hot in
Tokyo', so that the hearer can identify it.
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3.2.2 Demonstrative conventions which concern 'pointing to' an
individual entity
One can talk about almost any entity in the world. The speaker can, for example, talk
about the entity which does not exist in the physical space shared by the speaker and the
hearer, the entity which does not exist in the world any more, or the entity which is not
visible. For example, by 'my brother', I can talk about my brother, who is in Japan, in the
conversation I have with my friend in Edinburgh. By 'Austin' I can talk about the late
philosopher. By 'the air in this room', I can talk about something invisible. To explain the
fact that the speaker can specify the entity she talks about by a word/words so that the
hearer can identify it, we hypothesise, as Austin did, the demonstrative conventions which
correlate words with entities in the world.
The fact that words/expressions are correlated with entities has been explained by the
concepts of reference/referring and denotation/denoting in both truth-conditional and other
theories of meaning, as we discussed in Chapter 2. There are different ways in which
words/expressions are correlated with entities. For example, (i) names are correlated with
the bearers of the names, (ii) demonstratives are correlated with people/objects which are
proximate to or distant from the speaker (or the hearer), (iii) personal pronouns are
correlated with the speaker, the hearer, or the third person(s), and (iv) descriptive
expressions are correlated with people/objects of certain types. This shows that words and
entities have different types of semantic relation. These different semantic relations can be
explained well by Austin's demonstrative conventions: words are correlated with entities
by the demonstrative conventions, and different types of word are correlated with entities
in different ways. By using these demonstrative conventions, a speaker specifies a
particular entity, and specifies it in a particular way.
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Although Austin never emphasised the hearer' role in his theory, we have to incorporate it
to explain how a speaker specifies a particular entity by means of the demonstrative
conventions. Even if the speaker follows the linguistic conventions which correlate a word
with an entity correctly, he cannot specify the entity by the word if the hearer cannot
identify it. Imagine the speaker 'pointing to' a particular person by 'John'. Even if the
speaker 'points to' this person following the linguistic conventions which correlate the
name with the bearer of the name correctly, i.e., 'John' is the person's name, the speaker
cannot specify this person when the hearer does not know the person's name. This
strongly suggests that the demonstrative conventions by which the speaker performs a
speech act about a particular entity to a hearer concern not only the relations between
words and entities but also the ways in which the speaker specifies the entity for the
hearer. To describe this, we will adopt the distinction between appropriate and
inappropriate 'pointing', as well as the distinction between correct and incorrect
'pointing'.
'Pointing' is correct when a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by the word which is
linguistically correlated with the entity. 'Pointing' is appropriate when a speaker 'points
to' a particular entity by the word so that the hearer can identify the entity, without making
the hearer uncomfortable. The distinction between correct and appropriate 'pointing' is
similar to Lyons (1977b)'s distinction between correct and successful referring, which we
discussed in 2.4.1: if an entity is referred to by an expression which is true of him/her/it,
referring is correct, and if the hearer identifies the entity described by the expression,
referring is successful. We use the terms appropriate/inappropriate rather than
successful/unsuccessful because we want to include a social aspect of 'pointing'
(referring). As we will explain in the following, there are cases where the hearer identifies
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the entity the speaker 'points to' by certain words, but is uncomfortable about the
speaker's 'pointing to' the entity by those words because of the social relation or the
shared information. We will describe these cases as inappropriate 'pointing'.
In the following, we will describe the demonstrative conventions by which a speaker
'points to' a particular entity by his/her/its name (3.2.2.1), a personal pronoun or a
demonstrative (3.2.2.2), and a descriptive expression (3.2.2.3). By describing correct
and appropriate 'pointing' for each, we will show (i) how each type of word is
linguistically correlated with the entity, and (ii) how the speaker specifies the entity by
each type of word in order for the hearer to identify it.
3.2.2.1 'Pointing to' an entity by name
One can 'point to' a particular entity by his/her/its name. Uttering the sentence, 'Sam is a
businessman', I can 'point to' a particular person, who is my friend in Scotland, by
correlating the name 'Sam' with him. 'Pointing to' a particular entity by name is correct
when a speaker 'points to' the entity by his/her/its name. If I 'point to' Sam by 'Peter',
my 'pointing' is incorrect: the name 'Peter' is not correlated with the entity Sam because
this is not his name. The demonstrative conventions correlate names with entities as
bearers of the names.
'Pointing' is inappropriate when a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by his/her/its
name and a hearer cannot identify the entity by the name, because the hearer does not
know the entity or the name of the entity. This suggests that appropriate 'pointing' is the
case where the hearer knows the entity and the name of the entity, i.e., the hearer knows
the entity as a unique individual who has a proper name. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by
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his/her/its name is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity
as a unique individual who has a proper name that the hearer as well as the speaker knows
of.
There is a social element in appropriate pointing. If a speaker 'points to' an entity by a
name, and a hearer, though she identifies the entity, is uncomfortable about the speaker's
'pointing', 'pointing' is inappropriate. Consider the following example:
(1) A: John was driving a Vauxhall last Sunday.
B: You mean my father? Could you please call him 'Mr Dove'?
The hearer (Speaker B) identifies the entity the speaker (Speaker A) 'points to' by 'John',
i.e., her father, but she is not happy about the speaker's 'pointing to' her father by his
first name. We will discuss a social aspect of 'pointing to' an entity by different forms of
his/her/its name in Chapter 4 (4.3.3.2).
The violations of the demonstrative conventions which concern 'pointing to' entities by
names cause miscommunications or communication breakdowns. If a speaker 'points to'
an entity incorrectly, he ends up giving the hearer the wrong picture of states of affairs in
the world. If the speaker 'points to' an entity whose name is 'Peter' by uttering the
following sentence:
(2) John is a bachelor,
he, as a result, fails to 'point to' the entity he intends to 'point to', i.e., Peter. Does the
speaker 'point to' the entity whose name is 'John' or the entity whose name is 'Peter' in
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this case? The answer is that the speaker does not 'point to' either of them. The speaker
does not 'point to' the entity whose name is 'Peter', because he says 'John' instead. We
are not happy to say that the speaker 'points to' the entity whose name is 'John', because
the entity is not the one the speaker intends to 'point to'. Even if there is another person
whose name is John, and the person happens to be a bachelor, we wouldn't say that the
speaker makes a true statement: it is not John but Peter who the speaker means. Because
the speaker does not follow the demonstrative conventions correctly, he 'points to' neither
John nor Peter.
If the speaker utters the sentence in (2) incorrectly to 'point to' the entity whose name is
'Peter', the hearer naturally believes that the speaker 'points to' the entity whose name is
'John'. There is no reason why the hearer should think that the speaker 'points to' the
entity whose name is 'Peter', when the speaker uses the word 'John'. In this case, the
hearer either (i) cannot identify the entity whose name is 'John' or, (ii) picks out, wrongly
but naturally, an entity whose name is 'John', and believes that the speaker asserts that he
is a bachelor. If the hearer finds it out later that the person, John, is not a bachelor, she
will blame the speaker for making a false assertion. However, it is not clear that the
speaker made a false assertion, because he did not mean to make that assertion. Something
goes wrong on a more fundamental level, that is, the level of conventions. The assertion
was made by the speaker who used the conventions incorrectly, and as a result, the
assertion the hearer thinks the speaker made is not the assertion that the speaker intended
to make.
If a speaker 'points to' an entity inappropriately and the hearer cannot identify the entity
the speaker 'points to', the communication between them might stop, as is shown in the
following example:
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(3) A: John is a bachelor.
B: Who is John?
Or the hearer might reconstruct the entity as a type of entity who has the name. For
example, if the speaker utters the following sentence and the hearer does not know the
person whose name is 'Chris':
(4) Chris is a pilot,
the hearer may reconstruct the entity as a type of entity whose name is 'Chris'. When the
hearer reconstructs the entity as a type of entity whose name is 'Chris', she might add
some characters to the entity using the information that the entity's name is 'Chris' and the
entity is a pilot. The hearer might reconstruct the entity as a male person. Let us take
another example. Imagine that the speaker uttering the following sentence where the hearer
does not know the entity whose name is 'Hideko' (but knows that 'Hideko' is a Japanese
girl's name):
(5) Hideko loves sushi,
The hearer may reconstruct the entity as a Japanese female person (the hearer might be
convinced by this because of the speaker's assertion that the entity loves sushi). However,
the entity 'pointed to' by 'Chris' in (4) does not have to be a male person at all, and the
person 'pointed to' by 'Hideko' in (5) does not have to be a Japanese female at all, but
could be American.
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When a hearer reconstructs the entity the speaker correctly but inappropriately 'points to'
by his/her/its names, she might reconstruct the entity as a 'stereotypical' individual who
has that name. However, the features the hearer assigns to this unknown entity as a
stereotypical individual who has the name do not have to be true of the entity. By
'pointing to' an entity by his/her/its name, the speaker does not assert in the least that the
entity has stereotypical features as a bearer of the name: the speaker simply picks out the
entity by his/her/its name. This suggests that the demonstrative conventions which
concern 'pointing to' an entity by name are conventional relations between names and the
bearers of the name, by which a speaker picks out an entity without describing any
features of him/her/it.
Kripke (1972) calls names rigid designators in the sense that they designate the same
objects in every possible world. For example, 'although someone other than the US
President in 1970 might have been the US President in 1970 (e.g., Humphrey might
have), no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon' (Kripke, 1972: 48). Kripke
(1972) is correct. When a speaker 'points to' (refers to) an entity by name, the speaker
does not describe the entity in any sense. As we explained above, the speaker does not
describe the entity as a stereotypical individual who has the name. The speaker does not
describe the entity as, say, strange or the one with red hair in 'pointing to' (referring to)
the entity by 'Strange' or 'Redhead'. By the name the speaker picks out the entity as a
unique individual with a proper name, without relying on any contingent fact the entity has
certain attributes. In other words, names are dominantly correlated with the demonstrative
conventions of 'pointing to' entities.
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3.2.2.2 'Pointing to' an entity by a personal pronoun or a demonstrative
Unlike 'pointing to' an entity by his/her/its name, 'pointing to' an entity by a pronoun or a
demonstrative is dependent on the contingent and transient fact that the entity happens to
be the speaker or proximate to the speaker. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by a pronoun or
demonstrative is deictic. Lyons (1977b) defines deixis as follows:
By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being
talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of
utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee (Lyons, 1977b:
637).
An entity is picked out by 'this' because the entity is proximate to the speaker and an entity
is picked out by 'you' because the entity is the person being spoken to. Lyons (1977b)
describes this feature of 'pointing'/referring as egocentricity.
The canonical situation-of-utterance is egocentric in the sense that the speaker, by virtue of being the
speaker, casts himself in the role of ego and relates everything to his viewpoint. He is at the zero-point of
the spatiotemporal co-ordinate of what we will refer as the deictic context (Lyons, 1977b:638).
The demonstrative conventions which concern personal pronouns and demonstratives are
the relations between entities and roles in the speech situation1 or locations in relation to
the spatiotemporal location of the speech situation. Using these relations, the speaker
specifies a particular entity so that the hearer can identify it.
3.2.2.2.1 Personal pronouns
According to Lyons (1977b:638), the grammatical category of person depends upon the
notion of participant-roles, and the origin of the traditional term 'person' illustrates the
1 We will explain speech situations in 4.2.2.
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connection of participant-roles: the Latin word 'persona' (meaning "mask") was used to
translate the Greek word for "dramatic character" or "role".
3.2.2.2.1.1 First-person pronouns
When a speaker 'points to' herself by the first-person pronoun, 'I', she projects herself
as a person who is playing a role of the speaker at the time of utterance. The speaker can
make the hearer realise that she is talking about herself by highlighting the role of the
speaker. The demonstrative convention which concerns the first-person pronoun is the
relation between an entity and a role of the speaker in the speech situation. Using this
convention, one, when speaking, 'points to' oneself as an individual who is playing the
role of the speaker.
'Pointing' is correct when the speaker 'points to' herself by the first-person pronoun. It
seems unlikely in a normal situation that the hearer cannot identify who the speaker is.
Lyons (1977b: 645) says: 'the distinction that we drew ... between correct and successful
reference cannot seriously be drawn in relation to first-person pronouns'. There are,
however, unusual cases where 'pointing' is inappropriate. For example, if a person is
walking in the building and hears the voice from one of the rooms saying:
(6) I'll be back by three,
the person would not know who will be back by three. This shows that, if the speaker and
the hearer do not share the speech situation in which they communicate, 'pointing' is
inappropriate. In other words, 'pointing to' an entity using the first-person pronoun is
correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity in terms of the
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participant role of the speaker in the speech situation where who is playing the role is
clear.
3.2.2.2.1.2 Second-person pronouns
'Pointing to' an entity by the second-person pronoun is also dependent on the transient
fact that the entity is being spoken to/addressed at the time of utterance. As the following
example shows, the entity 'pointed to' by the second-person pronoun can change at any
moment:
(7) Not you, not you, not you, you, go.
'Pointing to' is correct when a speaker 'points to' by the second-person pronoun the
entity she is speaking to/addressing at the time of utterance. The demonstrative
conventions which concern the second-person pronoun are the relations between entities
and the participant role of the hearer.
'Pointing' by the second-person pronoun can be inappropriate. When a group of people
forms a speech situation and the speaker does not make it clear by gesture or eye-contact
to whom he is speaking, other participants might not identify which one of them is
actually being spoken to. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the second-person pronoun is
correlated by the demonstrative conventions with specifying the entity in terms of the
participant role of the hearer in the speech situation where who is playing the role is clear.
One function of 'pointing to' an entity by the first-person or second-person pronoun is
obviously to specify the entity the speaker talks about, but there is another function which
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concerns communication itself. To communicate is to accept the role of the speaker or the
hearer which changes at every turn. As the term 'person' shows, it is to play a 'drama' of
communication. In the drama of communication, the speaker picks out things in the outer
world and talks about them, and invites the hearer to comment on them indicating his point
of view. By 'pointing' to himself or the person he is speaking to in terms of participant
roles, the speaker emphasises that they are playing roles in communication and co¬
operatively creating communication.
In some languages, 'pointing to' oneself or the entity one is speaking to is further
differentiated in terms of the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. Since we
will discuss socially differentiated pronouns fully in Chapter 4 (4.3.2.1), we just
overview some important points here. As the distinction tu and vous in French shows,
some languages have socially differentiated pronouns. Using one of these pronouns, a
speaker not only emphasises the fact that he and the hearer are playing a role of the
speaker or the hearer in communication, but also specifies the social relation between
them. In specifying the relation between him and the hearer as a close/informal type or a
distant/formal type, the speaker characterises the present communication. For example, if
the speaker 'points to' the hearer by tu , the speaker characterises the present speech
situation as a close and informal type. If the hearer is not comfortable with having the
close and informal type of communication with the speaker, the hearer signals that to the
speaker. 'Pointing to' the hearer by tu is inappropriate. In other words, 'pointing to' an
entity the speaker is speaking to/addressing by tu is correlated with specifying the entity as
the hearer who shares a close and informal type of speech situation with the speaker. If the
speech situation is not of this type, 'pointing to' the hearer by tu is inappropriate.
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3.2.2.2.1.3 Third-person pronouns
The speaker can 'point to' by a pronoun an entity that plays neither the part of the speaker
nor that of the hearer: the speaker 'points to' the entity as the one that plays a part of the
third person. 'Pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is correct when the entity
is neither the speaker nor the hearer. 'Pointing' by the third-person pronoun is subject to
further differentiation in term of gender and animacy. The masculine/feminine distinction
is represented by the contrast between 'she' and 'he' in English, and the animate/inanimate
distinction is represented by the contrast between 'it' and 'she/he'. 'Pointing to' an entity
by 'she' is correct when the entity is neither the speaker nor the hearer, and feminine.
'Pointing to' an entity by 'it' is correct when the entity is neither the speaker nor the
hearer, and inanimate. The demonstrative conventions which concern the third-person
pronouns are the relations between entities and the participant role which is neither the role
of the speaker nor the hearer, which is further differentiated in terms of gender and
animacy.
Since all entities in the world which do not play the role of the speaker or the hearer are in
principle the third persons, 'pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is not
specific enough for the hearer to identify it. It seems that 'pointing to' an entity by the
third-person pronoun is correlated with saliency of the entity in the speech situation. That
is, 'pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is appropriate when the entity is
salient in the speech situation. The entity is salient when it is already introduced to the
speech situation. This is an anaphoric use of pronouns. Consider the following example:
(8) Mary bought a cake and she ate it.
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Both 'she' and 'it' are anaphoric in the sense that they are interpreted as being co-
referential with 'Mary' and 'a cake' respectively.
'Pointing to' an entity by the third-person pronoun is also appropriate when the entity is
by itself salient in the speech situation. In such a case, the third-person pronoun is deictic.
According to Lyons (1977a), one can utter the following sentence to express one's
condolences to a friend, whose wife has just been killed in a car crash:
(9) I was terribly upset to hear the news: I only saw her last week.
In these circumstances, there is no need for the speaker to specify who the referent of
'she' is (Lyons 1977a: 101).
Blakemore (1992: 66) gives a similar example. The speaker can utter the sentence in (10)
after, say, Ben has left the room.
(10) He looked tired.
The speaker may have nodded his head to Ben's direction, but there is no linguistic
expression, i.e., antecedent, necessary.
If the entity is not salient in the speech situation, say, the hearer does not notice Ben in the
case in (10) above, the speaker's 'pointing' becomes inappropriate. 'Pointing to' the entity
by the third-person pronoun is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with
specifying the entity as a salient entity in the speech situation (because it has been
introduced (anaphoric use) or it is by itself salient (deictic use)).
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3.2.2.2.2 Demonstrative pronouns
Demonstrative pronouns like 'this' and 'that' in English are primarily deictic:
They are to be interpreted with respect to the location of the participants in the deictic context. Roughly
speaking, the distinction between 'this' and 'that' ... depends upon proximity to the zero-point of the
deictic context (Lyons, 1977b: 646).
'Pointing to' an entity by the demonstrative pronoun is correct when the entity is in a
specified distance to the zero-point of the location of the speech situation. As for English
demonstrative pronouns, 'pointing to' an entity by 'this' is correct when the entity is
proximate to the zero-point, and 'pointing to' an entity by 'that' is correct when the entity
is remote from the zero-point. The distinction of proximity is language-specific. Some
languages, like English, have a two-way distinction of proximity, and others have a three-
way or more distinction. According to Frei (1944), Malagasy has a six-way distinction.
Japanese has a three-way distinction; kore, sore, and are. The speaker 'points to' an entity
which is proximate to the zero-point where the speaker is by kore, and an entity which is
remote from it by are, and an entity which is neither proximate to nor remote from it by
sore. The distinction among kore, sore, and are is also concerned with the entity's
proximity to the location where the hearer is. The speaker 'points to' an entity by sore
when it is proximate to the hearer. In this respect, Japanese demonstrative pronouns are
similar to Latin demonstrative pronouns: the entity which is proximate to the speaker is
'pointed to' (referred to) by hie, the entity which is proximate to the hearer/addressee is
'pointed to' (referred to) by is(te), and the entity which is remote from both the speaker
and the hearer/addressee is 'pointed to' (referred to) by ille (Lyons, 1968: 278-9).
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'Pointing to' an entity by the demonstrative pronoun is not specific enough for the hearer
to identify unless the speaker makes it salient by gesture or eye-movement or it is in itself
salient. Imagine the speaker 'points to' an entity by 'this' by uttering the following
sentence:
(11) This is a beautiful 17th century Chinese vase.
If the speaker utters the sentence in the situation where there are many vases around,
looking away from the entity he 'points to' and not physically pointing to it, the hearer
cannot identify it. 'Pointing' then becomes inappropriate. In other words, 'pointing to' an
entity by the demonstrative pronoun is correlated by the demonstrative conventions with
specifying the entity as a salient entity which is in a specified distance from the location of
the speech situation (where saliency might be given by the speaker's gesture or eye-
movement).
Japanese demonstrative pronouns are differentiated by another dimension: the
honorific/non-honorific dimension. There are two sets of demonstratives pronouns, kore,
sore, and are, and kochira, sochira, and achira. The latter set is marked with social
superiority. As we will discuss fully in Chapter 5, Japanese words are often subject to
further differentiation with respect to social superiority and inferiority. By kochira, a
Japanese speaker 'points to' an entity not only as the one which is proximate to her, but
also as the one who is socially higher than her (or as the one which is a belonging of the
person who is socially higher than her). Therefore, 'pointing to' an entity by a
demonstrative pronoun in Japanese can be inappropriate socially. If the speaker 'points to'
a person by a non-honorific demonstrative pronoun, say, kore, and the person is socially
higher than the speaker, 'pointing' becomes socially inappropriate. 'Pointing to' an entity
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by the demonstrative pronoun in Japanese is correlated with specifying the entity as a
salient entity which is in a specified distance from the location of the speech situation,
which is either socially higher than or lower than/equal to the speaker.
Like proper names, personal pronouns or demonstrative pronouns are dominantly
correlated with the demonstrative conventions: primarily entities are 'pointed to' by them.
To a much lessor degree, they are correlated with the descriptive conventions: attributes of
the entities are described. The distinction between 'he' and 'she', for example, concerns
masculine/feminine, which is an attribute of the entity 'pointed to'. Other distinctions, say,
between 'I' and 'you', and 'this' and 'that' concern relations between entities and roles in
or proximity to the speech situation, by which the entities are 'pointed to'.
3.2.2.3 'Pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression
When a speaker 'points to' an entity by a descriptive expression, 'pointing' is dependent
on the contingent fact that the entity is of a particular type. For example, if a speaker
'points to' an entity by 'the student' and 'pointing' is correct, it is dependent on the
contingent fact that the entity is of the type, STUDENT. It could be of a different type, say,
ACTRESS (in one of the possible worlds). 'Pointing to' an entity by a descriptive
expression is not deictic. The type a speaker assigns to the entity by means of a descriptive




There are two different ways in which 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression
becomes incorrect. One is solecism against the descriptive conventions and the other is
against the demonstrative conventions. Although there is no a priori reason for using the
word, 'dog' for a type of canine animal, the word ('dog') and the type (DOG) are
conventionally correlated. If a speaker uses (like Humpty-Dumpty) the word 'dog' for a
type other than the type of canine animal (DOG) and 'points to' an entity using the word
'dog' in this private sense, 'pointing' becomes incorrect. This is what we call solecism
against the descriptive conventions (in 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive convention).
'Pointing' is also incorrect if a speaker 'points to' an entity by the type which is not the
attribute of that entity. For example, if I 'point to' my landlady's pet by 'the dog', my
'pointing' is incorrect; because she is not of the type DOG, but of the type CAT. This is
what we call solecism against the demonstrative conventions (in 'pointing to' an entity by
a descriptive convention). That is, 'pointing' is correct when a speaker specifies the entity
by the words which are conventionally correlated with the type which is the attribute of the
entity.
As for what we call incorrect 'pointing', Russell and Strawson described different
aspects. As we discussed in Chapter 2, Russell (1905) says if the object the definite
expression denotes does not subsist, the sentence is false. The case which Russell (1905)
tried to exclude from his analyse of sentence meaning is the one, in our framework, where
the speaker does not 'point to' any entity at all by the definite expression, although it
superficially looks as if the speaker is performing the act of stating. If the speaker does not
have any particular person at all in his mind but still 'performs' a speech act of stating by
uttering:
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(12) The present king of France is bald,
we cannot describe successfully the meaning the speaker tries to express. In such a case,
the violation of linguistic conventions is so severe that it excludes the possibility for the
speaker to express meaning conventionally.
Strawson (1950)'s point is that the speaker's failure of 'pointing to' any entity by 'the
present king of France' does not exclude the possibility that a speaker at a different time
in history 'points to' a particular entity by 'the present king of France' and makes a true
assertion about him. There exists a conventional relation between the expression 'the
present king of France' and a particular type or a particular person of the type, and it is
independent of whether or not such a person exists at the time of utterance.
If a speaker has a particular person in mind, even incorrect 'pointing to' the person by a
wrong expression might be successful. For example, if someone utters the following
sentence:
(13) The king of Japan is in London,
I automatically ask in reply:
(14) You mean the emperor of Japan?
Whether the person, Akihito, is the king or the emperor depends on the institution of
Japan, and it is not difficult to imagine that the person who does not know Japan well
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believes mistakenly that Japan is a monarchy. If the speaker of the sentence in (13) has the
Emperor Akihito in mind and uses incorrectly the expression 'the king of Japan', the
hearer might be able to identify the person the speaker intended to 'point to'. The speaker
then might be able to make a true assertion about the Emperor Akihito by uttering the
sentence in (13). This shows, as Russell (1905) claims, that (in the act of stating) to
'point' by a descriptive expression is to specify a particular entity by the expression, and
therefore, even if the speaker uses the wrong expression, the hearer tries to identify the
person the speaker intends to 'point to', considering possible mistakes the speaker can
make about 'pointing to' the person. This also shows, as Strawson (1950) claims,
truth/falsity of the speaker' assertion depends on which entity the speaker 'points to' or
intends to 'point to' by the correct, or even incorrect, expression.
3.2.2.3.2 Appropriate 'pointing'
'Pointing' is correct when the speaker 'points to' the entity by the descriptive expression
which is conventionally correlated with the type which is the attribute of the entity. Correct
'pointing' becomes inappropriate when the description is not specific enough for the
hearer to identify the entity. For example, if the speaker 'points to' an entity by 'the dog'
in the park where there are many dogs, the hearer might not be able to identify the entity
the speaker 'points to', and ask: 'Which one?'. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the
descriptive expression is correlated with specifying the entity as a salient entity which has
a particular attribute.
When a speaker specifies the entity in terms of his/her/its position such as 'the head of the
department' or 'the President of the US', 'pointing' is correct if the speaker 'points to' the
entity by the descriptive expression which is conventionally correlated with the position
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which the entity occupies. For example, before 15th July 1998,1 could correctly 'point to'
Ryutaro Hashimoto by 'the Prime Minister of Japan'. If I 'point to' him by 'the Prime
Minister of Japan' now (August in 1998), my 'pointing' is incorrect. Ryutaro Hashimoto
is not in the position of Prime Minister of Japan any more, and someone else (Keizo
Obuchi) is in the position.
For 'pointing to' a person by the descriptive expression of the position to be appropriate, a
hearer must know who is in the position. If the hearer does not know the resignation of
the former Prime Minister for some reason (for example, she was abroad), the person the
speaker 'points to' by 'the Prime Minister of Japan' and makes an assertion about, i.e.,
Keizo Obuchi, is not the person the hearer believes that the speaker 'points to' and makes
an assertion about, i.e., Ryutaro Hashimoto. Appropriate 'pointing to' a person by the
descriptive expression of the position is the case where the hearer knows who is in the
position. That is, 'pointing to' an entity by the descriptive expression of this type is
correlated with specifying the entity as an entity which occupies a specific position at the
time of utterance that the hearer knows of.
To 'point to' an entity by a descriptive expression (in the act of stating) is to specify a
particular person by the attributes or position of the person. How is it different from
specifying a particular person by name? A simple answer to it is that by a descriptive
expression a speaker specifies an entity by its attributes or position, whilst by names a
speaker specifies an entity as an individual who has a proper name. Let us discuss it
further by analysing the cases where 'pointing to' an entity by a descriptive expression
rather than a proper name becomes inappropriate.
If I utter the following sentence to my friend, Akiko:
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(15) My supervisor at the college is retiring next year,
she identifies the person I 'points to' by the expression 'my supervisor at the college', but
definitely gets puzzled with my use of the expression. She and I went to the university
together and did the postgraduate course there together and the person I 'point to' by 'my
supervisor at the college' was her supervisor, too. In short, my friend knows the person I
'point to' personally. So Akiko doesn't understand why I try to specify the person by her
attributes (and my relation to her) when I know that she knows the person personally. A
typical response might be:
(16) You mean Professor Ueda? Why don't you say so?
This example shows that 'pointing' by a demonstrative expression becomes inappropriate
when both the speaker and the hearer have a personal, social relation with the person
'pointed to'. In other words, 'pointing' by a demonstrative expression rather than a proper
name is appropriate when either the speaker or the hearer does not have a personal, social
relation with the person 'pointed to'. If a speaker does not have a personal, social relation
with the person 'pointed to' and does not know the person's name, the speaker cannot
'point to' the person by name. If a speaker knows that a hearer does not have a personal,
social relation with the person the speaker intends to 'point to', the speaker knows that the
hearer cannot identify the person by name.
There are cases where the speaker 'points to' a person by a descriptive expression because
the speaker does not want to emphasis the social, personal relation between the speaker
and the person he 'points to', or the speaker wants to emphasise the certain attributes of
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the person he 'points to'. In these cases, 'pointing' by a descriptive expression becomes
appropriate even though both the speaker and the hearer have a personal, social relation
with the person 'pointed to'. For example, Hillary Clinton might 'point to' her husband
by 'the President' when she speaks to his spokesman in uttering the following sentence:
(17) The President is very concerned.
By uttering the sentence the speaker asserts that a person who is in the position of
President, i.e., Bill Clinton, is in the state of being concerned. And, by 'the President',
the speaker can emphasise the aspect of the person which is in the position of President of
the US, not an individual, Bill Clinton.
Let us take another example. If a student in the linguistic department is looking for a
subject for the experiment of tone, a lecturer might utter the following sentence to 'point
to' me, although both know me personally and know my name.
(18) That Japanese person will do,
It is my being a Japanese person, not my being an individual with the name Etsuko Oishi
that the speaker wants to emphasise in 'pointing'.
To sum up, there are two cases where a speaker can appropriately 'point to' an entity by a
descriptive expression, rather than by name. First, a speaker does not know the person
personally as an individual with a proper name, or a speaker believes that a hearer does
not know the person as an individual with a proper name. In these cases, a speaker
specifies an entity in terms of her/his/its generic type, physical appearances, or position,
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or the speaker's relation to her/him/it so that a hearer can identify the entity. Second,
although a speaker knows the person personally and knows that a hearer also knows the
person personally, the speaker emphasises a particular attribute of the person which is
important for the present speech situation between the speaker and the hearer. That is,
'pointing to' an entity by the descriptive expression is correlated with specifying the entity
as (i) an entity who either the speaker or the hearer does not know personally, who has a
particular attribute or occupies a specific position, or (ii) an entity who has a particular
attribute or occupies a specific position which is significant for the present speech situation
the speaker and the hearer share.
While 'pointing to' an entity by his/her/its name or a personal or demonstrative pronoun is
dominantly concerned with the demonstrative conventions, 'pointing to' an entity by a
descriptive expression is concerned with the demonstrative and descriptive conventions
equally. The descriptive conventions are concerned with 'pointing' by a descriptive
expression because a speaker 'points to' an entity by a type which is correlated with a
particular word. The demonstrative conventions are concerned with 'pointing' because a
speaker 'points to' an individual who has the type.
3.2.2.3.3 Functions of 'pointing'
Let us talk about another difficult issue which concerns 'pointing to' an entity by a
descriptive expression. Is the attribute of the entity by which the entity is 'pointed to' a
part of an assertion? For example, if the speaker utters the following sentence:
(19) The man is very tall,
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the entity is picked out by its generic type MAN. Is it a part of the assertion that the entity is
of the type MAN? One might argue that the attribute of the entity of being a male human
being is used for the hearer to identify the entity, but it is not a part of what a speaker
asserts.
It seems that attributes of the entity by which the entity is 'pointed to' is not a part of
assertion. Consider the following example:
(20) This gentleman is my wife.
Let us imagine that there is a fancy-dress party and a person utters the sentence 'pointing
to' his wife who dresses like Chaplin. The speaker 'points to' a person by her temporary
attribute that she looks like a gentleman, and asserts that the person is the speaker's wife.
The speaker does not seem to assert that the entity is of both the type gentleman and the
type wife (to the speaker). There seem to be a difference between uttering the sentence in
(20) and the sentence in (21) in the following:
(21) This is a gentleman and my wife.
However, one might argue that the difference is not so obvious. This is because a speaker
is expected to 'point to' an entity by a descriptive expression which is true of the entity,
i.e., a speaker is expected to 'point to' the entity correctly. If it is the case, a state of
affairs the speaker correctly asserts by uttering the sentence in (20), i.e., there is an entity
which is proximate to the speaker and of the type gentleman, and this entity is a type
wife of the speaker, is not very different from the state of affairs a speaker correctly
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asserts by uttering the sentence in (21), i.e., there is an entity which is proximate to a
speaker, and this entity is of both a type gentleman and a type wife of the speaker.
However, some distinction will show up when the entity is not a gentleman. In the case of
uttering the sentence in (20) when the person is not a gentleman but dresses like a
gentleman, the speaker's 'pointing' is not exactly correct, but the hearer most probably
understands why the speaker 'points to' the person by 'this gentleman' and identifies the
person. It is possible that the assertion is true if the person is the speaker's wife.
However, if the person is not a gentleman, the assertion the speaker makes by uttering the
sentence in (21) is not true, even if the person is the speaker's wife.
In the act of stating, a speaker 'points to' an entity in the subject position, and describes it
by giving a certain type to it in the predicate part. The function of 'pointing to' an entity in
the subject part is to make it clear to a hearer who/what a speaker talks about. If 'pointing'
is too incorrect, the speaker cannot specify the entity she talks about so that the hearer can
identify her/him/it. However, if 'pointing' is incorrect but not too incorrect, and the
speaker manages to specify the entity so that the hearer can identify it, we might be able to
say that the speaker makes a true assertion. The function of 'pointing' in the act of stating
is to specify the entity a speaker talks about.
If the function of 'pointing' is to specify the entity a speaker talks about, why does the
following sentence sound strange?
(22) That pretty baby is really ugly.
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If the speaker 'points to' the entity correctly, being a pretty baby is true of the entity the
speaker 'points to', or at least the speaker believes that it is true of the entity. The speaker
picks out the entity by its attribute of being a pretty baby, and assigns the type ugly,
which is opposite type of pretty. This means that the speaker has a contradictory belief
that the entity is pretty and ugly at the same time.
If a speaker does not commit himself to the belief that the entity has the attribute by which
the speaker 'points to' it, the sentence sounds less strange. Consider the following
example:
(23) Those so-called 'handicapped' children are not really handicapped.
In uttering the sentence, the speaker does not commit himself to the belief that those
children are handicapped: the speaker picks out the entities by their attribute by which the
people in general identify them, i.e., being handicapped. The speaker then asserts that
those people are not handicapped in the sense she uses the term 'handicapped'.
Descriptive expressions are supposed to express the attributes of the entity by which a
speaker can specify the entity so that a hearer can identify the entity: the attributes of the
entity which are obvious to a speaker and a hearer, or agreed by them. However, a
speaker might cleverly 'point to' an entity by the attributes of the entity which are neither
obvious to a hearer nor agreed by him to make the hearer believe that that is an attribute of
the entity. Imagine that you are a witness for the murder trial. In an earlier statement you
said that the man who is charged with murder might have been a little drunk. Then the
barrister says:
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(24) That drunken man was walking to the victim's house. Is that true? Could you
answer by just 'yes' or 'no', please?
You saw the man the speaker 'points to' by 'that drunken man' walking to the victim's
house and he might have been a little drunk, but he was not in the state of being drunk. If
you answer by 'yes' for the reason that the person 'pointed to' was walking to the
victim's house, you contribute to the picture the speaker wants to make about the event:
the man was drunk and walking to the victim's house.
This case shows that descriptive expressions such as 'that man' or 'that drunken man' are
not always used to purely 'point to' a particular entity. When the entity is already
introduced in the speech situation or salient in the speech situation, a full description is not
necessary for the hearer to identify the entity. Even an inaccurate description might do. In
those cases, a speaker can express some belief about the entity. The speaker does not
express this belief as a form of statement, i.e., he does not assert, but indicates that he has
that belief. In the above case, if you answer 'yes' to the barrister's question, you commit
yourself not only the fact that the person was walking to the victim's house, but also the
belief that the person was drunk.
When an entity is already introduced in the speech situation or salient in the speech
situation, the point of assertion is whether or not it is really this entity which is of a type or
does/did a type of action which is expressed in the predicate. In the example in (24), the
point is whether or not it is really that person, who is charged with the murder, that was
doing a type of action walk to a specific house, which is victim's. This type of speech act
is the act of instancing in Austin (1953)'s classification of four types of speech act. We
will discuss the act of instancing about an entity and situation in 3.4.1.
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3.2.2.4 Summary of 'pointing' to an entity
To 'point to' in the act of stating is to specify the entity the speaker talks about so that the
hearer can identify it. To 'point to' a person by his/her/its name is to specify the entity as
an individual with a proper name, and it implies that the speaker knows the person
personally and believes that the hearer knows the person so as to identify the person by
his/her/its name. 'Pointing to' a person by his/her/its name serves to stress a social relation
between the speaker and the person 'pointed to'. To 'point to' an entity by a personal or
demonstrative pronoun is to specify the entity in terms of participant roles in the speech
situation or proximity to the location of the speech situation. To 'point to' a person/object
by a personal or demonstrative pronoun is to relate the person/object in the world to the
speech situation the speaker and the hearer share. To 'point' to an entity by a descriptive
expression is to specify the entity in terms of the attribute or position of the entity. This
implies that (i) either a speaker or a hearer (or both) does not know the entity enough to
specify/identify it as an individual with a proper name, or (ii) that emphasising the attribute
or position of the entity is of some significance in the speech situation.
By the concept of the demonstrative conventions, we have successfully described different
types of relation between entities and words/expressions by which the speaker
refers/'points' to them. In our theory, we have described not only the relations between
entities and words/expressions to refer/'point' to them, which have been studied by
Russell (1905), Strawson (1950) and others, but also how the speaker specifies the entity
so that the hearer can identify it, emphasising a certain element of the entity or the speech
situation. We have described the former relations by correct/incorrect 'pointing' and the
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latter by appropriate/inappropriate 'pointing', a part of which is what Lyons (1977)
describes by the concept of successful/unsuccessful referring.
3.2.3 Descriptive conventions
As we discussed in Chapter 2 (2.3.3), in the act of stating, a speaker 'points to' an entity
by the demonstrative conventions and describes one of idiosyncratic features of the entity
by assigning a type to it. For example, if you look at the picture below:
(25)
5227 1227
and describe the diagram on the right, you 'point to' the entity by '1227' and describe its
feature, which is:
(26)
To describe this feature linguistically, you have to find a word whose sense is correlated
with this type of shape by the descriptive conventions. It is the word 'rhombus' in English
and hishigata in Japanese. You then perform the act of stating about the entity by uttering
the following sentences:
102
(27) 1227 is a rhombus.
(28) 1227 wa hishigata da.
Uttering these sentences, you 'point to' the entity by '1227' by means of the
demonstrative conventions and assert that the features of the entity are of a type which is
correlated with the word 'rhombus' in English and hishigata in Japanese by the descriptive
conventions. Your assertion is true in this case because, as the picture in (25) shows, the
entity you 'point to' is of the type you claim it to be.
The descriptive conventions correlate types of thing in the world with words. In other
words, things in the world are categorised, and each differentiated/categorised type is
correlated by the descriptive conventions with a particular word. As a result, differences
of categories/types are represented by the contrasts between words, say, 'rhombus' and
'circle' or hishigata and maru. Each language has its own categorisation of things in the
world, which is represented by contrast between words and sense-relations among words.
Categorisations of unrelated languages do not seem to differ too greatly to make
translation impossible. There are, however, some differences in categorisation among
languages. For example, the ways the colour spectrum is divided and categorised are
different in some languages. Pinker (1994) says:
Languages differ in their inventory of colour words: Latin lacks generic 'gray' and 'brown'; Navajo
collapses blue and green into one word: Russian has distinct words for dark blue and sky blue: Shona
speakers use one word for the yellower greens and the greener yellows, and a different one for the bluer
greens and the nonpurplish blues (Pinker, 1994:62).
The division and categorisation of the colour-spectrum can differ even among the speakers
of the same language. Many Japanese speakers in my parents' generation and those older
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than them use the word ao ('blue') for a much wider range of the colour-spectrum than
the younger generations use the word for, which includes the range for which the younger
generations use a different word midori ('green'). The speakers of older generation
understand the range of the colour-spectrum which the word midori ('green') stands for
and possibly use the word, but they usually don't distinguish the range of the colour
spectrum the word ao ('blue') covers from the one the word midori ('green') covers, and
use the word ao ('blue') for the combined range. So the type to which the word ao
('blue') is correlated in the use of those speakers of Japanese is different from the type of
AO for the majority of the speakers of Japanese. This sense of ao ('blue') still remains in
Japanese culture, and even the speakers who constantly distinguish the range the word ao
('blue') covers from the one the word midori ('green') covers describe the colour of the
traffic signal as ao ('blue') as a standard expression, although it looks obviously green.
This shows that things in the world are categorised into certain types, which differ cross-
linguistically and, in some cases, even within a language, and those types are arbitrarily
but conventionally correlated to words as their senses. The conventions which correlate
each of these types with a particular word are descriptive conventions. In the present
section, we discuss how language users use the descriptive conventions to perform and
understand linguistic acts.
For an act of stating to be successful, the speaker and the hearer have to use the same
descriptive conventions. Let us consider the following case. My mother is one of the
speakers who do not distinguish the range word ao ('blue') from that of the word midori
('green'). If my mother utters the following sentence:
104
(29) kondo kat ta fuku wa ao yo,
this time buy Past clothes
The clothes (I) bought this time are ao'
I assume that the entity she 'points to' as the clothes she bought is of the type AO in my
sense, i.e., which is the same as the type BLUE in English. It is, however, more than
possible that she asserts that the entity is ao in her sense, and her new clothes are green.
If her new clothes are green, does she assert something false? It is unfair to blame her for
a false assertion. My mother makes a true assertion in the sense she uses the word ao:
being ao is true of the entity she 'points to' in the sense she uses the word. The gap
between the type which I think my mother asserts and the type of the entity which I think
correct is caused by our uses of different descriptive conventions about the word ao.
Miscommunication on this level is the miscommunication of the level of conventions.
If a speaker and a hearer share the same demonstrative conventions, the truth or falsity of
the speaker's assertion matters. In the act of stating, an assertion is true if the entity
'pointed to' is of the type which the speaker claims it to be. If it is not, an assertion is
false. If the speaker utters the sentence in the following:
(30) It's a gorgeous Victorian townhouse in absolutely perfect condition,
and the hearer later finds out that it's an ugly London flat with no character which needs a
lot of refurbishment, the assertion is false.
To make a true assertion in the act of stating is to give a correct picture of a particular part
of the world to the hearer who might not know of the state of affairs there. Using the
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demonstrative conventions the speaker 'points to' a particular entity and, using the
descriptive conventions, describes it by giving it a particular type so that a hearer can get a
good picture of the features of the entity. If the speaker does not use the descriptive
conventions correctly, he gives the hearer a wrong picture of the features of the entity,
which is a case of a false assertion. In the example in (30) above, the hearer naturally
reconstructs the features of the entity according to the type the speaker assigns to it: the
entity is of a type of TOWNHOUSE which was built in Victorian era, and is of a type
GORGEOUS, and so on. The hearer reasonably assumes that the entity is of this type or at
least the speaker believes that the entity is of this type. If the hearer later finds out that the
entity is not at all of the type, the hearer blames the speaker for giving him the wrong
picture of the features of the entity. The level of the (mis)communication which concerns
correct/incorrect describing has been described in terms of truth/falsity, which concerns
the relation between the type the speaker assigns to a particular entity and actual features of
the entity.
There seems to be another level of communication, however. Things in the world are not
always exactly of a type, and most of them have different aspects. Imagine someone
describes me, Etsuko Oishi. However fine-grained the description of me is, it is still an
approximation ofmy attributes: the speaker cannot create Etsuko Oishi linguistically, who
is the same as real Etsuko Oishi. Detailed descriptions do not always serve better for the
hearer to understand the features of the entity. Sometimes a hearer understands the entity
better by a metaphoric description than by a detailed scientific description.
A speaker describes the entity he 'points to' so that a hearer can understand the attributes
of the entity. How approximate a description of the entity the speaker should give to the
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hearer depends on the hearer's knowledge or a type of speech situation the speaker and the
hearer share. Consider the following example from Austin (1962):
(31) France is hexagonal,
Austin (1962: 143) says, if the speaker utters the sentence in (31) to a top-ranking general,
assigning the type of being hexagonal to the country France might be good: it is a rough
but interesting approximation of the shape of France. It is obviously not good for a
geographer, who would think that assigning the type of being hexagonal to France is too
rough to give any serious consideration.
Does this mean that the sense of the word, 'hexagonal' changes from one speaker to
another or from one speech situation to another? It does not seem to be the case. The
speaker who utters the sentence in (31) does not believe that France is exactly hexagonal,
and he does not say that, either. That is, it is not the case that the speaker believes the
shape of France is exactly of the type which the word 'hexagonal' is correlated to by the
descriptive conventions. The speaker himself knows that being hexagonal is rough
approximation for the type of the entity.
Metaphoric use of word is of the same kind. Imagine someone uttering the following
sentence:
(32) Diana was a rose.
Being a rose might be a good, inspiring description of the attributes of the person Diana
for a hearer who wants a general picture of the character of the person. However, the
107
speaker does not assert that the person Diana was in fact a rose, but metaphorically
attributes rose-like properties to the individual2.
We might be able to analyse this nature of describing the entity by the contrast between
appropriate and inappropriate describing. Describing is appropriate when a speaker
describes the features of the entity by the words which specifies the features of the entity
to the degree which is required in the speech situation. In other words, describing the
features of the entity is correlated by the descriptive conventions with specifying the
features to the degrees which is required in the speech situation.
It seems that there is another level in which describing the features of entity becomes
appropriate or inappropriate. For example, if the speaker utters the following sentence:
(33) It is hot in here,
the speaker does not express a positive or negative judgment by the word 'hot': the type
HOT is differentiated from other types in terms of temperature. If the speaker, on the other
hands, utters the following sentences:
(34) It is stuffy in here,
(35) It is cosy in here,
the speaker expresses a negative judgment (in (34)) and a positive one (in (35)). In Mill
(1843)'s sense, the word 'stuffy' has a negative connotation and the word 'cosy' has a
positive one. These examples show that some words are subject to further differentiation
2See Lakoff & Johnson (1980).
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as to negativity or positivity, and those differentiation are conventionalised. If the speaker
describes, say, the features of the room by uttering the sentence in (34), the hearer
naturally believes that the speaker is uncomfortable to be there. If, on the contrary, the
speaker finds it comfortable to be there, describing the features of the room by 'stuffy' is
inappropriate. This shows that the descriptive conventions correlate not only words to
particular types of entity, but also words with particular ways of specifying the entity,
such as specifying it as positive or negative. We will develop this in Chapter 4 and 5,
where we will describe the descriptive conventions which correlate words with specifying
the entity socially.
In the present section we have described the descriptive conventions on the three levels.
On the level of conventions, we described the relations between words and types of thing,
which are differentiated and categorised within a language. On the level of truth/falsity, we
described, by using the concept of correct!incorrect describing, the relations between the
feature of the entity 'pointed to' and the type which the speaker assigns to the entity. They
have been analysed by the traditional concepts of truth/falsity. Correct describing is the
case where the feature of the entity 'pointed to' is of the type which the speaker assigns to
the entity, which makes the whole act of stating true. On the level of communication
between the speaker and the hearer, we described, by using the concept of
appropriate/inappropriate describing, the relations between words and the ways how the
speaker specifies the feature of the entity in the speech situation. Appropriate describing is
the case where the speaker specifies by the word the feature of entity to the degree which
is required in the speech situation, or specifies by the word non-truth-conditional aspect of
the entity. By analysing the meanings the speaker expresses by predicating something of
the entity referred to (in our terminology, by assigning a type to the entity 'pointed to') we
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have succeeded in describing meaning in a wider scope than that of truth-conditional
semantics.
3.3 Talking about a situation
In the preceding section, we discussed how a speaker 'points to' a particular entity and
describes features of it by using the demonstrative and descriptive conventions. In the
present section we will show that we can describe meaning about a particular historic
situation in the same way as we describe meanings about a particular entity.
The demonstrative and descriptive conventions which concern making an assertion about a
particular entity are not very different from the demonstrative and descriptive conventions
which concern making an assertion about a particular historic situation. If the speaker
identifies a particular entity in a spatiotemporal location and describes it or its action, the
speaker makes an assertion about a historic situation (where the particular entity is). For
example, when the speaker 'points to' an entity and asserts that it is of a type by uttering
the following sentence:
(36) Patricia is a Ph.D. student,
a speaker assumes that the attribute of the entity she describes as 'a Ph.D. student' is the
attribute the entity has at the time and place of utterance (unless specified otherwise),
which might be different at different time (and space).
We perceive changes of states of affairs in the world. We know that it is possible that
people and objects have some attributes at one point in time and space, and cease to have
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them at a different point in time and space. And a speaker can talk about not only the
attributes people and objects have at the time and place of the utterance, but also the
attributes they have/had at a different point in time and place. For example, a speaker can
talk about the time when an entity had particular attributes (as is shown in (37)) and the
place where an entity has particular attributes (as in shown in (38)).
(37) Catriona was a Ph.D. student two years ago.
(38) Yuli is a Ph.D. student in Switzerland.
In English, temporal location which is prior to time of utterance is grammatically marked
(by 'was' in (37)) but physical location is not. This is the same in Japanese.
(39) patorisia wa Ph.D. no gakusei desu,
student
'Patricia is a Ph.D. student'
(40) katoriina wa ni nen mae Ph.D. no gakusei deshi ta,
two year ago student past
'Catriona was a Ph.D. student two years ago'
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(41) yuli wa suisu de Ph.D. no gakusei desu.3
Switzerland in student
'Yuli is a Ph.D. student in Switzerland'
When a speaker talks about the attributes the entity has/had at the time and place which is
not the time and place of the utterance, the speaker has to not only specify the entity she
talks about, but also specify the spatiotemporal location where the entity has/had the
features. Just as 'pointing to' an entity, the speaker 'points to' a particular spatiotemporal
location, i.e., a historic situation, so that a hearer can identify it.
A speaker can specify the temporal location of a historic situation by a deictic
word/expression, assuming the temporal location of the speech situation as a deictic
centre. In the sentence in (37), the speaker specifies the temporal location of a historic
situation where the entity, Catriona, had the particular features of being a Ph.D. student at
a temporal distance from the time of the utterance; 'two years ago'. Or a speaker can
specify the location calendrically:
(42) Sue was a student in 1991.
Similarly, a speaker can specify the physical location by the name of the place, as 'in
Switzerland' in (38), or by the physical distance from the deictic centre where a speaker
and a hearer are. Consider the following example:
3 To express this meaning, the following sentence, which has continuous present form shite iru/imasu,
sounds better:
yuli wa suisu de Ph.D. no gakusei wo shite imasu.
Switzerland in student
'Yuli is (being) a Ph.D. student in Switzerland'
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(43) The weather is good 500 miles north from here.
These examples show that words/expressions are correlated to the physical and temporal
location of a historic situation by the demonstrative conventions. There are different types
of relation between the physical and temporal locations and words/expressions. For
example, 'pointing to' a historic situation by a deictic expression is correlated with
specifying the historic situation in terms of the location of the speech situation. 'Pointing'
by a deictic expression is correct when a historic situation is in a specified distance from
the speech situation. 'Pointing to' by a deictic expression is appropriate when the speaker
and the hearer share the speech situation so that the hearer can identify the historic
situation the speaker 'points to'.
If, in the historic situation the speaker 'points to', the entity the speaker 'points to' has/had
the feature he claims it to have, the speaker's assertion is true. Austin (1950) says:
A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the
demonstrative conventions (the one to which it 'refers') is of a type'* with which the sentence used in
making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions (Austin, 1950: 122).
For example, uttering the following sentence:
(44) Yuko saw a play yesterday,
the speaker 'points to' the entity by 'Yuko' and also 'points to' the historic situation which
is one day prior to the time of utterance by 'yesterday' and the past tense of the verb, and
4 Austin (1950: 122n) specifies the sense he uses the expression 'is of a type with which' as 'is
sufficiently like those standard states of affairs with which'.
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asserts the action of the entity 'pointed to' is of the type see a play (which is correlated
by the descriptive conventions with the words 'see/saw a play'). If I utter the sentence in
(44) to someone now (on 31st of August, 1998), 'pointing to' my friend by 'Yuko' and
'pointing to' 30th of August in 1998 by 'yesterday', my describing the historic situation is
correct because my friend Yuko saw the play which was a part of Edinburgh Festival on
30th August in 1998. This makes my whole act of stating about the particular historic
situation true.
If I utter the sentence in (45) instead 'pointing to' the same person by 'Yuko' and the same
historic situation by 'yesterday':
(45) Yuko went to a concert yesterday,
my describing is incorrect because Yuko did not go to the concert on the 30th of August in
1998. This makes my whole act of stating about the particular historic situation false: the
action of the entity in the historic situation 'pointed to' is not of the type go to a
concert (which is correlated by the demonstrative conventions to 'go/went to a concert')
the speaker claims it to be.
In the present section, we have shown that we can analyse the act of stating about a
historic situation in the same way as we analyse the act of stating about a particular
person. In the act of stating about a historic situation, a speaker by means of the
demonstrative conventions 'points to' a particular entity and the particular spatiotemporal
location where the entity is/was, and asserts by means of the descriptive conventions that
the entity is/was of a certain type or the action of the entity is/was of a certain type. It is the
relations between an actual state of affairs in the historic situation 'pointed to' and the type
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of state of affairs the speaker assigns to it that Austin (1959) describes by the concept of
truth. As we discussed in Chapter 2 (2.4.2) early Situation Semantics adopts Austin's
concept of truth in this sense.
We have described the demonstrative conventions on three levels; (i) the conventional
level where the relations between words/expressions and physical and temporal locations
of historic situation are concerned, (ii) the level of correct!incorrect 'pointing' where the
relations between words/expressions and the location of a particular historic situation the
speaker talks about are concerned, and (iii) the level of appropriate/inappropriate
'pointing' where the relations between words/expressions and the ways the speaker
specifies the location of the particular historic situation are concerned. The descriptive
conventions by which a speaker performs the act of stating about a particular historic
situation can be also described on three levels; (i) the conventional level where the
relations between words and types of state of affairs are concerned, and (ii) the level of
correct/incorrect describing where the relation between an actual state of affairs in the
historic situation and the type of state of affairs the speaker assigns to it are concerned.
Although we did not develop it above, there is a level of appropriate/inappropriate
describing where words/expressions and the ways the speaker specifies features of the
historic situation are concerned. We will discuss the relations between words/expressions
and the ways of specifying socially features of the historic situation in Chapter 4 and 5.
Using Austin's ideas of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions and concept of
truth, we have developed the semantic theory where meanings are described not only in
the dyadic relation between words and entities or historic situations, or words and types of
entity or situation, but also in the triadic relation where a speaker 'points to' a particular
entity or historic situation and describes it by assigning a type. By using the concept of
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appropriate/inappropriate 'pointing' and describing, we have incorporated in the theoiy
another aspect of meaning, which concerns how the speaker specifies in the speech
situation a particular entity or historic situation, or features of the entity or situation
'pointed to'.
3.4 Different Types of Speech Act
In 3.2 and 3.3 we have described how a speaker performs a speech act of stating about a
particular entity or a particular historic situation. In the act of stating about a particular
entity, a speaker 'points to' the entity by the demonstrative conventions and describes
idiosyncratic features of it by assigning it a particular type by means of the descriptive
conventions. In other words, the purpose of the act of stating is to give a hearer a picture
of a particular entity and its idiosyncratic attributes. Similarly, in the act of stating about a
particular historic situation, a speaker 'points to' a situation by demonstrative conventions,
while specifying the entity and the spatiotemporal location, and describes it by assigning it
a particular type by means of the descriptive conventions. The purpose of the act of stating
about a historic situation is to give a hearer a picture of a historic situation and the state of
affairs there.
As Austin (1953) says, this type of speech act is not the only type of act. There are three




A particular individual is described
stating
instancing
A particular attribute is described
placing
From subject to predicate
casting From predicate to subject
In the rest of 3.4 we discuss differences between the different types of speech act a
speaker performs by using the two types of convention. In 3.4.1 we explain the difference
between the act of stating and that of placing, and in 3.4.2 we explain the acts of
instancing and casting.
3.4.1 Stating and placing
3.4.1.1 Generic and non-generic sentences
In the act of stating, a speaker talks about a particular entity or a particular historic
situation and describes it by assigning a certain type to it. However, we do not always talk
about a particular entity or a particular situation. Consider the following example:
(48) The lion is a friendly beast,
117
By using the expression 'the lion', the speaker not only 'points to' a particular entity
which is of the type LION but 'points to' a type of entity which is a lion (that is, a type of
entity which is of the type LION). In the latter use of 'the lion', a speaker does not 'point
to' this individual or that individual, but 'points to' an attribute of the individual which is
not accidental but permanent, which is applicable to many other individuals of the same
class. Lyons (1977b) calls generic propositions what a speaker expresses by uttering the
sentence in (48) while using 'the lion' to say about ('point to') a type of entity which is a
lion:
... a generic proposition: i.e., a proposition which says something, not about this or that group of lions
or about any particular individual lion, but about the class of lions as such (Lyons, 1977b: 194).
There are two types of speech act a speaker can perform by uttering the sentence in (48).
A speaker can 'point to' a particular individual by 'the lion' and describe the idiosyncratic
attribute of it by assigning it a particular type, where the particular individual is described.
This is the act of stating. A speaker can also 'point to' an attribute of a class by 'the lion'
and describes the attribute by assigning it a type, where the particular attribute is
described. This is the act ofplacing.
The difference between the act of stating and the act of placing shows when the speaker
makes a false assertion in each act. If the speaker performs the act of stating by uttering
the sentence in (48), the assertion becomes false when the particular entity is not of the
type, FRIENDLY BEAST. If the speaker performs the act of placing, on the other hand, the
assertion does not become false immediately when there is an individual which is a LION
and not a friendly beast. Since the point of argument is whether or not the attribute of
being a type of LION is of a type, FRIENDLY BEAST (in other words, whether or not a
typical individual with the attribute of being a type of LION is of a type FRIENDLY BEAST),
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the existence of the individual which is a lion and not a friendly beast does not
immediately make the speaker's assertion false. The speaker's assertion becomes false
when a typical individual which is of the type lion is not of the type of friendly beast.
The similar contrast exists when the speaker 'points to' a situation. Dahl (1975) gives a
following example:
(49) a. A dog is barking,
b. A dog barks,
Krifka et al. (1995: 16) explain the above sentences:
Here [49a] is a particular sentence about a particular (specific) dog, and [49b] is a characterising sentence
which is not about a particular (specific) dog but, intuitively speaking, about dogs in general. Thus,
although a dog may be either specific or nonspecific in and of itself, [49a] cannot be interpreted as a
particular sentence about the kind Canis familiaris (or the class of dogs) stating that they happen to bark
at the moment, and [49b] cannot be interpreted as a characterising sentence about a particular dog, stating,
say, that Rover barks.
Let us explain the difference between the sentences above as different types of speech act.
Uttering a sentence in (49a), the speaker 'points to' an individual by 'a dog' and a
particular historic situation by present continuous tense, and describes the action of the
entity in the situation by assigning it the type bark. By uttering the sentence in (49b), on
the other hand, the speaker 'points to' a type of entity by 'a dog' and a typical situation
where the type of entity exists, and describes it by assigning it the type bark. If the
speaker utters the sentence in (49a) and the particular entity in the historic situation the
speaker 'points to' does not do the type of action bark, the speaker's assertion is false. If
the speaker utters the sentence in (49b) and the situation where the type of entity does the
type of action bark is not a typical situation, the speaker's assertion is false.
119
In Carlson (1989) and Krifka et al. (1995) the distinction between a historic situation and
a habitual situation is regarded as a generic and non-generic distinction. Consider the
following example from Krifka et al. (1995):
(50) a. John is smoking,
b. John smokes.
We can explain the difference between the habitual sentence (in (50b)) and the sentence of
a historic situation (in (50a)) in the same way as we described the difference between the
generic sentence (in (49b)) and the non-generic sentence (in (49a)). By uttering the
sentence in (50a), a speaker 'points to' a particular entity by 'John' and a particular
historic situation by present continuous, and asserts that the individual in the historic
situation does the action which is a type of SMOKE. By uttering the sentence in (50b), a
speaker 'points to' a particular individual by 'John' and a typical situation where the
individual is, and asserts that the entity typically does an action which is the type of
SMOKE.
By introducing the distinction between the act of stating and the act of placing, we do not
have to describe generic sentences as special cases. And the explanation that a speaker
'points to' an attribute of entity or situation by uttering a generic sentence is better than the
one that a speaker refers to ('points to') all entities in the class, which is often given to
generic sentences. This claim is often too strong for the meanings of some generic
sentences:
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(51) Beavers make dams5.
The sentence does not mean that all beavers makes a dam. Even if there are beavers which
do not make a dam, the sentence still can be true.
3.4.1.2 Referential use and attributive use of the definite descriptions
We purport to explain the difference between referential use and attributive use of the
definite description in term of the difference in speech acts. Let us have Donnellan
(1966)'s example again.
(52) Smith's murderer is insane.
According to Donnellan (1966), there are two interpretations for the sentence in (52). One
interpretation is that a speaker refers to a particular person, say, Jones, and asserts that he
is insane. The other is that a speaker refers to whoever is Smith's murder and asserts that
he is insane.
Let us correlate Donnellan (1966)'s referential use of the definite description with Austin
(1953)'s act of stating and Donnellan (1966)'s attributive use of the definite description
with Austin (1950)'s act ofplacing. The speaker can perform the act of stating by uttering
the sentence in (52). The speaker 'points to' a particular entity by 'Smith's murderer': the
speaker specifies the entity as the one who is a type MURDERER of a particular person
who has a proper name 'Smith'. And the speaker asserts that the idiosyncratic attribute of
this entity is of a type INSANE. If the attribute of the entity 'pointed to' is not the type of
5Carlson (1977).
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insane, the assertion is false: the speaker does not give the correct picture of the attribute
of the particular entity so that a hearer can understand the entity. If the person is not of the
type murderer of a particular person who has a proper name 'Smith', i.e., the entity is
not guilty of the murder, 'pointing' is incorrect. However the assertion still can be true if
the attribute of the entity is of the type insane.
The speaker can perform the act of placing by uttering the sentence in (52) as well. The
speaker 'points to' the attribute of being a murderer of a particular person named 'Smith',
whoever is in fact the person of the attribute, and describes it by assigning the type
insane to it. If the attribute of being a murderer of a particular person named 'Smith' is
not of the type insane, the assertion is false. For example, if the murdered person,
Smith, is the most vicious and cruel person in the world killing many kind and lovable
people, the attribute of being a murderer of him might not be of the type insane. In this
case, the assertion is false: the speaker gives a hearer a wrong picture of the attribute of
being the murderer of the person Smith. If Smith killed himself, the attribute of being the
murderer of the person Smith does not exist. This makes the speaker asserts something
about nothing, and there is no meaning conveyed.
We have described related but different sentences/readings in terms of the two different
types of speech act, i.e. stating and placing, and what assertion a speaker makes to a
hearer in each act. We have shown that we can explain successfully a difference between
generic and non-generic sentences/readings and a difference between referential use and
attributive use of the definite description in terms of these two types of speech act.
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3.4.2 Instancing and casting
In the acts of stating and placing, a speaker 'points to' a particular entity or a particular
attribute and describes it by assigning a certain type to it. In these cases, an entity or an
attribute of an entity is taken for granted and the point of question is what idiosyncratic
attribute the entity has (in the act of stating) or what linguistic type the attribute
corresponds to (in the act of placing). In both acts, the direction is from entities or
attributes of entities to linguistic types.
There is another direction. The speaker believes that (i) the hearer knows that some entity
has a certain idiosyncratic type but doesn't know which entity it is, or (ii) that the hearer
knows that some attribute is of a certain type but doesn't know what attribute it is. In the
former case, the speaker 'points to' an entity as the one whose attribute is of the type in
question, so that a hearer can identify the entity. This is the act of instancing. In the latter
case, the speaker 'points to' an attribute as the one which corresponds to the type in
question, so that the hearer can identify the attribute. This is the act of casting.
3.4.2.1 A-type and B-type utterances
Burton-Roberts (1986) notes the different interpretations of the sentence in (53) and
describes it in terms of difference in discourse. He says that, when 'Max' in the following
utterance is not a theme, the utterance is either about a person who is dandy or
'dandiness':
(53) Max is a dandy.
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The difference is made clear when we put the utterance in different discourses; (54) and
(55):
(54) A: Who is a dandy?
B: Max is a dandy.
(55) A: What is a dandy?
B: Max is a dandy.
Burton-Roberts explains the difference in terms of what he calls prepositional and
pragmatic (in)equivalence to the utterance, 'A dandy is what Max is'. Consider the
following examples:
(56) A: Who is a dandy?
B: !A dandy is what Max is.
(57) A: What is a dandy?
B: A dandy is what Max is.
Uttering the sentence, 'Max is a dandy' in (55) is equivalent to uttering the sentence, 'A
dandy is what Max is' as is shown in (57), while uttering it in (54) is not, as is shown in
(56). Burton-Roberts (1986) calls the type of utterance in (54) Type A and the type in (55)
Type B and distinguishes a discourse where and A-type utterance is to be uttered from the
one where B-type utterance is to be uttered.
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Furthermore, Burton-Roberts (1986) notices that a question that initiates a B-type
discourse, say, 'What is a dandy?' in (55) constitutes a canonical means of requesting a
definition:
Canonical answer to that question should supply, or purport to supply, definitions, or at least partial
definitions (Burton-Roberts, 1986:55).
The act of instancing corresponds to a sentence which can be an answer to the A-type
utterance, 'Who is x?'. In (54), the speaker B performs the act of instancing: the speaker
B 'points to' a particular entity by 'Max' as the entity whose idiosyncratic attribute is of
the type dandy. The act of casting corresponds to a sentence which can be an answer to
the B-type utterance, 'What is x?'. In (55), the speaker B performs the act of casting: the
speaker B 'points to' a particular attribute through an individual who has the attribute by
'Max' as the one which corresponds to the linguistic type dandy.
The ways the act of instancing and that of casting go wrong are different. Imagine the
speaker uttering the sentence in (53) to 'point to' an entity by 'Max' and asserts that this is
the entity whose idiosyncratic attribute is of the type dandy (performing an act of
instancing). If the entity Max in fact does not have the attribute which is of the type
dandy, the assertion is false. For example, the entity 'pointed to' by 'Max' never wears
nice clothes and is never stylish, the speaker's assertion is false: this individual does not
have the attribute in question.
Imagine the speaker uttering the sentence in (53) to 'point to' an attribute through an
individual who has the attribute by 'Max' and asserts that this attribute is of the type
dandy (performing an act of casting). We find out the attribute is not of the type dandy:
the attribute does not correspond to a sense that we use the word 'dandy' for. In this case,
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we assume either (i) the speaker makes a false assertion: he knows the sense of the word
'dandy' but wrongly explained it correlating the wrong attribute to it, or (ii) the speaker
uses the word 'dandy' in a different sense.
In performing the act of casting, a speaker 'should, or purport to supply, definition, or at
least partial definitions' (Burton-Roberts, 1986:55). The act of casting can be structurally
marked by 'x is what y is', say, 'A dandy is what Max is'. It is not surprising at all that to
utter the sentence in (53) to perform a speech act of casting is to give a definition of
'dandy'. This is what a speaker does to give an ostensive definition. If the speaker utters
the sentence:
(58) This is a dandy.
the speaker 'points to' the attribute and asserts that this attribute corresponds to the
linguistic type DANDY. In the act of casting, a speaker asserts something about the
language not about the world. In asserting that a particular attribute corresponds to the
linguistic type in question, the speaker does not give the hearer any information about the
world, while the speaker gives the hearer information about the world in the act of
instancing: say, a particular entity in the world is of the attribute in question.
A speaker can perform a speech act of instancing not only about a particular entity but also
about a particular situation. Consider the following example:
(59) A: You are a caring mother,
B: I was (a caring mother) ten years ago.
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Speaker B 'points to' a particular historic situation in the past by 'ten years ago' and the
past tense, and asserts that that was a situation when the entity, herself, is of a type of
CARING MOTHER. The speaker's assertion is false when the particular historic situation
'pointed to' is not the situation where the entity, the speaker herself, is of the type of
CARING MOTHER.
A speaker can perform the act of casting about a situation. Consider the following
example:
(60) A: What is it like if life goes wrong?
B: The life of your uncle Tom goes wrong.
The speaker 'points to' an attribute of a situation through the situation where a particular
entity is, and asserts that the attribute is of the type of situation where LIFE GO WRONG.
3.5 Conclusion
In the present chapter, we have successfully described truth-conditional meanings using
the demonstrative and descriptive conventions. The demonstrative conventions correlate
words with a particular entity or a particular historic situation. The descriptive conventions
correlate words with types of entity or situation. Using these two types of conventions a
speaker can perform different types of speech act about a particular entity and an attribute
of entities, and a particular situation and an attribute of situations. We have shown how
four types of speech act are made possible by these two types of conventions, and
described them in correlating them with linguistic factors such as genericity,
referential/attributive uses of the definite description, and A-type and B-type utterances.
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By using the concepts of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions and speech acts
which are made by these conventions, we have developed the semantic theory where we
can describe in a coherent manner different types of meaning which are in a wider scope
than straightforward truth-conditional meanings. In Chapter 4, we will develop the theory
so that non-truth-conditional conventional meanings can be incorporated and described
fully in a coherent manner.
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Chapter 4
Indicating and Meanings of ContextC
4.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we developed the theory where meanings are described as
what speaker asserts about the world, using Austin (1950)'s concepts of
demonstrative and descriptive conventions. We have also developed Austin (1953)'s
four types of speech act. We have shown that by uttering a sentence a speaker
potentially performs four types of speech act; stating, placing, instancing, and casting.
We have succeeded in analysing truth-conditional meaning in the theory as what the
speaker expresses in performing an act of stating.
As we showed in Chapter 1, there is another type of meaning, which is indicated
rather than asserted, where appropriateness/inappropriateness rather than truth/falsity
(or correctness/incorrectness) is concerned. This type of meaning concerns the speech
situation the speaker and the hearer share, especially the social aspect of the speech
situation. We call these meanings meanings of CONTEXTc. Meanings of CONTEXTc
are conventional, not context-specific. By means of linguistically conventionalized
devices, the speaker indicates that the speech situation is of a certain type or that the
social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation is of a certain
type. The conventions which enable the speaker to indicate something about the
speech situation are linguistic conventions, just as the conventions which enable the
speaker to assert something about a particular entity or historic situation are.
Therefore, the violation of both types of conventions causes miscommunication.
However, as we will show in the present chapter, they cause different types of
miscommunication. If the speaker violates the conventions about asserting, the
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speaker gives the hearer a wrong picture of the entity or historic situation in the world.
In this case, the speaker's act becomes incorrect, and the whole statement becomes
false. If the speaker violates the conventions about indicating, on the other hand, he
fails to create a speech situation where he and the hearer communicate with each other
at a comfortable social distance. In this case, the speaker's indicating becomes
inappropriate.
In the present chapter, we will develop Austin's two types of convention so that we
can describe meanings of CONTEXTc as conventional meanings in our theory of
meaning. In the following section (in 4.2) we will discuss meanings of CONTEXTc
and develop the theory, while clarifying some concepts, such as meanings of
CONTEXTc, speech situations, indicating, and the demonstrative and descriptive
conventions in the act of indicating. In 4.3, we will discuss lexical and grammatical
devices which are conventionally correlated with meanings of CONTEXTc, and
describe different meanings expressed by them. In 4.4, we will discuss related issues.
4.2 Meanings of CONTEXTc
4.2.1 Meanings of CONTEXTc
In Chapter 1, we have defined meanings of CONTEXTc as context-independent non-
truth-conditional meanings. Consider the following example:
(1) I am awake, silly.
The meaning which concerns 'I am awake' can be described as a meaning the speaker
asserts about the world. Let us assume that the speaker performs the act of stating by
uttering the sentence. According to the theory we developed in the previous chapter,
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the speaker 'points to' a particular entity by the first-person pronoun T, i.e., the
speaker 'points to' himself, and asserts that this entity is of a type AWAKE. This
meaning, which the speaker expresses in performing an act of stating about the entity,





where 'x' is a particular entity and 'S' is a speaker, and the square expresses a historic
situation where this particular entity exists. We use Kamp and Reyle (1993)'s idea of
showing meanings by symbols and boxes, but we do not follow their Discourse
Representation Theory in details. Our main purpose of using diagrams is to show that
there are two different types of meaning the speaker expresses by uttering a sentence.
The meaning about the historic situation shown in the diagram in (2) is not all the
meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (1). The speaker expresses a
different type of meaning by the vocative 'silly'. By the vocative 'silly', the speaker
indicates that the speaker and the hearer share a certain type of speech situation, rather
than asserts as the fact that the hearer is of a type SILLY. Let us compare the meaning
of the sentence in (1) with the meaning of the sentence in (3), where the speaker
asserts as a fact in the world that the hearer is of the type SILLY.
(3) I am awake, and you are silly.
The difference between them becomes clear when we compare the ways uttering each
sentence goes wrong. Uttering the sentence in (3) goes wrong when the hearer is not
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of the type SILLY: the speaker describes the feature of the entity, i.e. the hearer
incorrectly and, in doing so, gives a wrong picture of the world. Uttering the sentence
in (1), on the other hand, goes wrong when the speaker does not have a certain social
relation to the hearer which allows the speaker to assign the silliness to the hearer. The
hearer might not mind being addressed by 'silly' by her family or close friend, but she
might as well resent being addressed by it by a stranger. The hearer might not mind
being addressed by 'silly' in a private, informal situation, but she might as well resent
being addressed by it in a serious, formal situation. That is, if the speaker and the
hearer do not have the social relation which allows the speaker to assign silliness to the
hearer, uttering the vocative 'silly' is inappropriate. The speaker makes the hearer
uncomfortable by it.
The vocatives in the following examples express more clearly meanings of types of
social relation between the speaker and the hearer or types of speech situation they
share.
(4) a. I'm awake, darling,
b. I'm awake, Sir.
In (4a) legitimacy of addressing a hearer by the vocative 'darling' does not depend on
whether or not the hearer is of a type DARLING, but whether or not the speaker and the
hearer share a certain type of social relation, i.e., whether or not the speaker is socially
close to the hearer. Similarly, in (4b), legitimacy of addressing the hearer by the
vocative 'Sir' depends on whether or not the hearer is socially higher than the speaker
or the speech situation the speaker shares with the hearer is formal, not on whether or
not the hearer is the type SIR. In fact the word 'Sir' is not normally used to predicate
something of the referent (to describe the entity 'pointed to', in our theoretical
framework), as is shown in the following:
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(5) ?You are Sir.
Meanings of CONTEXTc, which directly concern the social relation between the
speaker and the hearer or the speech situation they share, are as important as meanings
asserted as a fact in the world, i.e., truth-conditional meaning. Imagine that in the
Northern Ireland peace talks one addresses a person in the opponent group by the
vocative 'you terrorist':
(6) You should hand in your weapons, you terrorist!
By addressing the hearer by 'you terrorist', the speaker indicates that the speaker and
the hearer share a type of speech situation which allows the speaker to assign a veiy
negative, insulting attribute to the hearer. In doing so, the speaker endangers
communication itself. The hearer might think there is no reason at all why he should
accept such an insulting speech situation, and stop communicating. The
appropriateness/inappropriateness of addressing the hearer by 'you terrorist' is no
less important than the truth/falsity of assigning to the historic situation a type
expressed by, 'you should hand in your weapons'.
We propose to describe these meanings of CONTEXTc as types of speech situation and
social relation in the speech situation. Just as the speaker 'points to' a particular entity
or historic situation and asserts that it is of a certain type, the speaker indicates that the
present speech situation or the social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the
speech situation is of a certain type. In the following sections (4.2.2 and 4.2.3), we
will develop the framework of the theory where we can describe meaning of
CONTEXTc as a meaning the speaker expresses about the speech situation by using the
demonstrative and descriptive conventions.
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4.2.2 Speech situations
When two people share the situation where they can reasonably assume that the other
person understands his spoken or written message and is willing to respond to it, they
are in the speech situation1. So if two people are communicating, they are already in
the speech situation. Sharing the speech situation, however, is not accompanied
automatically by one's sending a message to another, as it might superficially look.
Suppose you go to Japan without any knowledge of the language. You cannot share a
speech situation with a monolingual Japanese: he does not understand you. Your
uttering a sentence is no more effective than making a meaningless sound. Even in
your own community, you might not be able to share a speech situation with another
person. If you speak to the person and he refuses to respond, you cannot share a
speech situation with him.
To communicate with someone by uttering something is to create a speech situation
where two people are willing to accept roles of the speaker and the hearer, and
exchange opinions about the world. This implies that a speech situation exists between
the speaker and the hearer even when the speaker utters a sentence whose meaning
does not concern the speech situation. Consider the following sentence:
(7) John is a bachelor.
If we want to describe accurately the fact that the speech situation exists even when the
speaker doesn't actually indicate anything of it, the model of the meaning of the
sentence in (7) should be as follows:
"Because both spoken and written communication are concerned, the term 'speech situation' is not
appropriate. However, since the term is widely used and it gives us a clear idea, we use the term
without excluding written communication.
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(8)
The square on the right signifies the historic situation where the entity who is the
bearer of the name 'John' exists and the entity is of the type BACHELOR. The circle on
the left signifies a speech situation. However, since the meaning of the sentence in (7)
does not concern types of speech situation, there isn't any practical reason why we
should show the speech situation in the diagram. When a meaning is not directly
related to the speech situation, we can describe it without hypothesising the speech
situation. This is what all decontextualized approaches to meaning do.
The meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in (9), on the other hand,
directly concerns the type of the speech situation the speaker shares with the hearer.
(9) The door is open, Sir.
When the speaker utters the sentence in (9), we know that the speaker indicates that
the hearer is socially higher than him or the speech situation is formal. To explain this,
we hypothesise the conventional relation between addressing the hearer by 'Sir' and a
type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker in the speech situation or the
speech situation itself is formal. Using this conventional relation, the speaker specifies
the present speech situation by assigning it this type. That is, by uttering the sentence
in (9), the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is
socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. This meaning as well as
the meaning about the particular historic situation, where the speaker 'points to' a
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particular entity by 'the door' and describes it by assigning it the type OPEN, are





'Hi(H,S)' in the circle means that a hearer (H) is socially higher than a speaker (S). 'F'
means that a speech situation is formal. In the following section, we will explain the
conventions by which the speaker specifies the present speech situation which he
shares with the hearer.
4.2.3 Indicating and the demonstrative and descriptive conventions
When the speaker utters a vocative, such as 'Sir' 'silly', 'darling', and 'stupid' as a
part of the sentence, the hearer knows, as we do, the speaker assigns a certain type
correlated with the vocative to the present speech situation. This shows that addressing
a hearer by a certain vocative is correlated by convention with a type of speech
situation, and using those conventions the speaker creates a particular type of speech
situation between him and the hearer.
The speaker's 'pointing to' the present speech situation is like his 'pointing to' a
particular entity or situation in the act of asserting. There are, however, some
important differences. When the speaker 'points to' the speech situation, he does not
pick it out as he picks out an entity or historic situation. The only speech situation he
can pick out is the speech situation he shares with the hearer at the time of utterance,
while the speaker can pick out almost any entity or historic situation in the world. For
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example, the speaker cannot 'point to' the speech situation he shared with the different
hearer two days ago by uttering the vocative 'Sir'. For the reason that the speaker
cannot 'point to' any speech situation but the present one, we prefer the term
'highlight' to 'point to' for the speech situation.
Another difference is that, while 'pointing to' an entity or situation and assigning a
type to it are clearly distinguished in asserting, highlighting the present speech
situation and assigning a type to it are not in indicating. For example, addressing the
hearer by the vocative 'Sir', there is no clear distinction between a component of
highlighting the present speech situation and a component of assigning it a type where
a hearer is socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. This is like a
road sign 'Stop', where there is no clear distinction between pointing at the place and
describing it as the place to stop. As for vocatives, Lyons (1977b:225) says, 'One
might even argue the stronger claim that the distinction between naming and describing
is never absolutely clear in vocative expressions2'.
What are the functions of act of indicating? It seems to be to specify social parameters
of the present speech situation. By using the demonstrative and descriptive
conventions, the speaker assigns a certain social type to the present speech situation
highlighted, and in doing so, specifies the social parameters of the present speech
situation. For example, by the vocative 'Sir', the speaker specifies the present speech
situation as a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker or a speech situation
is formal. If the present speech situation is not of the type, indicating becomes
inappropriate. This makes the hearer uncomfortable communicating with the speaker,
which might lead to communication breakdown.
"We will discuss this point into detail in 4.3.1.2 in the present chapter.
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Another important function of indicating is a performative function. The speaker
specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation while already
communicating in the very speech situation. In a sense, the speaker is making a case
of communicating in the type of speech situation by uttering the sentence in which he
specifies the speech situation by that type. To explain this performative function of
indicating, we use the term 'create': the speaker does not just specify the present
speech situation as a certain type, but creates the type of speech situation between him
and the hearer. This is like the speaker creating a particular type of speech act by
uttering a performative sentence. If the speaker specifies the present speech situation
by an inappropriate type, and accordingly creates the type of speech situation between
him and the hearer inappropriately, the hearer most likely rejects it. Then creating the
type does not count. This is similar to the case where uttering the performative
sentence, 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow' becomes infelicitous when no one
accepts the offer saying something like 'Done'3.
In the following section, we will analyse the demonstrative and descriptive
conventions which concern vocatives, personal pronouns, and honorifics, and
describe what type of speech situation the speaker creates by means of those
conventions.
4.3 Descriptive Conventions and Different Meanings of
CONTEXTc
4.3.1 Vocatives
A surprisingly small number of studies have been done on vocatives in English. It
seems to be the case that traditional analyses of meanings which are based on reference
3 See Austin (1963:9)
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and predication do not apply to vocatives in a straightforward sense. We will introduce
analyses of vocatives by McCawley (1981) and Lyons (1977b) in the following.
McCawley (1981) describes vocatives in term of what he calls 'pragmatic
presupposition', and Lyons (1977b) describes vocatives in terms of reference and
predication.
4.3.1.1 Vocatives in McCawley (1981)
It is a standard interpretation that the meanings expressed by vocatives do not
contribute to prepositional contents of the sentences. McCawley (1981:237-239)
demonstrates this point by the following example:
(11) You know, Sam, China is industrializing rapidly.
According to McCawley, if the addressee is not called Sam, the utterance is
inappropriate, though the proposition which it expresses is true or false depending on
whether China is or is not industrializing rapidly, regardless of the name of the person
to whom the utterance is addressed. McCawley explains the meaning expressed by
'Sam' in terms of presupposition; it is presupposed that the addressee is Sam. He
describes this type of presupposition as 'pragmatic presupposition' and distinguishes
it from semantic presuppositions, which are shown in the following examples:
(12) a. Cecil is aware that Marcia is pregnant,
b. Marcia is pregnant.
(13) a. The Senator, didn't reveal that he, had spent the winter in Monaco,
b. The Senator spent the winter in Monaco.
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(14) a. It's odd that Oliver didn't kiss Pauline,
b. Oliver didn't kiss Pauline.
(15) a. The public doesn't realize that Nauru threatens our security,
b. Nauru threatens our security.
According to McCawley, in each pair, the proposition expressed by the first sentence
can reasonably be held to semantically presuppose the proposition expressed by the
second sentence, that is, for the first sentence to be either true or false, the second
sentence must be true. Semantic presupposition is thus described as a relationship
between two propositions. Whereas a relation between the sentence in (11) and the
meaning that the addressee is Sam is a pragmatic presupposition because that is 'a
relation between an utterance and a proposition' (McCawley, 1981:237-238).
McCawley says pragmatically presupposed meaning is described in terms of
appropriateness and inappropriateness. The sentence in (11) pragmatically
presupposes that the addressee is Sam, and if it is not the case, the utterance becomes
inappropriate. Similarly the following sentence pragmatically presupposes that the
addressee is the President, and, if it is not the case, the utterance becomes
inappropriate:
(16) Mr. President, I order you to give me all your tapes.
The important point McCawley (1981) makes is that (i) meanings expressed by
vocatives are not a part of prepositional contents of the sentences, and (ii), if there is
something wrong with the use of a vocative, the sentence becomes inappropriate rather
than false. Because McCawley follows the traditional dichotomy between semantics
and pragmatics, where only truth-conditional meanings are semantic meanings, he
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describes the meanings expressed by 'Sam' and 'Mr President' as pragmatic
meanings. We, however, analyse those meanings expressed by vocatives in the
extended scope of semantics as we discussed in Chapter 1.
4.3.1.2 Analysis of vocatives in Lyons (1977b)
As the relation between the title of Lyons (1977b) and its contents shows, Lyons uses
the term 'semantics' in a wider sense than truth-conditional semanticists do. Lyons
(1977b) includes the analysis of vocatives in the scope of semantic meaning.
The interesting point Lyons makes is that 'the lexeme which denotes the class can also
be used to address an individual member of the class' (Lyons, 1977b:224). Compare
the following sentences:
(17) Come here, dog,
(18) Come here, Fido.
Lyons says, although the former is analysed as 'Come here, you who are a dog' and
the latter as 'Come here, you who are named Fido', the distinction between the
predicative function of the statement 'It's a dog' and the appellative4 function of the
statement 'It's Fido' is not clear in vocative expressions.
This point concerns our former discussion about an intrinsic difference between an act
of asserting and an act of indicating. In the act of asserting, 'pointing at' an entity or
historic situation is clearly distinguished from assigning a type to it (predicating
something of it). In the act of indicating, however, highlighting the present speech
4Lyons uses the term 'appellative' for uses of names to mean their bearers which are not referential
use: for example 'John' and 'John Smith' in the sentences, 'This is John' and 'He is called John
Smith'. See Lyons( 1977:217).
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situation is not clearly distinguished from assigning a type to it. Both the type of
word, like 'Fido', which is predominantly related to the demonstrative conventions in
the act of asserting (e.g., 4Fido' in 'Fido is a dog') and the type of word like 'dog',
which is predominantly related to the descriptive conventions in the act of asserting
(e.g., 'dog' in 'Fido is a dog') can be used as a vocative.
This difference is reflected by the ways in which specifying the present speech
situation by vocatives becomes inappropriate. Specifying the present speech situation
by the vocative 'Gill':
(19) I'll call you tonight, Gill,
becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not Gill, but, say, Tessa: the name is
wrong. However, specifying the present speech situation by the vocative 'blondie':
(20) Here you are, blondie,
becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not of the type: she is not blond.
Lyons describes the distinction between referring and describing as different types of
lexeme, that is, proper names and common nouns. According to Lyons, 'Fido' is a
proper name, and 'dog' is a common noun. However, there are a number of
borderline cases:
P]s 'the sun' a proper name (like 'The Hague') or an expression containing a common noun? Once we
use 'sun' in the plural (as in the sentence 'There may be other suns in the universe as well as our
own') we may be inclined to say that it is a common noun. But a nominalist might argue that cases
like this can still be analysed like sentences containing proper names in the plural ('There are other
Peters in the room') (Lyons, 1977b:225p.
5See also Quine(1960).
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There are borderline cases in vocatives, too. Consider the following examples:
(21) Judge, may we approach the bench?
(22) The dinner is ready, my Lord.
Does the speaker use the vocative 'Judge' in (21) in a similar way as he uses 'Fido' in
(18)? Or does the speaker use it in a similar way as he uses 'dog' in (17)? It is difficult
to decide. The vocative, 'Judge' is like 'Fido' in (18) in the sense that a particular
entity is addressed by the word. It is also like 'dog' in (17) in the sense that the entity
has to be of a particular type: if the entity is not a judge, he cannot be addressed by
'Judge'. For the same reason, it is difficult to say which way 'my Lord' in (22) is
used.
It seems that in these borderline cases, the function of 'pointing to' an individual and
that of 'pointing to' an attribute are mixed. As we discussed in Chapter 3, most words
are either (i) principally correlated with 'pointing to' an entity or historic situation (by
demonstrative conventions), and correlated with, to a much lesser degree, types of
entity or historic situation (by descriptive conventions), or (ii) dominantly correlated
with types of entity and situation (by descriptive conventions), and correlated with, to
a much lessor degree, 'pointing to' an entity or historic situation (by demonstrative
conventions). That is, the demonstrative conventions and descriptive conventions do
not exclude each other. So we can reasonably assume that vocatives are also correlated
with both types of convention. Some meanings more concern the hearer as a particular
person, and other meanings more concern the hearer as a person of a type, and there
are also mixed cases.
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4.3.1.3 Vocatives in our model
In both McCawley (1981) and Lyons (1977b), meanings expressed by vocatives are
analysed as meanings about a hearer6. In Lyons (1977b), two types of vocative are
differentiated. One is a proper name type: addressing the hearer by this type of
vocative becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not the individual who is the bearer
of the name. The other is a common noun type: addressing the hearer by this type of
vocative becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not of the type the common noun
correlated with. The vocative 'Sam' in (22a) in the following is an example of the
proper name type, and 'stupid' in (22b) is an example of the common noun type. Let
us show the meanings of the sentences in (22a) and (22b) in the diagrams in (23) and
(24) respectively.
(22) a. China is industrializing rapidly, Sam,





'H=SAM' means that the hearer is the bearer of the name 'Sam', and by assigning this
type to the present speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation
as a type where a speaker is communicating with a hearer who is a particular
individual with a proper name 'Sam'. We will describe the meanings expressed by the
vocatives of the proper name type in the following section (4.3.1.3.1).




'S:stupid(H)' means that the speaker assigns stupidity to the hearer, and by assigning
this type to the present speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech
situation as a type where a speaker and a hearer share such a hostile relation that the
speaker does not mind giving the hearer a negative and offensive type. We will
describe the meanings expressed by the vocatives of descriptive type in 4.3.1.3.27. In
4.3.1.3.3, we will describe the meanings expressed by the vocatives of other types.
4.3.1.3.1 Proper name type
By uttering the vocative 'Sam' in (22a), the speaker specifies the present speech
situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a hearer who is a particular
person with the name 'Sam'. In doing so, the speaker creates this type between him
and the hearer. If the speaker addresses the hearer by a wrong name, the speaker's
specifying the present speech situation as this type is inappropriate. The speaker
cannot create this type of speech situation between him and the hearer because the
hearer with whom the speaker is communicating does not have the name 'Sam'. The
hearer most probably responds to the speaker by saying something like 'I'm not Sam'.
This is similar to one of the cases where uttering a performative sentence becomes
infelicitous, which Austin (1962) calls 'misapplication'. This is violation of the
7Since we also analyse adjectives which are used as a vocative, we use the term of 'the vocatives of
the descriptive type', instead of Lyons' term of 'the vocatives of the common-name type'.
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condition that 'the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved' (Austin, 1962: 15).
The linguistic conventions which concern addressing the hearer by his/her name seem
to be further differentiated in terms of the social relations between the speaker and the
hearer. Consider the following sentences.
(25) a. There's a car at the door, Professor Johnson,
b. There's a car at the door, Robert,
c. There's a car at the door, Bertie.
Imagine the hearer is Professor Robert Johnson. If the appropriateness of specifying
the present speech situation by addressing the hearer by his/her name entirely depends
on who the hearer is, utterances of sentences in (25a) to (25c) are equally appropriate
whoever utters it. However, this is not the case. These sentences can be inappropriate
even if the hearer is Professor Robert Johnson.
If the wife of Professor Johnson utters the sentence in (25a), it sounds inappropriate,
unless she says it jokingly or ironically. Similarly, if the student of Professor Johnson
utters the sentence in (25c), it sounds inappropriate, unless they are in a specially close
relation. This shows that specifying the speech situation by addressing the hearer by
his/her name is further differentiated in terms of the social relation between the speaker
and the hearer. A vocative of title plus last name is correlated with a type of distant
relation between a speaker and a hearer, a vocative of first name is correlated with a
type of close relation, and a vocative of diminutive form of the first name is correlated
with a type of very close relation. By means of these linguistic conventions, the
speaker specifies the social parameters of the present speech situation he shares with
the hearer.
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By addressing the hearer by title plus last name, the speaker specifies the present
speech situation by a type where a speaker is communicating with a person to whom
the speaker is socially distant. In doing so, the speaker creates this type of speech
situation between him and the hearer. If the present speech situation is not of this type,
addressing the hearer by title plus last name is inappropriate. The speaker creates the
type of speech situation between him and the hearer inappropriately, which makes the
hearer uncomfortable. The speaker can, however, intentionally specify the present
speech situation by the inappropriate type: although the speaker knows that it is not the
type of the present speech situation, he assigns the certain type to the present speech
situation to be amusing (or to mean something else). For example, the wife of
Professor Johnson can utter the sentence in (25a) above ironically: she knows the type
where a speaker is socially distant to a hearer is not the type of the present speech
situation she shares with her husband, but intentionally specifies the present speech
situation as such.
By addressing the hearer by first name, on the other hand, the speaker specifies the
present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a person to
whom the speaker is socially close. By addressing the hearer by a diminutive form of
the first name, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a
speaker is communicating with a person to whom the speaker is socially very close. In
doing so, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.
Different ways of addressing the hearer by name are also correlated with types of
speech situation, i.e., formal and informal types of speech situation. Imagine the
couple work for the same university. Even if they address each other by a diminutive
form of the first name at home, they address each other by title plus last name at the
board meeting of the university. This shows that addressing a hearer by a name is not
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only correlated with the types of social relation, but also types of speech situation.
Addressing a hearer by title plus last name is correlated with a formal type of speech
situation. Using this relation, the speaker specifies the present speech as a formal type
by addressing the hearer by title plus last name. Similarly there are conventional
relations between addressing a hearer by first name and an informal type of speech
situation, and between addressing a hearer by a diminutive form of the first name and
a very informal type of speech situation. Using these relations, the speaker specifies
the social parameters of the present speech situation he shares with the hearer.
It is possible that there are competing social elements in the speech situation. There are
cases, for example, in which the speaker and the hearer are socially close but they are
in a formal situation, or the speaker and the hearer are socially distant but they are in a
very informal situation. By which type the speaker specifies the present speech
situation in these cases is culturally specific. Describing these culturally specific
elements are, however, beyond the scope of the present thesis.
Let us demonstrate meanings of the sentences in (25a) to (25c), where the speaker
specifies the present speech situation as a certain type by addressing the hearer by
'Professor Johnson', 'Robert' or 'Bertie', in the diagrams in (26), (27) and (28).
(26)
'D(S,H)' means 'the speaker is socially distant to the hearer', and 'F' means 'the











'C(S,H)' means 'the speaker is socially close to the hearer', and 'IF' means 'the
speech situation is informal'.
'C+(S,H)' means 'the speaker is socially very close to the hearer', and 'IF+' means
'the speech situation is very informal'.
4.3.1.3.2 Descriptive type
By addressing the hearer by a vocative of the descriptive type, the speaker specifies
the type of the present speech situation in terms of his assigning a particular type to the









By addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid', the speaker specifies the present
speech as a type where a speaker is assigning stupidity to a hearer. Consider the
following example:
(29) You're standing in my foot, stupid.
Assigning the negative type of stupidity to the hearer seems to be correlated with a
type of speech situation in which a speaker is offensive to a hearer. That is, by
addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid', the speaker specifies the present speech
situation as a type where a speaker is offensive to a hearer.
There seem to be two different ways in which addressing the hearer by 'stupid'
becomes inappropriate. It becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not of the type
STUPID. If one has a brother who always addresses him by 'stupid', he might one day
protest as follows:
(30) A: Let's go, stupid.
B: Don't call me stupid. I am not stupid.
Addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid' becomes also inappropriate when the
speaker and the hearer do not share the speech situation where the speaker should/can
be offensive to the hearer. Imagine someone utters the sentence, 'You're standing in
my foot, stupid' to you, and it is not you who are standing in the speaker's foot. You
would claim that the speaker should/can not be offensive to the hearer, i.e., you,
because you are not standing in the speaker's foot. You might respond to the hearer in
the following way:
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(31) A: You're standing in my foot, stupid.
B: Don't call me stupid. I'm not standing in your foot.
Addressing the hearer by the vocative 'stupid' is correlated with the type of speech
situation where a hearer is of the type STUPID and a speaker is offensive to a hearer.
Using this relation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation he shares with
the hearer as such by addressing the hearer by 'stupid'.
However, as the following example shows, in addressing the hearer by 'stupid' the
speaker can specify the present speech situation as a type which is not offensive:
(32) I love you, stupid.
Addressing the hearer by 'stupid' is indirectly correlated with a type where a speaker
assigns a hearer a negative type non-offensively, i.e., a type where giving a hearer a
negative type is not counted negative because of the close and affectionate social
relation between a speaker and a hearer. In short, addressing the hearer by 'stupid' is
indirectly correlated with a type where a speaker is close and affectionate to a hearer.
The relation between addressing the hearer by 'stupid' and this type of speech
situation is not as conventional as the more straightforward relation between
addressing a hearer by 'stupid' and the offensive type of speech situation (as in (29)).
Therefore, the speaker has to mark 'non-offensiveness' so that the hearer can
understand that the speaker creates a close and affectionate type of speech situation by
addressing the hearer by 'stupid'. The speaker might mark 'non-offensiveness' by
intonation, a content of assertion (as in 'I love you' in (32)) and so on, unless non-
offensiveness is unmistakably obvious between the speaker and the hearer.
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Not every word of the descriptive type is used as a vocative. Consider the following
example:
(33) a. Well done, clever.
b. ?Well done, intelligent.
Addressing a hearer by 'clever', the speaker specifies the present speech situation in
terms of the speaker's assigning cleverness to the hearer. That is, the speaker specifies
the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is of the type CLEVER and a
speaker admires a hearer (about his quick understanding or skillfulness). However,
addressing the hearer by 'intelligent' is not conventionally correlated with a particular
type of speech situation. A potential type of speech situation where a speaker admires
a hearer about his intellectual ability is not conventionalized in English.
4.3.1.3.2.2 'Darling' type
There is a type of vocative which is directly correlated with types of social relation
between a speaker and a hearer. Consider the following examples:
(34) a. I'm ready, darling,
b. I'm ready, sweetheart.
The vocatives 'darling' and 'sweetheart' are correlated with a type of speech situation
where a speaker is very intimate and affectionate to a hearer. Using these conventional
relations, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as such by addressing the
hearer by 'darling' or 'sweetheart'. In doing so, the speaker creates this type of speech
situation between him and the hearer. Addressing the hearer by 'darling' or
'sweetheart' becomes inappropriate when the speaker does not have a close and
152
affectionate relation to the hearer or the hearer does not want to share this type of
speech situation with the speaker. The hearer might express this as follows:
(35) A: Nice weather, darling.
B: Don't call me darling. I'm not your darling.
4.3.1.3.2.3 'Blondie' type
There is another type of vocative. Consider the following examples:
(36) a. Here you are, blondie.
b. Here you are, biggie.
By 'blondie' or 'biggie', the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of
assigning a particular type to a hearer's prominent physical attribute. That is, the
speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a hearer is of the type
BLOND or BIG and a speaker is frank and friendly to a hearer. If the word has a
negative meaning, addressing the hearer by the word can be abusive or insulting.
Consider the following Japanese examples:
(37) b. ashi wo fun de iru yo, chibi .
foot stand in short
'(You) are standing in (my) foot, short'
a. ashi wo fun de iru yo, hage,
foot stand in bald
'(You) are standing in (my) foot, bald'
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Chibi in (37a) is a slang word for 'short' (se-ga-hikui is a standard expression for
'short') and expresses a negative meaning. By addressing the hearer by chibi, the
speaker specifies the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is of the type
SHORT and a speaker is abusive or insulting to a hearer. In doing so, the speaker
creates an abusive type of speech situation between him and the hearer. Similarly, by
addressing the hearer by hage ('bald') (in (37b)), the speaker specifies the present
speech situation as a type where a hearer is of the type BALD and a speaker is abusive
or insulting to a hearer.
There is an interesting difference between addressing the 'stupid' type of vocative and
addressing the 'blondie' type of vocative. By addressing the hearer by 'stupid', the
speaker creates an offensive type of speech situation even though the hearer is not of
the type. If, for example, the speaker utters, 'You're standing in my foot, stupid', the
speaker creates an offensive speech situation between him and the person he speaks
to. This is so, even if the person is not of the type STUPID. If the speaker, on the other
hand, addresses the hearer by 'blondie' where the hearer does not have blonde hair,
the speaker cannot create a friendly type of speech situation between him and the
hearer. This is the case of misapplication in Austin' term: the hearer is not
appropriately addressed as 'blondie'.
This difference between 'stupid' type of vocative and 'blondie' type of vocative comes
from the difference in lexical meaning of each type of word. Words such as 'stupid'
and 'clever' express judgmental value. Therefore, if the speaker uses this type of
word, she cannot avoid expressing her positive or negative judgment. When the
speaker uses this type of word as a vocative to specify the present speech situation, the
speaker expresses positive or negative judgment about the speech situation she shares
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with the hearer, or the hearer himself. Even if addressing the hearer by the vocative is
inappropriate, the speaker expresses her positive or negative judgment about the
present speech situation or the hearer all the same. On the other hand, words such as
'blond' and 'big' express non-judgmental descriptive value (although being blonde or
big can be given some social value). When the speaker uses words such as 'blondie'
and 'biggie' as a vocative, he specifies the present speech situation in terms of his
giving a non-judgmental description of the attribute of the hearer. Therefore, if the
description is wrong, the speaker cannot specify the speech situation.
Addressing the hearer with blonde hair by 'blondie' becomes inappropriate when the
hearer does not share a frank and friendly type of speech situation with the speaker. If
a blonde school teacher is addressed by 'blondie' by her student, she might as well
respond as follows:
(38) A: Good morning, blondie.
B: Don't call me blondie. I am Miss Shalliday.
4.3.1.3.3 Other types
4.3.1.3.3.1 'Judge' type
There is a type of vocative which is in between the proper-name type and the
descriptive type. As the capital letters of 'Judge' and 'President' show, the vocative of
'Judge' or 'Mr President' is correlated with the hearer as a particular individual. And it
is also correlated with the hearer as a person in a particular position.
(39) a. Judge, the witness is in the court.
b. Mr. President, I order you to give me all your tapes.
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By addressing the hearer by 'Judge' or 'Mr President', the speaker specifies the
present speech situation in terms of the speaker's communicating with a particular
individual who is specified in terms of his/her position. That is, the speaker specifies
the present speech situation as a type where a speaker is communicating with a person
in a specified position, which is of some importance. In doing so, the speaker creates
this type of speech situation between him and the hearer. Specifying the present
speech situation by this type of vocative becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not
in the position or the hearer's being in the position is not important. For example,
addressing the hearer by 'Judge' is inappropriate when the hearer is not in the
position. Addressing the hearer by 'Judge' becomes also inappropriate when, for
example, the speaker is an old friend of the hearer, and they communicate with each
other as friends. Addressing the hearer by this type of vocative is also correlated with
a formal type of speech situation (where the position of the hearer is of importance).
Let us show in the following the meaning the speaker asserts (about the historic
situation) and indicates (about the speech situation) by uttering the sentence in (39a):
4.3.1.3.3.2 'Sir' type
By addressing the hearer by 'Sir', the speaker specifies the present speech situation as
a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, or a formal type of speech







and the hearer. Let us show the meaning the speaker asserts and indicates by uttering
the sentence in (41) in the diagram in (42).






Addressing the hearer by 'Sir' becomes inappropriate when the hearer is not socially
higher than the speaker and the speech situation is not formal. For example, if the
speaker addressing the hearer who is his inferior by 'Sir' in a drinking session, his
addressing the hearer by 'Sir' is inappropriate.
The hearer might reject this type of speech situation the speaker created for the reason
that he does not want to emphasise that social element of the speech situation. Imagine
a Ph.D. student addressing her supervisor by 'Sir' in the meeting. Her supervisor
might feel more comfortable with an academic type of speech situation where
communicators exchange their opinions freely without worrying too much about their
social ranks. Then he might respond as the second utterance in the following
exchange:
(43) A: This is the paper I wrote, Sir.
B: You don't have to sir me.
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By uttering 'You don't have to sir me', the speaker B rejects the type of speech
situation the speaker A created, and suggests a more informal type.
This shows that if there are several competing social elements in the speech situation,
to assign the present speech situation as a certain type is to emphasise that element of
the speech situation, and create the type of speech situation accordingly. This is an
important point about specifying the present speech situation by a vocative. We
should, however, analyse the conventions which concern this type of meaning on a
different level. These conventions are between specifying the present speech situation
by a certain vocative rather than others and the element of the speech situation the
speaker emphasises, rather than specifying the present speech situation by a certain
vocative and a type of speech situation.
4.3.1.3.4 Summary for vocatives
So far we have distinguished three types of vocative and analysed types of speech
situation the speaker creates by addressing the hearer by them. They are vocatives of
the proper-name type, those of descriptive type, and those of the mixed type. Let us
show in the following example different types of vocative and different types of
speech situation the speaker creates by them:
(44)
VOCATIVES TYPES OF SPEECH SITUATION
(I) Proper-name type A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a particular
individual with a proper name
(i) Title + last name A speaker is socially distant to a hearer or the speech
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e.g. Prof. Johnson situation is formal
(ii) First name A speaker is socially close to a hearer or the speech
e.g. Robert situation is informal
(iii) Diminutive form A speaker is socially very close to a hearer or the
e.g. Bertie speech situation is very informal
(II) Descriptive type A speaker gives a certain type to a hearer's attribute
(i) judgmental A speaker expresses a certain judgment about a hearer's
e.g. stupid particular attribute
(ii) social relational A speaker and a hearer are in a certain social relation
e.g. darling







A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a particular
person who is in a position, and the speech situation is
formal
A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a person
who has a certain social relation to the speaker, or the
speech situation is formal
In the present section, we have shown that vocatives (in English) are conventional
devices which characterise the communication between the speaker and the hearer in
terms of certain elements of the hearer or the social relation between the speaker and
the hearer. By means of these conventional devices, the speaker differentiates types of
communication (types of speech situation, in our terminology) and specifies the
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present communication (the present speech situation, in our terminology). This is
independent of differentiating types of things in the world, and referring to a particular
entity and predicating something of it ('pointing to' a particular entity and assigning a
type to it, in our theory).
4.3.2 Grammatical Meanings of CONTEXTc
In the present section, we discuss meanings of CONTEXTc expressed by grammatical
devices. Before we go into it, let us define grammatical meanings and lexical
meanings. A lexical meaning of a word, say, 'man' is defined as its difference from
meanings of sense-related words, such as 'woman', 'animal', 'machine', 'God',
'wife' and so on. In a sense, the meaning of 'man' has different aspects and each
aspect of meaning stands out when compared with a particular antonym or synonym.
For example, when 'man' is compared with 'wife' in the expression 'man and wife',
it becomes clear that the aspect which is a synonym of 'husband' is meant. In other
words, it is not always clear which aspect of the meaning of a word is called for until
it is in a certain context or compared by a certain antonym or synonym.
It is reasonably clear what contrast a grammatical meaning makes. For example, it is
clear that an inflectional morpheme '-s' in 'boys' is differentiated in terms of number,
which makes a contrast with 'boy' without '-s'. Similarly an inflectional morpheme '-
ed' in 'walked' is differentiated in terms of tense, which contrasts with 'walk' without
'-ed'. Contrasting in terms of a certain meaning applies over most words which are
involved. For example, we find in most count nouns in English the distinction
between plurality which is expressed by the inflectional morpheme and singularity
expressed by the absence of the morpheme. Similarly we find in most verbs the
distinction between past tense which is expressed by the inflectional morpheme and
the present tense expressed by the absence of it. So we know that in the sentence in
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(45) the speaker refers to more than one boy, and the speaker refers to a past situation
in (46).
(45) The boys are in the playground.
(46) Jeremy walked out of the room.
If we define grammatical meanings like this, the meaning expressed by the distinction
between tu and vous in French is a grammatical meaning: in referring to a hearer by
tu, a speaker contrasts it with referring to her by vous. The distinction is concerned
with types of social relation between the speaker and the hearer. In the following




The T/V distinction in the second-person pronoun is well known to linguists. Brown
and Gilman (1960) first drew attention to the generality of the pattern of exchange: in
relations of intimacy, A and B exchange T pronouns; in relations of social distance (or
non-intimacy) A and B exchange V pronouns; in relations of dominance where A
ranks higher than B, A gives T and receives V8.
8According to Brown and Levinson (1978), the T/V distinction is well studied, too: in addition to the
cases described by Brown and Gilman (1960) for French, German, Spanish and Italian, Friedrich
(1972) provides data for Russian; Comrie (1975) for other Slavic languages and for Greek; there are
also data from Hungarian, Swedish, Czech, Hindi, Quechua, Tamil, Welsh and some African
languages.
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According to Brown and Gilman (1960), tu in (47a) shows that the speaker and the
hearer are intimate, and vous in (47b) shows either (i) that the speaker and the hearer
are socially distant, or (ii) that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker. In the
second case (in (ii)) the speaker expects to be addressed asymmetrically by tu:
(47) a. Tu es le professeur,
b. Vous etes le professeur.
Let us restate this in our theoretical framework. As we discussed in Chapter 3
(3.2.2.2.1.2) by the second-person pronoun the speaker 'points to' (refers to) a
person as the one who plays the role of the hearer. 'Pointing to' a person as the one
who plays the role of the hearer is further differentiated in terms of the social relation
between the speaker and the hearer. 'Pointing to' the hearer by tu is correlated either
(i) with a type of social relation where a speaker is socially close to a hearer, or (ii)
with a type where a speaker is socially higher than a hearer. When the speaker utters
the sentence in (47a), we cannot decide which type the speaker assigns to the present
speech situation. If the speaker expects the hearer to address him symmetrically by tu
in his turn, then we know the speaker assigns to the present situation the type in (i)
where a speaker is socially close to a hearer. If the speaker expects the hearer to
address him asymmetrically by vous, we know the speaker assigns the type in (ii)
where a speaker is socially higher than a hearer. By means of the linguistic convention
about tu, the speaker might create between him and the hearer the type of speech
situation where a speaker is socially close to a hearer, hoping that the hearer accepts
this type and addresses him back symmetrically by tu. Or the speaker might create
between him and the hearer the type of speech situation where a speaker is socially
higher than him, hoping that the hearer accepts this type and addresses him back
asymmetrically by vous.
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Similarly, 'pointing to' the hearer by vous is correlated either (i) with a type of speech
situation where a speaker is socially distant to a hearer or (ii) with a type where a
hearer is socially higher than a speaker. The speaker might create between him and the
hearer a type of speech situation in (i), hoping that the hearer accepts this type and
addresses him back symmetrically by vous. Or the speaker might create between him
and the hearer a type of speech situation in (ii), hoping that the hearer accept this type
and addresses him back asymmetrically by tu. Let us show the meaning expressed by




By specifying the present speech situation as either type, the speaker creates the type
of speech situation between him and the hearer. 'Pointing to' the hearer by, say, tu
becomes inappropriate when the speaker is not close to the hearer and the speaker is
not socially higher than the hearer.
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4.3.2.1.2 First-person pronouns in Japanese
In Japanese there are three first-person pronouns, ore, boku, and watashi, by which a
male speaker refers to himself. Among them, ore and boku are marked for male
speakers and watashi is used by both male and female speakers. So a Japanese male
speaker has three alternatives to express one and the same proposition, 'pointing to'
(referring to) himself by one of these first-person pronouns. Consider the following
examples:
(50) a. ore wa tookyo shusshin da,
b. boku wa tookyo shusshin da/desu,
c. watashi wa tookyo shusshin desu.
I Tokyo from be
'I am from Tokyo'
The difference among ore, boku, and watashi concerns different ways the speaker
presents himself in the speech situation. As we discussed in Chapter 3 (3.2.2.2.1.1),
by the first-person pronoun the speaker 'points to' himself as an individual who is
playing the role of the speaker. 'Pointing to' oneself as a speaker is further
differentiated in terms of gender and formality/informality in Japanese. In uttering the
sentence in (50a) with ore, the speaker presents himself (as a male speaker) to the
hearer very informally, almost vulgarly, in the speech situation. That is, the speaker
specifies the present speech situation as a very informal type where a male person
plays the role of the speaker. In uttering the sentence in (50b) with boku, the speaker
presents himself (as a male speaker) to the hearer informally in the speech situation.
That is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as an informal type where a
male person plays the role of the speaker. In uttering the sentence in (50c) with
watashi, a speaker presents himself formally to a hearer in the speech situation. That
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is, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a formal type. Let us show the
meanings of the sentences in (50a), (50b) and (50c) in the diagrams in (51), (52), and
(53) respectively.
(51)
By specifying the present speech situation as one of these types, the speaker creates
the type of speech situation between him and the hearer. If the speaker specifies the
present speech situation as a certain type by one of these first-person pronouns, and
the present speech situation is not of the type, 'pointing' becomes inappropriate. For
example, if the speaker 'points to' himself by ore in the utterance to his boss in the
business meeting, his utterance is inappropriate, since the social parameter of
informality determined by the use of the pronoun (IF) is not consistent with the social
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parameter permitted within the actual speech situation. The type of speech situation the
speaker created between him and the hearer inappropriately cannot be shared by the
hearer. The hearer probably thinks that the speaker is too stupid to see obvious
elements which concern a type of speech situation, or the speaker lacks linguistic
ability. The hearer might believe that the speaker is a rebel who ignores the importance
of social relations between people or social settings.
In T/V languages and Japanese, first-person and second-person pronouns are further
differentiated as to the social relations between the speaker and the hearer or
formality/informality of the speech situation. Using the conventional relations between
a particular first-person or second-person pronoun and a type of speech situation, the
speaker of these languages specifies the present speech situation as a certain type. In
doing so, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.
4.3.2.2 Japanese honorifics
Although we will discuss Japanese honorifics fully in Chapter 5, we explain in the
present section one type of Japanese honorifics, which is grammaticalised meaning of
CONTEXTc-
Following Tokieda (1941), which we will discuss in detail in Chapter 5, Shibatani
(1990) adopts the two-way distinction of honorifics, 'addressee-controlled
honorification' and 'referent-controlled honorification':
Though very often the subject happens to be identical with the addressee, these referent-controlled
honorification processes must be distinguished from addressee-controlled honorification, which is far
more wide-spread. In other words, Japanese possesses two types of honorification processes along the
speaker-addressee axis and the speaker-referent axis. (Shibatani, 1990, 375).
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Shibatani uses the terms 'plain' and 'polite' for the distinction in the addressee-
controlled honorification, and uses the terms 'plain' and 'honorific' in the referent-
controlled honorification. The following is the examples of those two types of
honorification in Japanese:
(54) a. Taroo ga ki ta, (plain)
come past
b. Taroo ga ki mashi ta, (polite)
come polite past
'Taro came'
(55) a. Sensei ga warat ta, (plain)
teacher laugh past
b. Sensei ga owarai ni not ta. (honorific)
teacher Hon-laugh become past
'The teacher laughed'
The contrast between the sentences in (54) concerns different types of social relation
between the speaker and the hearer (speaker-addressee axis), and the contrast between
the sentences in (55) concerns different types of social relation between the speaker
and the referent (speaker-referent axis). The referent-controlled honorification is
further subcategorised into subject honorification and object honorification. We will
discuss this in Chapter 5 (5.2.1.3).
The addressee-controlled honorifics are grammaticalised devices differentiating types
of speech situation the speaker and the hearer share. The honorific auxiliary mashi in
167
(54b) is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially higher than a speaker in a
hierarchical situation, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a hearer, or (iii) the speech
situation is formal. The absence of the honorific auxiliary in (54a), on the other hand,
is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is socially equal to or higher than a hearer,
(ii) a speaker is socially close to a hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is informal. By
using these relations between the presence/absence of the honorific auxiliaries and
types of speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as one of
these types. The meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence without the
honorific auxiliary mashi in (54a) is shown in the diagram in (56), and the meaning




With or without the honorific auxiliary mashi, the speaker specifies the present speech
situation as one of those two types. In doing so, the speaker creates between him and
the hearer either type of speech situation. Uttering the sentence without the honorific
auxiliary becomes inappropriate when the hearer is socially higher than the speaker,
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the speaker is socially distant to the hearer, and the speech situation is formal. For
example, if the speaker utters a sentence without mashi when the hearer is his superior
and they talk about a business matter, the utterance becomes inappropriate. In this
case, since the actual social parameters of the speech situation are such that the type of
speech situation the speaker creates between him and the hearer cannot be shared by
the hearer. Indicating something about the speech situation does not affect the truth or
falsity of the proposition expressed. That is, indicating that the speech situation is of a
certain type by means of the convention about the honorific auxiliary mashi is
independent of asserting that a historic situation is of a certain type. In other words,
the speaker expresses meanings about CONTEXTc independently of expressing truth-
conditional meanings.
The meanings expressed by referent-controlled honorifi.es concern both the present
speech situation and the historic situation. In Chapter 5, we will develop the theory to
explain this type of honorific in Japanese.
4.3.3 Meanings of CONTEXTc expressed by lexemes
We have claimed that meanings of CONTEXTc are either appropriate or inappropriate in
terms of the social parameters of the speech situation the speaker and the hearer share.
This is a crucial difference from meanings about historic situations, which are either
true or false. Is it possible that meanings about historic situations are to be
inappropriate socially? This seems to be the case. Some lexemes by which the speaker
makes an assertion about historic situations also serve to typify types of speech
situation.
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4.3.3.1 Slang: 'kick the bucket' and 'die'
As we discussed in 4.2.1, by uttering the vocative 'Sir', the speaker indicates that the
speech situation he shares with the hearer is of a type where a hearer is socially higher
than a speaker or a speech situation is formal. By uttering the vocative 'stupid', the
speaker indicates that the speech situation he shares with the hearer is of a type where
a speaker is in a position to assign stupidity to a hearer. So the meaning the speaker
expresses by uttering the sentence in (58a) is different from the meaning the speaker
expresses by uttering the sentence in (58b). Although the speaker expresses one and
the same meaning about the historic situation uttering these sentence, he assigns
different types to the present speech situation.
(58) a. The door is open, Sir.
b. The door is open, stupid.
Let us compare 'kick the bucket' and 'die'.
(59) a. He kicked the bucket,
b. He died.
These sentences do not express exactly the same meaning. The difference, however,
does not concern types of historic situation: KICK THE BUCKET and DIE do not
correspond to different types of action. Therefore, the following question sounds
strange:
(60) Did he kick the bucket or die?
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The difference seems to concern types of speech situation, but does not directly
concern types of social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer. Both 'kicked the
bucket' and 'die' can be used with the vocative 'Sir', which expresses types of social
hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer.
(61) a. He kicked the bucket, Sir.
b. He died, Sir.
Although the sentence in (61a) sounds a little odd socially, it is acceptable if a soldier
utters this sentence to his superior to report his fellow soldier's death in an amusing,
non-serious way.
The distinction between 'kick the bucket' and 'die' does not seem to concern whether
or not the speaker is in a position to assign a certain type to the hearer's attribute. As is
shown in the following example, speaker's assigning stupidity to the hearer by the
vocative 'stupid' seems to be independent of his assigning the type correlated by either
'kick the bucket' or 'die'.
(62) a. He kicked the bucket, stupid,
b. He died, stupid.
It does not concern types of social closeness between the speaker and the hearer,
either. This is shown in the following example:
(63) a. He kicked the bucket, darling,
b. He died, darling.
171
What types of speech situation then does the distinction between 'kick the bucket' and
'die' concern? We should find it out in describing when and how either 'kick the
bucket' or 'die' becomes inappropriate. If the speaker utters the sentence with 'kick
the bucket' to the family of the dead man, it is very inappropriate. If the speaker utters
it when asked how his father is in a conversation with the Queen, it is very
inappropriate, too. This means that the utterance becomes inappropriate to the hearer
(the family of the dead man, or the Queen) about the way the speaker describes the
death. The speaker, by uttering the sentence with 'kick the bucket', assigns the present
speech situation a type where death of the particular person is described very
informally, almost vulgarly, with some amusing tone.
Because 'kick the bucket' expresses a very informal type of speech situation, the
sentence in (61a) sounds somewhat odd. By the vocative, 'Sir', the speaker assigns
the present speech situation a type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, and
also assigns a very informal type by the slang verb, 'kick the bucket'. Since the
speech situation where social superiority matters is usually formal, the type expressed
by 'Sir' and the type expressed by 'kick the bucket' crash. It is, however, possible
that social superiority matters in a very informal situation, as we showed above.






By means of vocatives, the speaker indicates that the present speech situation is of a
certain type, which is independent of asserting that the historic situation is of a certain
type. On the other hand, slang words such as 'kick the bucket' are concerned both
with asserting something about the historic situation and with indicating something
about the present speech situation. That is, one layer of the meaning of 'kick the
bucket' expresses a type of action, which is equivalent to the type expressed by 'die',
and another layer of it expresses a type of speech situation. The relation between
words like 'kick the bucket' and types of speech situation have been described in
sociolinguistics or other fields of pragmatics as the relation between words and
registers. By hypothesising two layers of meanings, i.e., the layer of a type of action
and the layer of a type of speech situation, we can describe both truth-conditional and
social meanings of these words as semantic meanings and give a unitary explanation
of their meanings.
4.3.3.2 Social forms of reference (1)
In 4.3.1, we have shown that vocatives with certain proper names become
inappropriate depending on the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. Let
us have those examples here again:
(65) a. There's a car at the door, Professor Johnson,
b. There's a car at the door, Robert,
c. There's a car at the door, Bertie.
We have shown that by uttering the vocatives, 'Professor Johnson', 'Robert' and
'Bertie', the speaker assigns to the present speech situation different types of social
relation between a speaker and a hearer, or different types of speech situation. In
doing so, the speaker creates the particular type of speech situation between him and
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the hearer. The utterance becomes inappropriate when the present speech situation is
not of the type indicated.
Does the distinction among the vocatives 'Professor Johnson', 'Robert' and 'Bertie'
exist when these words are used to refer to a person? It seems it does. Consider the
following example:
(66) a. Professor Johnson is tall,
b. Robert is tall,
c. Bertie is tall.
Just like uttering, say, the sentence in (65c) becomes inappropriate when the speaker
is not close to the hearer, uttering the sentence in (66c) seems to be inappropriate when
the speaker is not close to the person referred to. Uttering the sentence in (66c) also
becomes inappropriate when the speaker and the hearer are in a formal speech
situation.
When uttering the sentence in (66c) is inappropriate, i.e., when the speaker is not
close to the person referred to by 'Bertie', to whom is the utterance inappropriate? To
the hearer or the referent? Although one can claim that it is inappropriate to the
referent, we defend the idea that it is inappropriate to a hearer9. Suppose little Robert
goes to elementary school and utters the following sentence to his teacher, referring to
himself by 'Bertie':
(67) Bertie is hungry.
^This point concerns the classification of honorifics in Japanese, which is discussed by Tokieda(1941)
and others. See 5.2.1.2.
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His teacher will correct his usage on the grounds that it is inappropriate to speak to the
teacher at school referring to himself as 'Bertie', not on the grounds that he and the
referent are not close enough: because the speaker and the referent are one and the
same person in this case, the question of closeness does not apply.
Referring to a person by a certain name can be inappropriate to the hearer in the sense
that the speaker assigns the wrong type to the social relation between the speaker and
the referent, which is misleading to the hearer. If the speaker utters, say, the sentence
in (66c), the hearer reasonably assumes that the speaker is close to the referent.
Referring to a person by a diminutive form is correlated with the speaker's closeness
to the person referred to. By using this relation, the speaker indicates that the speaker
is close to the referent by referring to him by a diminutive form. So, if the speaker
refers to a person by a diminutive form but does not know him personally, the speaker
indicates something inappropriate, which might lead to the hearer's misunderstanding
of the social aspect of the world.
Let us show the meanings expressed by the sentence in (66a), (66b) and (66c) in the
following diagrams of (68), (69) and (70) respectively:
As the overlap of the circle and the square in the diagram shows, the meanings
expressed by the referring forms 'Professor Johnson', 'Robert' and 'Bertie' concern
both the historic situation and the speech situation. The social relation between the






the speech situation. In doing so, the speaker enforces an existing social relation
outside the speech situation.
Even if the speaker is socially close to the referent, the speaker has to refer to the
person by title plus last name in a formal speech situation. So referring to a person by
a title plus last name is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is socially distant to a





Referring to a person by his first name is correlated with a type where (i) a speaker is
close to a referent or (ii) a speech situation is informal.
(70)
Referring to a person by a diminutive form of the first name is correlated with a type
where (i) a speaker is veiy close to a referent or (ii) a speech situation is very
informal.
The type the speaker gives to the social relation between him and the referent might be
disputed by the hearer. Consider the following example:
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(71) Student A: Is Ronnie in?
Secretary: Dr Cann is in the board meeting.
Actually, I heard this conversation at the linguistics department. The context was as
follows: when an undergraduate student came in the secretary's office and asked her
about a particular person, Dr Ronnie Cann, the secretaiy answered in the way shown
in (71), putting the stress on 'Dr Cann\ It seems that she meant that the speaker, the
undergraduate student, isn't socially close to the referent, the lecturer. It is possible
that she meant that the present speech situation is formal, but it didn't seem to be the
case. In this case the speaker gave the social relation between him and Dr Ronnie Cann
a type where a speaker is close to a person referred to by referring to him by his first
name. The hearer argued against this type, and indicated that the social relation
between them is of a type where a speaker is distant to a person referred to.
4.3.3.3 Social forms of reference (2)
By referring to a person by a certain word, the speaker marks a social aspect of the
person referred to. 'Lady' and 'woman' are one of those pairs of words whose non-
factual, social meanings differ considerably. Consider the following example, which
is a part of the movie, Howards End.
(72) Maid: There's a woman to see you, ma'am.
Tibby: A woman, not a lady, Annie?
Maid: She won't give her name.
Margaret: Ask her to come up.
177
The distinction between 'woman' and 'lady' and that between 'woman' and 'man' are
of different kinds. In a sense, the layer of meaning of the word 'woman' which
contrasts with 'lady' differs from the layer of the meaning which contrasts with 'man'.
As the above example shows, the layer of the type WOMAN which contrasts with
LADY, concerns a social type. To assign a person the type WOMAN in this sense, one
has to read social codes the person is sending and consider whether or not the social
aspect of the person is of this type. This layer of the type WOMAN is not as obvious as
the layer which contrasts with the type MAN. In most cases, it is quite obvious
whether or not a person is of the type WOMAN which contrasts with the type MAN. To
assign the type WOMAN, not the type MAN, is safely said to report a fact in the world.
By means of the contrast between 'woman' and 'lady', the speaker assigns a particular
social type to a person referred to. And in doing so, the speaker specifies a non-
factual, social layer on the top of the factual, i.e., truth-conditional, layer of the
historic situation. In uttering the sentence in (73a) in contrast to the sentence (73b), the
speaker not only asserts that a particular female person is at a particular door, but also
indicates that the person is socially non-superior.
(73) a. The woman is at the door,
b. The lady is at the door.
Let us show the meanings expressed by the sentences in (73a) and (73b) in the







'Non-S(x)' means that x is socially non-superior.
(75)
0
'S(x)' means that x is socially superior.
There are cases where the speaker assigns a person the type LADY for the reason that
the speech situation is so formal that the speaker is expected to refer to a person by a
word which expresses social superiority. That is, referring to a person by 'lady' is
also correlated with a formal type of speech situation, which is shown in the following
diagram:
(76)
There is a similar contrast in social meanings among words like 'gentleman', 'chap',
'fellow', and 'bloke'. Vulgar words like 'bastard' and 'tart' also concern the social
aspect of a referent.
The difference between 'Japanese' and 'Jap' also concerns the social aspect of a
person referred to. In one layer of the word 'Jap' is correlated with a type of






another layer, which is correlated with an extremely negative type which concerns the
nationality. In referring to a particular person by 'Jap', the speaker not only picks out
the entity by his nationality, but also indicates a negative character of the referent
concerning the nationality.
The hearer might as well argue against the type which the speaker indicates by
referring to the person by 'Jap':
(77) A: That Jap is extremely shy.
B: Could you stop calling my friend 'Jap'?
What the second speaker argues against is to assign the negative type to the social
aspect of the referent in terms of the nationality.
4.3.4 Summary of types of meaning of CONTEXTc
We have defined meanings of CONTEXTc as meanings the speaker indicates, which
concern the speech situation. By means of the descriptive conventions which correlate
types of speech situation and vocatives, personal pronouns, and the honorific
auxiliary, the speaker specifies the present speech situation as a particular type. We
have described this process as speaker's act of creating the type of speech situation
between him and the hearer.
There are different linguistic devices by which the speaker specifies the social
parameters of the present speech situation. Vocatives (in English) are such a linguistic
device, though it is not fully grammaticalised. Addressing the hearer by a certain
vocative is 'outside' referring and predicating. The speaker indicates that the present
speech situation is of a certain type independently of asserting that the historic situation
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the speaker 'points to' (refers to) is of a certain type. There are two types of vocative,
proper-name type and descriptive type. The proper-name type of vocative is
dominantly correlated with the hearer as a particular individual, and a speaker specifies
the present speech situation in terms of the social relation between the speaker and the
hearer as a particular individual. The descriptive type of vocative is dominantly
correlated with the hearer with a particular attribute, and the speaker specifies the
present speech situation in terms of the relation where the speaker assigns a
judgmental, social, or descriptive type to the hearer.
The TTV distinction in second-person pronouns is a grammatical device of
differentiating types of speech situation. By means of the T-pronoun or the V-
pronoun, the speaker specifies the present speech situation in terms of social closeness
or distance, or social hierarchy between the speaker and the hearer. Similarly Japanese
first-person pronouns are differentiated in terms of (i) social closeness or distance
between the speaker and the hearer, (ii) the social hierarchy between the speaker and
the hearer, and (iii) formality/informality of the speech situation10. Indicating that the
present speech situation is of a certain type by means of a particular second-person
pronoun in T/V languages or a particular first-person pronoun in Japanese overlaps
with asserting that the historic situation is of a certain type. By a particular second-
person pronoun, the speaker 'points to' a particular person in terms of the participant
role in the present speech situation1', which is a part of asserting. By the second-
person pronoun, a speaker indicates that the present speech situation is of a particular
type. That is, one layer of the meaning of the second-person pronoun is correlated
with a particular individual to whom the speaker 'points' (as a part of asserting), and
another layer of the meaning is correlated with a type of speech situation the speaker
assigns to the present speech situation (as indicating).
1 °Japanese second-person pronouns are also differentiated in terms of types of speech situation. We
will come back to this point in 5.3.3.
1 'See 3.2.1.1.2.1.
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The addressee-controlled honorifics, which are marked by the presence or absence of
the honorific auxiliary, are also a grammatical device to specify the type of the present
speech situation. Unlike the second-person pronouns in T/V languages and the first-
person and second-person pronouns in Japanese, the addressee-controlled honorifics
do not contribute to the meaning about a historic situation which is asserted. By means
of the presence or absence of the honorific auxiliary, the speaker indicates that the
present speech situation is of a certain type, independently of asserting that the historic
situation is of a type. By means of the addressee-controlled honorifics, the speaker
specifies the present speech situation in terms of (i) social closeness or distance
between the speaker and the hearer, (ii) the social hierarchy between the speaker and
the hearer, and (iii) formality/informality of the speech situation.
Let us summarize these linguistic devices and types of speech situation expressed by
them in the following:
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(78)
Linguistic devices TYPES OF SPEECH SITUATION
(I) Vocatives (proper-name) A speaker is communicating with a hearer as a
particular individual
A speaker assigns a certain type to a hearer's
attribute
A speaker is socially close to or distant from a
hearer
A hearer is socially higher or lower than/equal to
a speaker
A speech situation is formal or informal
A speaker is socially close to or distant from
a hearer
A hearer is socially higher or lower than/equal to
a speaker
A speech situation is formal or informal
We have also shown that, while asserting that the historic situation is of a certain type,
a speaker can indicate something about the present speech situation. For example, by
means of a slang word, the speaker indicates that the present speech situation is of an
informal type. Slang like kick the bucket, which has a counterpart whose meaning
differs only in the formality of speech, has two layers of meaning. One is correlated






situation. By indicating that the present speech situation is of an informal type, for
example, the speaker creates the type of speech situation between him and the hearer.
It is also possible that the speaker makes an indication which concerns both the present
speech situation and the historic situation. For example, by 'pointing to' (referring to)
a person by a diminutive form of the first name, the speaker indicates that the speaker
(in the speech situation) is close to the referent (in the historic situation). 'Pointing to'
(referring to) a person by a particular proper name is correlated, by convention, not
only with picking out an individual who has the name, but also with indicating that the
speaker and the referent are in a certain social relation. In other words, by means of
the conventions which differentiate 'pointing to' a particular person in terms of the
social relation between a speaker and a referent, the speaker specifies the social
relation between her and the person. In doing so, the speaker enforces the existing
social relation between her and the person.
We have also shown that some words are not only correlated with a factual aspect of
the historic situation but with a non-factual, social aspect of the historic situation. For
example, when the speaker 'points to' a person by 'that lady' in contrast to 'that
woman', the speaker indicates that the person is socially superior. These words are
correlated, by convention, not only with a type which is verifiable but with a social
type.
Let us show in the following these social meanings expressed through 'pointing to'
(referring to) a person and assigning a type to it (predicating something of it) by
uttering a particular word:
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(79)
Linguistic devices Types of speech situation or historic situation
(I) Slang A speech situation is informal
(II) Referring expressions (proper-name type)
(i) Title + last name A speaker is socially distant from a referent
the speech situation is formal
(ii) First name A speaker is socially close to a referent
the speech situation is informal
(iii) Diminutive form A speaker is socially very close to a referent
the speech situation is very informal
(III) Referring expressions A referent has a certain social attribute
(descriptive type)
We have so far demonstrated these meanings in three types of diagram. We show the
meanings the speaker indicates something about the speech situation, independently of
asserting something about a historic situation in the diagram in (80), where the circle
which stands for the speech situation and the square which stands for the historic
situation are separated. We show the meanings the speaker indicates about the social
relation between the speaker (in the speech situation) and the referent (in the historic
situation) in the diagram in (81), where the circle overlaps with the square. We show
the meanings the speaker indicates something about a historic situation in the diagram
in (82), where the small circle which expresses a social aspect of the referent or a
social relation between the referent and another participant is in the square which







We have shown that there is a type of conventional meaning which is expressed by
grammatical and lexical devices, which is not truth-conditional. We call it meaning of
CONTEXTc and define it as a meaning which the speaker indicates rather than asserts.
The meanings of CONTEXTc essentially concern the speech situation the speaker and
the hearer share. Developing Austin's concepts of demonstrative and descriptive
conventions, we have succeeded in describing meanings of CONTEXTc in the same
coherent way as we describe truth-conditional meanings. The speaker highlights the
present speech situation and, at the same time, assigns it a particular type, which is
indicating (in which the speaker specifies the present speech situation), while the
speaker 'points to' a particular entity and assigns a type to it, which is asserting (in
which the speaker describes the entity). In indicating if the present speech situation is
not of the type assigned to it, uttering the sentence becomes inappropriate, whereas in
asserting uttering the sentence becomes incorrect or the assertion is false if the entity
'pointed to' is not of the type assigned to it.
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In Chapter 5, we will discuss Japanese honorifics, where expressing (i) types of
social relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation, (ii) types of
social relation between the speaker (in the speech situation) and the referent (in the
speech situation), and (iii) types of social relation between participants in the historic
situation is fully grammaticalised.
4.4 Indicating and Performatives
4.4.1 Performatives
Before we close the present chapter, we will describe performatives in our theoretical
framework. We will clarify differences between performatives and constatives
according to the theory, and explain how uttering a performative is performing a
speech act.
Austin (1962) introduces the distinction between performatives and constatives, using
the following sentences:
(83) a. I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife),
b. I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth,
c. I give and bequeath my watch to my brother,
d. I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
Austin explains performative utterances as follows:
They do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'; and the uttering of
the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing an action, which again would not normally be described as,
or as 'just', saying something (Austin, 1962:5).
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Performative sentences are (i) first person indicative active sentences in the simple
present tense and (ii) can co-occur with the adverb 'hereby'. These characteristics
strongly suggest a connection between performative sentences and speech situations.
We defend the idea that performative sentences are about the speech situation. That is,
in performative sentences, the situation the speaker 'points to' and describes is the
speech situation the speaker highlights and specifies: the situation the speaker asserts
about and the speech situation the speaker indicates about coincide.
In uttering a constative sentence, the speaker 'points to' a historic situation and
describes it by assigning a certain type to it. In the present chapter we have shown
that, by uttering a constative sentence, the speaker can indicate something about the
speech situation. That is, while asserting that the historic situation is of a certain type,
the speaker can indicate, by a grammatical or lexical device, that the present speech
situation is of a certain type. In constative sentences, asserting and indicating are
independent of each other, although words can be correlated both with a type of
historic situation and with a type of speech situation.
In uttering a performative sentence, on the other hand, the historic situation the
speaker asserts something about and the speech situation she indicates something
about are one and the same situation. The action in the historic situation the speaker
'points to' and describes is the action in the speech situation, which comes into
existence by the speaker's utterance. For example, in (83b) the historic situation the
speaker 'points to' is the present speech situation where the speaker utters 'I name this
ship the Queen Elizabeth'. The action in the historic situation the speaker 'points to'
and describes is the action the speaker is making in the speech situation by uttering this
very sentence, i.e., the speech act of naming. The indication that the speech in the
present speech situation is of a type of naming is made by saying, as an assertion, that
the speech act is of the type.
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Performative sentences are distinguished from constative sentences in terms of the
relation between what is described and the act of describing. In uttering a constative
utterance, the speaker describes an action or state of affairs in the situation which is
outside of the speech situation and, therefore, exists independently of the speaker's act
of describing it. In uttering a performative utterance, on the other hand, the speaker
describes an action which comes into existence by this act of describing itself, and,
therefore, there isn't any gap between what is described (signifie), e.g., the act of
naming, and what describes (signifiant), e.g., 'I name'. This is why to utter a
performative sentence is to perform a speech act itself, and performative sentences,
according to Austin, cannot be true or false in a straightforward sense.
However, as Austin (1962) shows by the concept of 'felicity conditions',
performative sentences are also subject to criticism: they can be infelicitous, or
inappropriate in our terminology. Uttering a performative sentence is concerned not
only with the demonstrative conventions by which the speaker highlights the present
speech situation but also with descriptive conventions. In uttering a performative
sentence, the speaker indicates/asserts that the speech situation is of a certain type (by
means of the descriptive conventions). If the speaker assigns a wrong type to the
speech situation, her utterance becomes inappropriate. For example, if the speaker
who is not in the position to name the ship utters the sentence in (83b), the speaker
assigns a wrong type to the action in the present speech situation (unless it is the act of
naming for a private use). Austin calls this a case of misapplication, which is against
the felicity condition that 'the particular persons and circumstances in a given case
must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure involved (Austin,
1962:15)'.
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According to this theory, we can explain why only first-person indicative active
sentences in the simple present tense can be performative sentences. In uttering
constative sentences, asserting that a historic situation is of a certain type does not
coincide with indicating that the speech situation is of a certain type. In uttering the
sentences in (84a) and (84b), for example, the speaker asserts that a historic situation
is of a certain type, which is not to indicate that the speech situation is of a certain
type. The present speech situation cannot coincide with the historic situation in the past
the speaker 'points to' and describes (in (84a)), or the historic situation where Mary
is, which the speaker 'points to' and describes (in (84b)).
(84) a. I named the ship Queen Elizabeth,
b. Mary bets you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
This is because, as we discussed in 4.2.3, the speaker cannot indicate any speech
situations but the present one she shares with the hearer.
We can also explain the co-occurrence of the adjective 'hereby' with performative
sentences. Uttering the word 'hereby' the speaker explicitly 'points to' the present
speech situation, more specifically her speech act in the present speech situation. So, if
a speaker utters, 'hereby', we expect the speaker to assert/indicate that the speech act
is of a certain type, i.e., to utter a performative sentence. Therefore, a constative
sentence where the speaker does not indicate/assert about the present speech act does
not co-occur with 'hereby'.
Let us show the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering the performative sentence
in (83b) in the following diagrams:
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(85)
Since the act of naming a particular ship the Queen Elizabeth is performed in the
speech situation, the square which expresses a historic situation is in the circle which
expresses the speech situation. By assigning the type of NAMING to the speech act in
the present speech situation, a speaker specifies the type of the present speech situation
and, in doing so, performs the speech act in the speech situation. As for types of
speech act, Austin (1962) depicts them in terms of felicity conditions, and Searle
(1969, 1979), by giving more detailed description of the conditions, expresses them
in the form of rules.
4.4.2 Problems of Speech Act Theory
Austin's contribution is to show by performative sentences that sentence meaning
concerns not only types of states of affairs (in the historic situation) but types of
speech act (in the speech situation). By the concept of felicity conditions, Austin also
shows that the speaker can specify the present speech act he is performing to a hearer
by assigning it a particular type. However, Austin fails to develop the concept of
speech situation. This is because Austin does not give a hearer an active role in
communication, as his equation of 'communicatee' with 'audience' in the following
shows:
If there is to be communication of the sort that we achieve by language at all, there must be a stock
of symbols of some kind which a communicator (the speaker) can produce 'at will' and which a
communicatee ('the audience') can observe (Austin, 1950:121).
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Since a hearer is only the audience in his theory, Austin cannot develop the concept of
a situation where the speaker performs a speech act to the hearer, i.e., a speech
situation in our theory. Austin emphasises speech acts the speaker performs instead.
In Searle's theoiy the underestimation of the hearer's role becomes more obvious, and
even the speaker's role is less stressed. As a result, Searle's Speech Act Theory has
become a theory of meaning where the dyadic relation between types of speech act,
i.e., types of illocutionary force, and linguistic procedures to perform those speech
acts are studied, as we described in 2.3.1.
If logical positivism, a central tenet of which is that unless a sentence can be verified,
it is strictly speaking meaningless, is a philosophical excess, Searle's theoiy is an
excess at the other end. While logical positivists only analyse meanings which concern
types of states of affairs in the world which are verifiable, Searle (1969, 1979)
essentially analyses meanings which concern speech acts. Because the speech act
theory has developed in the direction Searle (1969, 1979) suggested, the gap between
the speech act theory and formal theories which describe meanings as types of state of
affairs has never been narrowed: these two types of theories took completely different
courses12. And, according to Recanati (1994), the theories which describe meanings
as types of state of affairs are still dominant:
In the middle of this century so-called 'ordinary-language philosophers'-most prominently Ludwig
Wittgenstein, John Austin and Peter Strawson- put forward a new, 'pragmatic picture' of language
which stood in sharp contrast to the picture that had been dominant since the beginnings of analytic
philosophy. Half a century later it is fair to say that the old picture which ordinary-language
philosopher were opposing has been to a large extent restored to its posiuon of dominance. ... the old
picture was not abandoned, as ordinary-language philosophers had urged; it was elaborated rather than
eliminated (Recanati, 1994:156).
12The exception is Vanderveken (1990, 1991), who tries to bridge the speech act theory and formal
theories of truth-conditional meaning by formalising illocutionary forces.
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To have a full picture of sentence meaning, we have to describe both meaning about a
historic situation and meaning about a speech situation, as we have claimed in the
present thesis. We should then describe the interrelation between the two types of
meaning, which we have, at least partially, shown by the relation between a square
and a circle in the diagrams in the present chapter.
Throughout the present chapter, we have shown that there are linguistic conventions
which correlate words with types of speech situation, types of social relation between
the speaker and the referent, and social interpretations of the historic situation. By
means of these conventions, the speaker highlights and, at the same time, specifies the
present speech situation, or the social layer of the historic situation. We depict these
acts of the speaker as creating a particular type of speech situation between him and the
hearer, or enforcing existing social relations or social attributes of people in the world.
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Chapter 5
Japanese Honorifics and Indicating
5.1 Meanings of CONTEXTc
In the preceding chapter, we developed the theoretical framework where meanings
involving speech situations are analysed as meanings of CONTEXTc: the speaker
indicates that the present speech situation is of a certain type using linguistic devices.
In English meanings of CONTEXTc are not fully grammaticalised. It is not the case that
the presence and the absence of, say, the vocative 'Sir' are correlated with two
different types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer. Although the presence
of 'Sir' is correlated (by the descriptive conventions) with a type of speech situation
where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, the absence of it is not so correlated:
the absence simply means that the social relation between a speaker and a hearer is not
specified. That is, the type of social relation between a speaker and a hearer which is
correlated with the vocative 'Sir' is expressed as an 'extra meaning', as is shown in
the following examples:
(1) a. The door is open,
b. The door is open, Sir.
In other words, the meanings of CONTEXTc expressed by vocatives in English are not
thoroughly systematic. The type where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker is
expressed by the vocative 'Sir', but there isn't any vocative which is correlated with a
type where a hearer is lower than a speaker, and this type is not correlated with the
absence of 'Sir', either.
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On the other hand, meanings of CONTEXTc are highly grammaticalised and thoroughly
systematic in Japanese. The presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary masu
are correlated (by the descriptive conventions) with two different types of speech
situation. Owing to these descriptive conventions, the speaker indicates by the
honorific auxiliary that the speech situation is of a type where a hearer is socially
higher than a speaker (in (2a)) or a type where a hearer is socially lower than or equal
to a speaker by the absence of the honorific auxiliary (in (2b)):
(2) a. Taroo ga ki mashi ta,
b. Taro ga ki ta.
come past
'Taro came'
As we discussed in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, by specifying the present speech situation as a
particular type, the speaker creates the type between him and the hearer. If the speaker
violates the descriptive conventions concerning types of speech situation, he is
destined to specify the speech situation by the wrong type, and, in doing so, creates
the wrong type of speech situation between him and the hearer. This may make the
hearer very uncomfortable in communication. The hearer might conclude that the
speaker violates the conventions; the hearer believes that the speaker is either a
foreigner who has not leamt the linguistic conventions between the types of social
relation and the presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary in Japanese, or a
nonconformist who ignores these social conventions. Or the hearer might suspect that
there is another social element in the speech situation he doesn't know of, and on the
basis of it the speaker creates the particular type of speech situation.
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In extreme cases, the wrong use of the honorific auxiliary may cause a speaker to
make an indication about the speech situation which is incompatible with his assertion
about the historic situation Consider the following example:
(3) lore wa omaeno buka da,
I your inferior be
'I am your inferior'
The absence of the honorific auxiliary is correlated with a type where a hearer is
socially lower than or equal to a speaker. Furthermore, as we discussed in 4.3.2.1,
referring to himself by ore is correlated with a type where a speaker presents himself
to a hearer informally, almost vulgarly, in the speech situation. Therefore, in uttering
the sentence in (3), the speaker indicates that the present speech situation is of a type
where a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, and a speaker presents
himself informally, almost vulgarly, to a hearer. The speaker, however, asserts that he
is the hearer's inferior. When the speaker asserts so, he is expected to assign a type
where a hearer is socially higher than a speaker. This is because the speaker's being in
a lower position than a hearer is one of the major factors which feature the speaker's
social inferiority, which is linguistically marked by the honorific auxiliary. The
discrepancy between the type of speech situation the speaker actually assigns to the
present one and the type he is expected to assign from his assertion about the historic
situation causes inconsistency.
The sentence in (3) is, however, not as bad as to be ungrammatical, meaningless, or
paradoxical. Although they are interrelated, the speaker talks about two situations; the
speech situation and the historic situation. Although assigning a certain type to the
historic situation can strongly suggest that the speech situation is of a particular type,
this does not exclude the possibility of speaker's assigning a different type to the
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speech situation. Imagine that the speaker used to be the hearer's boss and was
recently victimized by a malicious scandal and lost his position. The speaker might be
able to utter the sentence in (3) to express his desperation: the speaker indicates by the
use of ore and the absence of the honorific auxiliary that the social relation between
him and the hearer belongs to a type where a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a
speaker, and asserts the fact that he is the hearer's inferior.
In 4.3.3.2 and 4.3.3.3 we explicated another type of meaning of CONTEXTc, which
directly concerns historic situations. By 'pointing to' (referring to) a person by a
diminutive form of his first name, for example, the speaker indicates that the speaker is
very close to the referent or the speech situation is very informal. This type of meaning
is interesting because it is about the historic situation, but is not asserted (as truth-
conditional meaning is) but indicated. While this type of meaning of CONTEXTc is
rather limited in English and far from being grammaticalised, it is fully
grammaticalised in Japanese. The meanings about a social aspect of the historic
situation are expressed systematically by the distinction between honorific referring
expressions and non-honorific ones, and between honorific verbs and plain verbs.
Consider the following examples:
(4) a. Yamada ga ki ta,
b. Yamada-soma ga irrashat ta
come past
'Yamada came'
By uttering these sentences, the speaker can perform one and the same act of stating
about a particular person, who is the bearer of the name 'Yamada': the speaker 'points
to' the historic situation in the past where the person Yamada was, and asserts that he
did a type of action COME. The difference between these sentences concerns types of
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social relation between the person 'pointed to' and the speaker, which are marked by
'pointing to' the person either by his last name or by his last name plus soma, and
describing his action either by a plain verb ki ('come') or an honorific verb irashat. As
we will discuss in full length in 5.3.2, 'pointing to' (referring to) a person only by his
last name is correlated with a type where a referent is socially much lower than a
speaker, while 'pointing to' (referring to) a person by his last name plus soma is
correlated with a type where a referent is socially much higher than a speaker.
Describing the action of a referent by a plain verb is correlated with a type where a
referent is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, while describing the action of a
referent by an honorific verb is correlated with a type where a referent is socially
higher than a speaker.
By means of these linguistic conventions, the speaker can make a specific indication
about the social relation between him and the person referred to. By uttering the
sentence in (4a), the speaker indicates that a particular person Yamada is socially much
lower than him, while asserting that the person came. By uttering the sentence in (4b),
on the other hand, the speaker indicates that the person Yamada is socially much
higher than him, while asserting that the person came. There are two layers in meaning
about historic situations. One is a factual layer, where it matters whether or not an
entity or situation 'pointed to' is of a particular type. Meaning in this layer is truth-
conditional meaning and is asserted. The other is a social layer, where it matters
whether or not a person 'pointed to' has a particular type of social relation to a
speaker. Meaning in this layer is indicated.
The layer in which the following sentence goes wrong is the social layer:




By 'pointing to' a particular person only by his last name Yamada, the speaker
indicates that the social relation between the person 'pointed to' and him is of a type
where a referent is socially much lower than a speaker. The speaker, however,
indicates something contradictory by describing the action of the person by the
honorific verb irasshai: the speaker indicates that the social relation between the
referent, i.e., Yamada, and him is of a type where a referent is socially higher than a
speaker. As a result, a speaker indicates that the person, Yamada, is socially much
lower than him and higher than him at the same time, which is a contradiction. The
hearer might take this contradictory indication as an irony, because the straightforward
interpretation is impossible. The hearer might take this as follows: the speaker
indicates Yamada's inferiority as a person, which is marked by 'pointing to' him only
by his last name, in spite of his high social status, which is marked by the honorific
verb.
There are similar cases in English, where a speaker indicates something inconsistent.
Consider the following examples:
(6) a. That gentleman is a nice bloke,
b. That lady is a tart.
Although the speaker indicates social superiority of the person by 'pointing to' him or
her by 'gentleman' or 'lady' respectively, the speaker makes an incompatible
indication by assigning the attribute of him/her the type BLOKE or TART, which marks
social non-superiority of the referent. As a result, straightforward interpretations of
these sentences are impossible, and they sound sarcastic.
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In Chapter 4, we defended the idea that by means of the linguistic conventions, the
speaker specifies the type of the present speech situation, and in doing so, creates the
type between him and the hearer. We also defended the idea that by means of the
linguistic conventions, a speaker specifies the social relation between the person
'pointed to' and the speaker, and in doing so, reinforces existing social relations and
social attributes of people in the world. In the present chapter, we will describe how a
Japanese speaker, using the conventions of the two types of honorific, creates a
particular type of speech situation between him and the hearer, and specifies the social
relation in the historic situation.
Our plan for the present chapter is as follows. In 5.2 we introduce Japanese honorifics
and classifications of them. In 5.3 and 5.4, we describe Japanese honorifics as
grammaticalised devices to express meanings of CONTEXTc: one type is about a
speech situation (in 5.3) and the other type is about historic situations (in 5.4). Then
the concluding section follows.
5.2 Japanese Honorifics: Classifications and Problems
5.2.1 Classification of honorifics
According to Kasuga (1977), honorifics appeared in literature as early as the 8th
century. They appeared in Manyoshu, an anthology which includes 4,500 poems in 20
volumes, which was completed in the late 8th century. It is generally accepted that
honorifics are one of the major features which characterise Japanese. However,
according to Oishi (1977), it was not until the early 20th century that comprehensive
studies on honorifics were published. There were only a few exceptional works on
them before then, such as Rodriguez (1608).
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In the early 20th century, there were two traditional Japanese linguists whose works
were influential enough to be the landmarks in the history of honorific studies. One is
Yamada and the other is Tokieda. In the following, we will introduce Yamada's and
Tokieda's classifications of honorifics.
5.2.1.1 Yamada's classification of honorifics
Yamada is the first linguist to publish a comprehensive study on honorifics. In his
book (Yamada, 1924), Yamada described honorifics as grammatical rules, which
concern person. Yamada classified honorifics into two types: kensho ('humble
forms') express humbleness and are used to refer to or describe the first person and
his belongings; keisho ('honorifics') are a type which is used to refer to or describe
the second and third persons to express honour to them. Nouns of keisho
('honorifics') are subcategorised into (i) taisha keisho ('second-person honorifics'),
which are used to express honour to the second person; (ii)ippan keisho ('general
honorifics') are used to refer to the third person. Many linguists have followed
Yamada's three-way distinction; kensho ('humble form') for the first person, taisha
keisho ('second-person honorifics') for the second person, and ippan keisho
('general honorifics') for the third person.
As for verbs, Yamada introduced a distinction between zettai ('absolute') and kankei
('relative') for both kensho ('humble forms') and keisho ('honorifics'). We explain
the distinction between zettai kensho ('absolute humble forms') and kankei kensho
('relative humble forms') first. Zettai kensho ('absolute humble forms') are a type
where humbleness to the first person's action is expressed, regardless of the second or
third person's action. For example, when a speaker uses moosu ('say') or itasu
('do') for his action, the speaker simply expresses humbleness of his action of saying
or doing. On the other hand, kankei kensho ('relative humble forms') are a type
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where humbleness to the first person's action is expressed in relation to a co-occurring
action of the second or third person. For example, when a speaker uses itadaku
('get/be given') or ukagau ('hear') for his action, the speaker expresses humbleness to
his action of getting/being given or hearing in relation to the second or third person's
action of giving or saying. The speaker describes his action of getting/being given or
hearing by the humble verb so that the second or third person's action of giving or
saying can be 'high' in relation to his action 'lowered'.
Zettai keisho ('absolute honorifics') are a type where honour toward the action of the
second or third person is expressed regardless of the first person's action. For
example, when a speaker uses oboshimesu ('think') for the second or third person,
the speaker simply expresses honour to the action of the second or third person. On
the other hand, kankei keisho ('relative honorifics') are a type where honour toward
the action of the second or third person is expressed in relation to a co-occurring first
person's action. For example, when a speaker uses kudasaru ('give') for the action of
the second or third person, the speaker describes the second or third person's action in
relation to his action of getting/being given. The speaker describes the second or third
person's action of giving by the honorific verb so that his action of getting can be
'low' in relation to the second or third person's action made 'high'.
Yamada (1924)'s analysis of the honorifics is characterised by the systematic
description of honorifics in their relation to the first, second, and third persons.
However, because of his determination to describe all honorifics in relation to person,
Yamada had to give implausible explanations of some honorific phenomena, which
was later criticised by Tokieda (1941).
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5.2.1.2 Tokieda's theory and classification of honorifics
Tokieda expressed a unique idea about Japanese and Japanese linguistics in
Kokugogaku Genron ('The fundamental theory of Japanese linguistics') (Tokieda,
1941), which is still influential among Japanese linguists. His uniqueness lies not only
in the theory itself but his way of developing it. Unlike most of his contemporaries,
whose works were based on classification and description of a particular linguistic
phenomenon, Tokieda took a more modem approach: he started with a hypothesis
about language and analysed various phenomena to prove it. His famous theory is
named as gengo kateisetsu ('the theory of the process of a language'): he claims that a
language should be analysed as the process in which a speaker expresses his idea
about the world to a hearer. This is not far from our idea put forward in the present
thesis.
Tokieda hypothesises two processes in which a speaker expresses his idea about the
world. One process is that a speaker describes (a part of) the outer world as an
objectively conceptualised state of affairs. Roughly speaking, it is the process in which
a speaker expresses a proposition. The words which are used for this purpose are
called shi, which includes yama ('mountain'), hashiru ('run'), ureshii ('happy') and
so on. The other is that a speaker expresses his subjective, direct attitude to the
proposition. The words which are used for this purpose are called ji, and they include
zu/ji, which expresses negation1, ya, which expresses interrogation2, and mu, which
expresses mood3 (Tokieda, 1941:231-2).
Tokieda proposes the model of sentence meaning where a speaker describes (a part of)
the world as a state of affairs using shi words, and expresses his attitude to it using ji
use nai to express negation in modern Japanese.
2We use ka to express interrogation in modern Japanese.
3We use daroo to express this type of mood in modern Japanese.
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words. In his model the proposition expressed by shi words is encapsulated by the
speaker's attitude to the proposition, which is expressed by ji words, as is shown in
the following:
(7) [[proposition (by shi)] attitude to a proposition (by yz)]]
Using this model, Tokieda analysed sentences as follows:
(8) a. \[hana sakuJ ka]
flower bloom question
'Does a/the flower bloom?'
b. [[kare yoma] mu]
he read mood
'He will/may read'
c. \\ame ga furu] 0]4
rain fall
'Rain falls'
In (8a) the speaker expresses an interrogation of the proposition that a/the flower
blooms, and in (8b) the speaker expresses a modal meaning that the referent will/may
read. In (8c), a speaker asserts that rain falls without expressing his attitude to it,
which is unmarked.
Following the general distinction between shi and ji, Tokieda (1941) classifies
honorifics into two types; shi honorifics and ji honorifics. Shi honorifics concern
4These are Tokieda's original examples. See Tokieda (1941:249-14).
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propositions and ji honorifics concern attitudes to propositions. Using shi words, a
speaker refers to a part of the world and describes it as a type of state of affairs. In
doing so, the speaker expresses the social relation between the person referred to and
him or between the person referred to and another participant. The honorifics used for
this purpose are shi honorifics. On the other hand, using Ji words, a speaker expresses
an attitude to the proposition. In doing so, the speaker expresses the social relation
between him and the hearer. The honorifics used for this purpose are ji honorifics.
The following examples exemplify these types:
a. [[Ueda sensei ga ki ta]0]
b. [[Ueda sensei ga irashat fc]0]
c. [[Ueda sensei ga kiJ mashi la]
d. [[Ueda sensei ga irashai] mashi ta]
teacher come past
'Teacher Ueda came'
In uttering any of these sentences, the speaker can express one and the same
proposition: Teacher Ueda came. However, the social relations between the referent
and the speaker, and the hearer and the speaker expressed by them differ from one
another. In uttering the sentence in (9a), which has a plain verb and no ji honorific, the
speaker means that neither the referent nor the hearer is socially higher than him. If the
speaker utters the sentence in (9b) instead, which has an honorific verb but no ji
honorific, he means that the referent, but not the hearer, is socially higher than him. In
uttering the sentence in (9c), which has a plain verb and a ji honorific, a speaker means
that the hearer, but not the referent, is socially higher than him. In uttering the sentence
in (9d), a speaker means that both the referent and the hearer are socially higher than
him. As these examples show, using a plain or honorific verb is independent of using
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or not-using a ji honorific. Types of meaning which are expressed by ji honorifics and
shi honorifics are to be symbolised as follows:
(10) shi honorifics
honorific verbs R > S
plain verbs R =/< S
ji honorifics
with ji honorifics H > S




X > Y: X is socially higher than Y
X =/< Y: X is socially equal to or lower than Y
Unlike Yamada (1924), Tokieda (1941) does not think humble verbs are very different
from honorific verbs, and describes them equally under shi honorifics. In the
following a humble verb, mairi ('come'), makes a contrast to a plain verb ki ('come'):
(11) a. [[otooto ga tookyo he ki] mashi to]
b. [[otooto ga tookyo he mairi] mashi 43].
brother Tokyo to come past
'(My) brother came to Tokyo'
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Uttering a sentence in (lib), which has a humble verb, a speaker means that the
referent is socially lower than him5. Let us add the meaning expressed by humble
verbs in the model of honorific meanings in (10):
(12) shi honorifics
honorific verbs R > S
plain verbs R = /< S
humble verbs R < S
ji honorifics
with ji honorifics H > S




X > Y: X is socially higher than Y
X =/< Y: X is socially equal to or lower than Y
X < Y: X is socially lower than Y
Behind this classification is Tokieda's criticism of Yamada. In Yamada's analysis,
humble verbs are to express humbleness of the first person, and honorific verbs are to
express honour to the third person. Tokieda, on the other hand, claims that both
humble verbs and honorific verbs are concerned with the speaker's understanding and
description of the sociocultural aspect of the situation the speaker talks about: they are
not to express directly humbleness or honor, whereas ji honorifics are to express
5 The reason the speaker describes his brother's action of coming by a humble verb is that the hearer
is an outsider of the speaker's family to whom the speaker should describe his family's action
modestly. But let us pretend for the moment that we believe that the use of a humble form means that
the referent is socially lower than the speaker. We will discuss this point in 5.2.1.4 and 5.4.4.
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honor to the hearer directly. Tokieda (1941:440-41) uses the following examples to
dispute Yamada (1924):
(13) a. gohan wo itadaki nasai.
meal eat(humble) do
'Eat/have the meal!'
b. (nanji6 wa) chikoo maire,
you near come(humble)
'(You) come near!'
A mother can utter a sentence in (13a) to her child who hasn't started eating. She
describes her child's action by the humble verb, itadaki. According to Yamada (1924),
a humble word is used to express a first person's humbleness of herself, her family,
or her belongings. So, if Yamada (1924) is correct, the speaker expresses her
humbleness of her child by describing her child's action by the humble verb in (13a).
To whom is the speaker's humbleness of her child expressed? Obviously it is not the
hearer, because the hearer is the speaker's child. The next possibility is that the
speaker's humbleness of her child is expressed to someone/something with whom the
child's action of eating is concerned. It is, however, strange that the speaker's
humbleness is expressed to the meal or the person who cooks the meal (the cook can
be the speaker herself). So there is no one to whom one can reasonably assume the
speaker's humbleness of her child is expressed.
Similarly, in (13b), the second person whose action is described by the humble verb
mairu ('come') and the hearer are one and the same person. It is impossible that the
speaker's humbleness of the referent, i.e., the hearer, is expressed to the hearer. It is
^Nanji is an old form of a second-person pronoun.
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possible that the speaker's humbleness of the referent is expressed to a person to
whom the referent comes/goes. In this case, however, it is the speaker that the referent
comes/goes to. The speaker then expresses his humbleness of the referent to himself,
which is strange. So there isn't anyone one can reasonably assume the speaker's
humbleness of the referent is expressed to.
Tokieda (1941) argues against Yamada (1924)'s idea that the speaker expresses honor
or humbleness to the second or the third person by an honorific verb or a humble verb,
showing the above examples where the speaker does not express humbleness to
anyone. Tokieda (1941) claims that the use of an honorific verb or a humble verb
expresses the speaker's interpretation of the social aspect of the person referred to. In
the example in (13a) the speaker describes the action of eating by the humble verb
because the referent is her child, who is socially low. Similarly, in (13b) the speaker
describes the action of coming by the humble verb because the referent is socially
lower than him.
Tokieda's two-way distinction is adopted, with or without modification, by many
linguists in later years. Tsujimura (1967, 1977, 1992), and Shibatani (1990) are
among them. In the following section we will introduce their classifications of
honorifics.
5.2.1.3 Tokieda's followers
Tsujimura (1967, 1977, 1992) adopts Tokieda's two-way distinction between shi
honorifics and ji honorifics and uses the terms of sozai honorifics ('material
honorifics') and taisha honorifics ('addressee honorifics') for shi honorifics and ji
honorifics respectively. Tsujimura then classifies material honorifics into two types,
jooisha shutai go ('upper-person words') and kaisha shutai go ('lower-person
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words'). The former includes honorific words and the latter includes humble words.
Tsujimura also adopts Yamada (1924)'s distinction between ze«a/('absolute') and
fain&ciOrelative') for both jooisha shutai go ('upper-person words') and kaisha shutai
go ('lower-person words'). As we explained in 5.2.1.1, relative honorifics and
relative humble words concern the social relation between participants, whereas
absolute honorifics and absolute humble words7 concern the social relation between a
speaker and a referent. Consider the following examples:
(14) a. Yamada son ga shacho wo tasuke ta
b. Yamada san ga shacho wo otasuke-shi ta
c. Yamada sari ga shacho wo tasuke-te-kudasat ta
president help past
'Mr Yamada helped the President'
The difference among the relative verbs, tasuke, otasuke-shi-, tasuke-te-kudasat
('help'), is concerned with the social relation between an agent, i.e., Mr Yamada and a
beneficiary, i.e., the President. The sentence with a plain verb expresses that there
isn't any hierarchical difference between the agent and the beneficiary (in (14a)). And
the plain verb also shows that neither the agent nor the beneficiary is socially higher
than the speaker. The sentence with a humble verb expresses that the agent is socially
lower than the beneficiary (in (14b)). The sentence with an honorific verb expresses
that the agent is socially higher than the beneficiary (in (14c)).
Tsujimura's classification of honorifics is the following:
7The term 'absolute' is not accurate in the sense that even 'absolute' honorifics and humble words are
concerned with types of relative social relation between a speaker and a referent. However, since the
term is widely used, we use it in the present thesis.
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(15) 1. sozai honorifics ('material honorifics')
a. jooisha shutai go ('upper-person words')
(i) zettai ('absolute')
honorific verbs R > S
plain verbs R =/< S
(ii) kankei ('relative')
honorific verbs R > P
plain verbs R = P(=/<S)
b. kaisha shutai go ('lower-person words')
(i) zettai ('absolute')
humble verbs R < S
plain verbs R =/< S
(ii) kankei ('relative')
humble verbs R < P
plain verbs R = P(=/<S)
2. taisha honorifics ('addressee honorifics')
with taisha honorifics H > S
without taisha honorifics H =/< S
R: referent S: speaker
H: hearer P: another participant
X > Y: X is socially higher than Y.
X = Y: X is neither socially higher nor lower than Y.
X < Y: X is socially lower than Y8
8Tsujimura also has a subcategory called bikago ('decorative words') in material honorifics, but we
won't go into discussion about it.
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Shibatani (1990) also follows Tokieda's two-way distinction of honorifics, and uses
the terminology of 'referent-controlled honorification' and 'addressee-controlled
honorification' for Tokieda's shi honorifics and ji honorifics, as introduced in Chapter
4. Like Tsujimura, Shibatani subcategorises referent-controlled honorification into (i)
subject honorification, which is equivalent to Tsujimura's upper-person honorifics,
and (ii) object honorification, which is equivalent to Tsujimura's lower-person
honorifics. Shibatani, however, does not distinguish relative honorifics from absolute
honorifics as Tsujimura does. Shibatani's classification is shown as follows:
(16) 1. Referent-controlled honorification
a. subject honorification Sb > S
b. object honorification O > Sb
2. Addressee-controlled honorification H > S
Sb: subject H: hearer
O: object S: speaker
As the term 'honorification' shows, Shibatani regards honorifics as a syntactic process
of marking the social superiority of an agent (subject honorification), that of a
beneficiary (object honorification), and a hearer (addressee-controlled honorification).
Shibatani also adopts distinctions in style; formal vs. vulgar, but a discussion of this
would take us too far from the current topic9.
9Harada (1976) describes honorifics in the framework of transformational grammar and also adopts a
two-way distinction. Harada uses "propositional honorifics' for Tokieda's shi honorifics. and
'performative honorifics' for Tokieda's ji honorifics. Harada (1976:503) distinguishes subject
honorification from object honorification in propositional honorifics.
212
5.2.1.4 Criticisms of Tokieda's two-way classification
Although many traditional and modem Japanese linguists adopt it, there are some
criticisms of Tokieda's two-way classification of honorifics. One of them is Ishizaka's
(1944). Ishizaka claims that, although Tokieda (1941) abolishes the distinction
between the first person and the second person in shi honorifics, the distinction is still
important because they are directly related to the social relation between the speaker
and the hearer, with which ji honorifics are concerned. Consider the following
examples:
(17) a. watashi ga¬ soko he mairi masu
b. ore ga soko he iku.
I there to go
'I('ll) go there'
(18) a. kimi wa soko he iku ka?
b anata wa soko he irasshai masu ka?
you there to go question
'Do(Will) you go there?'
In (17), referring to himself by watashi (a formal form for 'I') or ore (an
informal/vulgar form for 'I') and describing his action by mairi (a humble verb for
'go') or iku (a plain verb for 'go') are not independent of using or not using the
honorific auxiliary masu. If the speaker refers to himself by watashi and describes his
action by the humble verb mairi the speaker finishes the sentence with the honorific
auxiliary masu. Similarly, in (18), referring to a hearer by kimi (a second-person
pronoun which shows that the person referred to is socially lower than or equal to the
speaker) or anata (a second-person pronoun which shows that the person referred to is
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socially higher than the speaker), and describing the hearer's action by iku (a plain
verb for 'go') or irasshai (an honorific verb for 'go') are not independent of using or
not using the honorific auxiliary masu. For example, if the speaker refers to the hearer
by anata and describes the hearer s action by the honorific verb irasshai, the speaker
finishes the sentence with the honorific auxiliary masu. In these examples the social
relation for which the speaker chooses a referring expression and a verb coincides with
the social relation for which the speaker chooses using or not using the honorific
auxiliary; the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. For this reason, the
following sentences sound strange:
(19) Iwatashi ga soko
I there
'I('ll) go there'






In (19), the speaker refers to himself formally using watashi and describes his action
of going by a humble verb mairu, but, nevertheless, he does not use the honorific
auxiliary masu. It is peculiar that the speaker refers to himself formally and describes
his action in a humble way when he does not believe that the hearer is socially higher
than him. Similarly, in (20), the speaker refers to the hearer by a pronoun anata which
shows the referent, i.e., the hearer, is socially higher than the speaker, and describes
the referent's action by an honorific verb irassharu. Nevertheless, the speaker does
without the honorific auxiliary, which shows that the hearer is socially equal to or
lower than the speaker. This shows that the speaker expresses an inconsistent belief
about the social relation between him and the hearer.
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According to Ishizaka, these correlations between shi honorifics and ji honorifics
cannot be explained in Tokieda's model of honorifics, where referring to a person by a
certain expression and describing his action by a certain verb is independent of using
or not using the honorific auxiliary: the former concerns the social relation between the
referent and the speaker or the referent and another participant, and the latter concerns
the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. It is, however, not clear that
Tokieda's two-way classification itself is problematic as Ishizaka claims. There are
cases, as Ishizaka (1944) shows, where uses of shi honorifics are dependent on uses
ofji honorifics because a speaker or a hearer is referred to. In those cases, the social
relation between the speaker and the hearer in the speech situation for which the
speaker uses ji honorifics is the social relation in the historic situation, for which the
speaker uses shi honorifics. However, this does not mean that the distinction between
shi and ji honorifics does not hold.
Furthermore, the issue of interrelation between shi honorifics and ji honorifics does
not seem to be just the issue of persons, as Ishizaka would like to claim. The social
relation in the situation referred to (in which shi honorifics are concerned) also
coincides with the social relation in the speech situation (which ji honorifics are
concerned) when a speaker's family or a hearer's family is referred to. Consider the
following examples:
(21) a. kinoo haha ga tookyo he mairi mashi ta
b. ?kinoo haha ga tookyo he mait ta.
yesterday mother Tokyo to come past
'(My) mother came to Tokyo yesterday'
The social relation for which the speaker uses the humble verb mait ('come') is in fact
the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, not the social relation between
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the speaker and the person referred to, i.e., the speaker's mother. It is customary that
when a speaker talks to an outsider to whom she should be formal, the speaker
identifies her family with herself and uses a humble word for her family, just as she
uses a humble word for herself. This is why the sentence in (21b) sounds strange.
Although the speaker refers to her mother by a formal word haha and describes her act
of coming by the humble verb mait, which means that the hearer is an outsider to
whom she should be formal, the speaker does not use the honorific auxiliary mashi.
Similarly, when the speaker refers to the hearer's family, the social relation for which
the speaker uses shi honorifics is the social relation between the speaker and the
hearer, not the social relation between the speaker and the person referred to. Consider
the following example:
(22) a. goshisoku mo irasshai mashi ta ka?
b. ?goshisoku mo irasshat ta ka?
son too come past question
'Did (your) son come, too?'
By referring to the hearer's son by the honorific word goshisoku ('son') and
describing his action by the honorific verb irashai/irashat, the speaker expresses that
the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, not that the hearer's son is socially
higher than the speaker. In (22b), however, the speaker does not use the honorific
auxiliaiy mashi to show that the hearer is socially higher than the speaker, which
makes the sentence strange. There are also cases where a speaker identifies a member
of the company or organization she belongs to with herself, and a member of the
company or organization the hearer belongs to with the hearer1 °.
1 will discuss this further in 5.4.4.
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Contrary to what Ishizaka says, these interrelations between shi honorifics and ji
honorifics are not a problem for Tokieda's classification. They can be explained within
Tokieda's classification. When a speaker refers to the hearer, the social relation for
which the speaker chooses shi honorifics is the social relation between the speaker and
the referent, i.e., the hearer. As a result, the social relation for which the speaker
chooses shi honorifics coincides with the social relation for which the speaker chooses
ji honorifics. When a speaker refers to herself, the social relation for which the speaker
chooses shi honorifics cannot be the social relation between the speaker and the
referent, because the referent is the speaker herself. As we discussed in 4.3.2.1, for a
speaker to refer to herself is to present herself in the speech situation she shares with
the hearer. Similarly for a speaker to describe her action is to present her action in the
speech situation she shares with the hearer. So it is the social relation between the
speaker and the hearer that the speaker is conscious of when referring to herself and
describing her action. It is not difficult to imagine that this has become a convention: a
speaker expresses the social relation between her and the hearer by shi honorifics
when the speaker refers to herself and describes her own action. Then the social
relation for which the speaker chooses shi honorifics coincides with the social relation
for which she chooses ji honorifics. When the speaker refers to her own family or the
hearer's family, the speaker identifies her family with herself, or the hearer's family
with the hearer11.
Under Tokieda's classification we can expand the analysis of correlation between shi
honorifics and ji honorifics into a wider area. Kikuchi (1997) reports a new usage of
the humble verb, (verb)-(sa)sete-itadaku. The humble verb (verb)-(sa)sete-itadaku
originally means 'be allowed or given the right to do something by someone who is
socially higher'. Consider the following example:
1 'This may come from Japanese culture where an individual is identified with the social group she is
a member of. See Nakane (1967).
217
(23) sensei no hon wo tsukawa-sete-itadake masu ka?
teacher book use question
'Am (I) allowed to use the teacher's book?'
Using the humble verb, tsukawa-sete-itadaku, the speaker describes her action of
using the book as an action which is to be allowed by a person who is socially higher
than her, i.e., the teacher. In doing so, the speaker expresses that the teacher is
socially higher than her. Kikuchi (1997:40-47) reports the cases where (verb)-(sa)sete-
itadaku is used for the action in which allowance or permission doesn't apply in a
straightforward sense.
(24) watashidomo wa kono tabi shinseihin wo kaihatsu
we(pl) this time new product produce
-sasete-itadaki mashi la.
past
'We were allowed to have produced a new product this time'
(25) watashidomo wa shoogatsu wa hawai de
we(pl) New Year Hawaii in
sugo-sasete-itadaki masu.
spend
'We are allowed to spend the New Year in Hawaii'
According to Tsujimura (1997), the humble verb (verb)-sasete-itadaku is losing its
original meaning of 'being allowed or given the right to do something by a socially
higher person', and getting what he calls a meaning of absolute humble word. By
218
uttering the sentence in (24), the speaker simply expresses humbleness to his and his
colleague's act of producing a new product, which is to show his humbleness to the
hearer. Similarly, by uttering the sentence in (25), the speaker simply expresses
humbleness to the hearer by describing her and her family's plan to spend the New
Year in Hawaii by the humble verb.
We can explain this change of the meaning of (verb)-sasete-itadaku as a case of
correlation between shi honorifics and ji honorifics. The humble verb (verb)-sasete-
itadaku is a shi honorific which expresses a type of social relation between a person
referred to and another participant, which Kikuchi calls meaning of (verb)-sasete-
itadaku as a relative humble word. In (23), for example, the verb expresses a type
social relation between a referent (the speaker) and the owner of the book (the teacher),
i.e., the referent is socially lower than the owner. The verb (verb)-sasete-itadaku is
also correlated with the social relation between the speaker and the hearer, because,
when the speaker describes her action, the speaker presents her own action in the
speech situation. So, using the verb (verb)-sasete-itadaku, the speaker describes her
action as something which is allowed by someone socially higher (although there may
be no such person in these cases), and tries not to give the hearer an impression that
she is boasting of producing a new product (in (24)) or spending the New Year in
Hawaii (in (25)). This is the use of (verb)-sasete-itadaku as an absolute humble word.
In this use, the verb (verb)-sasete-itadaku gets the function of ji honorifics as well as
that of shi honorifics, and concerns the social relation between the speaker and the
hearer. The use of (verb)-sasete-itadaku as a ji honorific, however, has not been fully
accepted yet.
Miyaji (1971) also criticises Tokieda's distinction between shi honorifics and ji
honorifics. According to Tokieda, using shi honorifics the speaker describes the social
aspect of a person or situation referred to, while the speaker expresses honour to the
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hearer by ji honorifics. Casting doubt on the idea that ji honorifics express honor,
Miyaji says that we can claim that, just as shi honorifics are used to describe the social
aspect of a person or situation referred to, ji honorifics are used to describe the social
aspect of the speaker's uttering something to the hearer in the speech situation. That is,
while types of social relation between a speaker and a referent are expressed by shi
honorifics, types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer are expressed by ji
honorifics.
However, under the definition ofji honorifics proposed by Miyaji, we cannot explain
a performative function of ji honorifics. By using the honorific auxiliary, the speaker
does not just describe the social relation between the speaker and the hearer. The
speaker creates a certain type of speech situation between the speaker and the hearer.
This is made possible by the mechanism ofji honorifics where highlighting the present
speech situation and assigning a type to it are amalgamated. Highlighting the present
speech situation (by means of the demonstrative conventions) and assigning a certain
type to it (by means of the descriptive conventions) are performed as one and the same
act, and, as a result, the speaker highlights the present speech situation with the
assigned type, while communicating in the very speech situation. In doing so, the
speaker creates the type of speech situation between her and the hearer. For example,
when I utter a sentence without the honorific auxiliary to my colleague after talking to
her with it for many months, I do not just describe the social relation between us. I
highlight the present speech situation and assign it a close type of social relation while
communicating in the very speech situation. As a result, I have made a case of
communicating in the close social relation with my colleague, hoping that she will
accept this type of social relation as our social relation in the present speech situation.
To explain this performative function of ji honorifics, we should not describe ji
honorifics just as expressions of types of social relation between a speaker and a
hearer. It seems that Tokieda (1941) describes ji honorifics as the speaker's direct
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expression of honor to the hearer to explain the performative function of ji honorifics.
We will come back to this point in 5.3.1.
In the present section, we have shown that Ishizaka's (1944) and Miyaji's (1971)
criticisms ofTokieda's classification of shi and ji honorifics are not valid. In the rest of
the present chapter, we will analyse meanings and functions of Japanese honorifics
following Tokieda's classification of shi and ji honorifics. We will show what
meanings of CONTEXTc are expressed by shi and ji honorifics, and how Japanese
speakers, by using them, specify the social aspect of the world, and incorporate it into
the factual aspect of the world.
5.2.1.5 Types of social meaning expressed by honorifics
We have so far explained meanings of CONTEXTc about speech situations expressed
by the presence and the absence of the honorific auxiliary, i.e., ji honorifics, in terms
of (i) social superiority and equality/inferiority between the speaker and the hearer, (ii)
social closeness and distance between the speaker and the hearer, and (iii) formality
and informality of the speech situation. As for the meanings of CONTEXTc about
historic situations expressed by an honorific or non-honorific referring expression and
a plain, honorific, or humble verb, i.e., shi honorifics, we have described social
superiority, equality, and inferiority between a speaker and a referent. Let us examine
the ranges of meanings of CONTEXTc expressed by Japanese honorifics.
Tsujimura (1977:50-58) classifies social relations expressed by honorifics into four
types; (i) social superiority and inferiority, (ii) relation between benefactors and
benefactees, (iii) power, and (iv) social closeness and distance. Tsujimura
subcategories social superiority and inferiority into (a) hierarchy in the same
organization, (b) social status, (c) age, and (d) experience. For example, as for social
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superiority and inferiority, a person uses an honorific for his boss (hierarchy in the
same organization), a person in the street uses an honorific for an MP (social status), a
person uses an honorific for an older person (age), and a person who has just started a
new job uses an honorific for a person who has been doing the job for a long time
(experience). As for the relation between benefactors and benefactees, a patient uses an
honorific for his doctor, and as for power, an examinee uses an honorific for an
examiner. As for social closeness and distance, a person uses an honorific for a
stranger. Tsujimura also points out that formality and informality of the speech
situation concern honorifics: in formal occasions, one uses honorifics.
We use social superiority and inferiority as general terms which also include the
relation between benefactors and benefactees and power in Tsujimura's classification.
That is, a benefactor is socially higher than a benefactee, and a person with power is
socially higher than a person without it. There are then three types of meaning
expressed by honorifics; (i) social superiority and inferiority, (ii) social distance and
closeness, and (iii) formality and informality of the speech situation. The general rules
are: (i) if the hearer or the referent is socially higher, the speaker uses an honorific, and
if the referent is socially lower, the speaker uses a humble word; (ii) if the speaker and
the hearer or the referent are socially distant, the speaker uses an honorific; and (iii) if
the speech situation is formal, the speaker uses an honorific.
There seems to be no way to express separately social superiority, social distance and
formality, which means that they are related concepts, and there might be a hyper-
concept. The strongest candidate for it would be social distance: vertical social distance
is social superiority, horizontal social distance is social distance (in the opposite sense
of social closeness), and social distance itself is correlated with formality. The wider
the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, or the speaker and the referent
is, the more heavily the speaker marks the social relation with honorifics (or humble
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forms). The inside of the circle in the following diagram stands for the distance where
the speaker does without honorifics (or humble forms), and the rest stands for the
distance where the speaker marks with honorifics (or humble forms).
(26)
There are a few points to mention. Under the democratic Constitution after the war,
many Japanese speakers have become reluctant to use a humble form to mark social
inferiority, except in the business environment where social hierarchy is clearly fixed.
Those speakers do not mark social distance when they refer to a person who is socially
lower, and describe his action, as shown in the following diagram:
(27)
The second point concerns influence from the actual setting of communication. When a
speaker is in a business meeting where the company's business policy is discussed,
the speaker marks social distance very rigidly. The same speaker might not do so
when he is in a friendly drinking session afterwards, in referring to and addressing the
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same people. This shows that, although the principles of marking the distance with
honorifics and humble forms are the same, application is affected by outer elements.
As a result, a point beyond which a speaker marks the relation as 'socially distant'
moves, as shown in the following diagram:
(28)
The next question is how to illustrate types of meaning of honorifics. The choice is
between (i) describing both ji and shi honorifics by social distance as a general term
(say, [+/-D]) and (ii) describing them by superiority or inferiority ([H(x,y)]
[E/L(x,y)]), social distance or closeness ([D(x,y>] and [C(x,y)]), and formality or
informality ([FJ and [IF]), as we have been doing. Although the former representation
has an advantage of formalizing types of meaning of Japanese honorifics simply and
clearly, we choose the latter representation for the following reasons. First, our
present purpose is to show what types of meaning the speaker expresses about the
social relation between him and the hearer, and between him and the referent in various
situations, rather than to formalize those meanings. Second, this representation makes
cross-linguistic comparison easier: we can compare meanings expressed by honorifics
in Japanese with the meanings expressed by other linguistic devices in other
languages, where social superiority, social distance, and formality might not be
conjoined into one concept.
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Before we close the present section, let us show Tokieda's categorization of shi and ji
honorifics and our ways of presentation of each category.
(29) Tokieda's ours
shi honorifics
honorific verbs R > S HI(R,S) or D(S,R) or F
plain verbs
humble verbs
R = /< S E/L(R,S) or C(S,R) or IF
R < S L(R,S)
ji honorifics
with ji honorifics H > S HI(H,S) or D(S,H) or F




5.3 Ji honorifics: meaning of CONTEXTc which concerns
speech situations
5.3.1 Meaning about speech situations
Before we start analysing ji honorifics, let us go back to the point Miyaji (1971)
makes, which we introduced in 5.2.1.4. Tokieda (1941) bases shi and ji distinction on
the 'difference' between the speaker's description of the social aspect of the person or
situation referred to and the speaker's direct expression of honour to the hearer.
According to Miyaji, however, one can claim that by ji honorifics the speaker
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describes the social aspect of his utterance, just as he describes the social aspect of the
person or situation referred to by shi honorifics.
In one sense, Miyaji (1971) is right. To utter a ji honorific, say, the honorific auxiliary
masu, is to assign a certain type to the present speech situation. There are cases where
a speaker does not express her honour to the hearer in the strict sense of 'honour'.
When the speaker uses masu in an opening speech of the conference, for example,
she does not seem to express her personal honour to the hearers.
It is, however, also true that there is a direct, immediate impact of uttering a ji
honorific on the speaker-hearer relation in the speech situation, which does not exist
between uttering a shi honorific and the relation between the speaker and the referent.
One utters a ji honorific to do something, not just to describe the speech situation. It is
like uttering a performative sentence such as 'I declare a war' or 'I sentence you to life
in prison', which is to perform declaring or sentencing, not just to describe the present
speech act. Or it is like uttering a sentence of phatic communion such as, 'Good
morning', which is to greet, not just to describe the historic situation or the speech
situation. In short ji honorifics are performatives, which is an important difference
between shi and ji honorifics.
We have been saying that the speaker creates a particular type of speech situation by
means of ji honorifics, but we should explain it a bit more. In 4.2.2, we define
communication as two people's creating and sharing the speech situation where they
are willing to accept the changing roles of the speaker and the hearer and exchange
opinions about the world. In this sense, a speech situation is a mental entity, not a
physical space where a speaker and a hearer are. How does the speaker create a speech
situation as a mental entity between him and the hearer? We have shown that uttering a
word or a sentence to someone does not always guarantee creating a speech situation.
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In fact there are many ways in which the speaker's effort is in vain: the hearer might
not understand the language, or might be too hostile to the speaker to respond, cannot
or might not hear what the speaker says, and so on. Although he is aware of the
possibility to fail, the speaker talks to a hearer anyway: the speaker takes a 'gamble' by
making a case of communicating in the speech situation. If the speaker gets a
reasonable response from the hearer, the preceding utterance of the speaker is counted
as a part of communication, and the speaker has succeeded in creating the speech
situation.
It matters not only whether or not the speaker creates a speech situation between him
and the hearer, but also what type of speech situation he creates. There is a
comfortable distance between people in communication, and the speaker wants to be
close to some and distant to others. Since the social distance is crucial in
communication, it is reasonable to hypothesise that language is equipped with a device
by which the speaker creates a type of speech situation where a speaker has a particular
social distance from a hearer. Types of speech situation are language specific, although
it is more than possible that many languages develop similar types of speech situation.
We have shown in Chapter 4 that vocatives in English and T/V distinction in some
languages are such a device to create different types of speech situation. So are
Japanese ji honorifics. Using the conventional relation between ji honorifics and types
of speech situation, the speaker specifies the present speech situation she shares with a
particular hearer, considering actual social parameters of the speech situation and their
importance, and, in doing so, creates the particular type of speech situation between
her and the hearer.
To describe this direct impact of speaker's use of ji honorifics to the present speech
situation, it is not too bad to say, 'a speaker expresses an honour to a hearer', as
Tokieda (1941) puts it. To do so, the term 'honour' should be used in a widest
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possible sense. However, we do not take Tokieda's idea of the honour-expressing
function of ji honorifics. We stick to the idea that ji honorifics are performatives to
create a certain type of speech situation.
5.3.2 Ji honorifics
As we have repeatedly shown in the present thesis, the presence of the honorific
auxiliary masu is correlated with a distant type of speech situation, where (i) a hearer is
socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker and a hearer are socially distant, or (iii) a
speech situation is formal. The absence of it, on the other hand, is correlated with a
non-distant type, where (i) a hearer is socially equal to or lower than a speaker, (ii) a
speaker and a hearer are socially close, or (iii) a speech situation is informal. By means
of these linguistic conventions, the speaker assigns either type of speech situation to
the present speech situation, and, in doing so, creates the type of speech situation
between her and the hearer. The meanings the speaker expresses by uttering the
sentences in (30a) and (30b) are shown in the diagrams in (31) and (32) respectively.
(30) a. Yamada san ga ki mashi ta




There are other ji honorifics. The honorific auxiliary desu is used for a copula
sentence. Another honorific auxiliary, gozaimasu, is also for a copula sentence, and it
is correlated with a wider social gap between a speaker and a hearer. The type of
speech situation correlated with gozaimasu is that (i) a hearer is socially much higher
than a speaker, (ii) a speaker and a hearer are socially veiy distant, or (iii) a speech
situation is very formal. The following is a copula sentence without an honorific
auxiliaiy (in (33a)), one with desu (in (33b)), and one with gozaimasu (in (33c)).
(33) a. Yamada san ga shachoo da,
b. Yamada son ga shachoo desu,
c. Yamada san ga shachoo de
president copula
gozaimasu.
'Mr Yamada is the President'
If the present speech situation is not of the type the speaker assigns, the speaker's
assigning is inappropriate, which makes the speaker's creating the type of speech
situation between her and the hearer inappropriate or even a failure. Imagine the
speaker uttering the sentence in (33c) to his wife during the dinner. The speaker
assigns the intimate and informal speech situation he shares with his wife at present a
very inappropriate type, where (i) a hearer is socially much higher than a speaker, (ii) a
speaker and a hearer are socially very distant, or (iii) a speech situation is very formal.
Since this type cannot be obtained in any of actual social parameters of the present
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speech situation, the speaker's wife would not understand why the speaker specifies
the present speech situation by this type (unless he says it as a joke).
There are cases where the social relation between the speaker and the hearer is on the
borderline of two types, or there are competing elements in the social relation between
the speaker and the hearer. In such a case, the speaker chooses the most important
element of the present speech situation and creates a particular type of speech situation
accordingly. This shows in turn what social relation the speaker wants to develop
between her and the hearer, or what aspect of the social relation the speaker finds
crucial for the present speech situation. Let us take an example. Between my
supervisor at college, Professor Ueda, and me, there is more than one type of social
relation. She is my former supervisor, so we have a teacher-student relation. And she
is older than me, so we have a senior-junior relation. For these, I would create a
distant type of speech situation. However, since I graduated from the college a long
time ago and we have been friends since then, we have a friend relation. And,
furthermore, Professor Ueda and I are interested in the same area in linguistics, so we
have a colleague relation, too. For these I would create a non-distant type of speech
situation. Therefore, when I think of our social relation to choose an appropriate ji
honorific, I have to decide which aspect of our social relation is more crucial for the
present speech situation. The setting matters: when I have tea with her at home, I
would assume the friends aspect is crucial for the present speech situation, and create a
non-distant type between us. The topic also matters: when we talk about linguistics, I
would assume the colleague aspect is crucial for the present speech situation, and
create a non-distant type. The presence of other discourse participants also matters: if
other students of Professor Ueda are present, I would assume the teacher-student
aspect is crucial for the present speech situation, and create a distant type between us.
In each case, Professor Ueda would know what social factor I find crucial for the
speech situation.
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5.4 Shi honorifics: meaning of CONTEXTc which concerns
historic situations
5.4.1 Meaning of CONTEXTc about historic situations
As we discussed 5.1, there is a type of meaning about a historic situation which is not
truth-conditional. We have described this as there being two layers of meaning about a
historic situation. One is a factual layer, where a person or situation is 'pointed to' and
his/her/its action or state is described. Truth-conditional meaning concerns this layer.
The other is a social layer, where the social aspect of a referent or situation is described
as a social relation between the referent and the speaker, or the referent and another
participant. Honorifics which concern this layer are shi honorifics.
A speaker creates a social layer of historic situation by constantly differentiating social
aspects of the referent or situation. We can hypothesise that 'pointing to' a person and
describing his action become subject to further differentiation in terms of social
distance, and that such differentiation has become a linguistic convention. When the
differentiation is grammaticalised and the speaker cannot describe a fact of the historic
situation without marking social distance, a social layer of the historic situation comes
into existence as real as a factual layer of the historic situation. Shi honorifics are
correlated with this type of differentiation, and, by using them, the speaker specifies
social relation in the historic situation. In doing so, the speaker reinforces existing
social relations in the world or emphasises social aspects of people in the world.
The social layer of the historic situation is expressed as a relation between a referent
and a speaker (or another participant). A person is 'pointed to' by an honorific
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expression and his action is described by an honorific verb by some speakers, and the
same person is referred to by a non-honorific expression and his action is described by
a plain verb by other speakers. The social aspect of the referent is not expressed as the
referent's attributes, say, being a member of the superior social class. That is, shi
honorifics represent types of relative social distance between a person referred to and a
speaker (or another participant). This is the reason Fillmore (1971) defines honorifics
as social deixis. Shi honorifics express the referent's relative social distance from the
deictic centre, which is often identified with a point of social scale where the speaker
occupies.
Since the Meiji period (1868-1912), when rigid differentiation of social classes which
was conventionalised in the Edo period (1603-1868) started to lose its importance12,
the differentiation of social distance by shi honorifics has become more important than
before. The formality and informality of the speech situation can be also expressed by
shi honorifics. For example, there are cases where a speaker 'points to' a person by an
honorific expression and describes his action by a polite verb not because the person
'pointed to' is socially higher than the speaker or socially distant to the speaker, but
because the speech situation is formal. This relation between shi honorifics and the
formality or informality of the speech situation is similar to the relation between slang
words and the informality of the speech situation, which we discussed in Chapter 4. In
both cases, 'pointing to' a person and describing his action by certain words are
correlated with types of present speech situation.
5.4.2 Shi honorifics
We classify shi honorifics into two types. One is absolute honorifics, which concern
(i) types of social relation between a person referred to and a speaker, (ii) types of
12See Shibatani (1990).
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social distance between a person referred to and a speaker, and (iii) formal or informal
types of speech situation. These types of relation or speech situation are expressed by
honorific or non-honorific referring expressions and plain, humble, or honorific
verbs. We will illustrate meanings the speaker expresses by absolute shi honorifics
using the following diagram:
The circle which stands for a speech situation overlaps with the square which stands
for a historic situation. This is because meanings of absolute shi honorifics concern a
social relation or distance between a speaker in the speech situation and a referent in
the historic situation. By assigning a type to the social relation or distance between him
and the referent, the speaker specifies a social layer of the historic situation.
The other type is relative honorifics, and the meanings of relative shi honorifics
concern types of social relation between a person referred to and another participant in
the historic situation. These types of social relation are expressed by humble or
honorific verbs. We will illustrate meanings the speaker expresses by relative shi






The circle in the square stands for the social layer of the speech situation, where the
social relation between a referent and another participant in the historic situation is
specified13.
5.4.2.1 Absolute honorifics
Let us start with referring expressions. 'Pointing to' a person only by his last name is
correlated by convention with a type where (i) a referent is socially much lower than a
speaker, (ii) a speaker is very close, almost vulgar, to a referent, or (iii) the speech
situation is very informal. 'Pointing to' a person by his last name plus kun is
correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially lower than a speaker, or (ii) a
speaker is close to a referent (referring to someone by kun does not seem to be
specified in terms of formality or informality of the speech situation). 'Pointing to' a
person by his last name plus san is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is
socially equal to or higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially a little distant to a
referent or (iii) the speech situation is formal. 'Pointing to' a person by his last name
plus soma is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially much higher than a
speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially veiy distant to a referent, or (iii) the speech situation
is very formal.
13Let us mention morphology of honorific and humble verbs. The following are some of the pairs of
a plain verb and an honorific verb (the former of each pair is a plain verb and the latter an honorific
verb): iu and ossharu ('say'), suru and nasaru ('do'), taberu and agaru ('eat'), and kureru and
kudasaru ('give'). Apart from these, verbs can be made into honorific verbs in the following
structures; o/go-(\erb)-ni-naru, o/go-(yerb)-nasaru, (verb)-nasaru, o/go-(verb)-kudasaru, and (verb)-
rendrarer. For example, a verb warau ('laugh') becomes o-warai-ni-naru, o-warai-nasaru, warai-nasaru,
o-warai-kudasaru, and warawa-reru . Some of the pairs of a plain verb and a humble verb are in the
following (the former of each pair is a plain verb and the latter a humble verb): taberu and itadaku
CeaV), tazuneru and ukagau ('visit'), ageru and sashiageru ('give'), in and mooshiageru ('say'), and
miru and omenikakaru ('see'). Like honorific verbs, verbs become humble verbs in the following
structures: o/go-(verb)-5nm, o/go-(veib)-mooshiageru, and o/go-(yerb}-itasu. For example, a verb
tasukeru ('help') becomes o-tasuke-suru, o-tasuke-mooshiageru, and o-tasuke-itasu. See Ogawa
(1982:260-65) and Kikuchi (1994:114ff).
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The conventions which concern describing the referent's action by a humble, plain, or
honorific verb are explained in the following. Using a humble verb for the action of a
person except a speaker himself or a member of the speaker's social group14 is
correlated by convention with a type where a referent is socially much lower than a
speaker. Since marking social inferiority of a referent by a humble verb is not a
common practice any more and is restricted in hierarchical environment, it is not
correlated with a type where a speaker is close to a referent, or a speech situation is
informal. Using a plain verb for the action of a person is correlated with a type where
(i) a referent is socially lower than or equal to a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially close
to a referent, (iii) the speech situation is informal. Using an honorific verb for the
action of a person is correlated with a type where (i) a referent is socially higher than a
speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a referent, or (iii) the speech situation is
formal.
Using these linguistic conventions, the speaker specifies the social relation between
him and the person in the historic situation as a certain type or the present speech
situation as a certain type. For example, while 'pointing to' a particular person Yamada
and describing his past action by assigning it a type COME, the speaker specifies the
social relation between him and the person or the present speech situation as a
particular type by uttering one of the following sentences (where mairi is a humble
verb, ki a plain verb, and irasshai an honorific verb):
14For the meanings the speaker expresses by using a humble verb for the action of himself or a
member of his social group, see 5.4.4.
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(36) a. Yamada ga main mashi ta
b. Yamada kun ga ki mashi ta
c. Yamada son ga irasshai mashi ta
d. Yamada soma ga irasshai mashi ta.
come past
'Yamada came'
These socially differentiated meanings in (36a), (36b), (36c) and, (36d) are illustrated
in the diagrams in (37), (38), (39), and (40) respectively (where the social meaning
expressed by the honorific auxiliary mashi is in the left half of the circle which stands
for the speech situation, and social meanings expressed by different referring forms
and verbs are in the right half).
Potential types where a speaker is socially very close to a referent and a speech
situation is very informal expressed by the referring form of the last name only are





The potential type where a speech situation is informal expressed by the plain verb is















By means of the conventions of absolute shi honorifics, the speaker specifies the
social aspect of the person 'pointed to' (or the present speech situation) by assigning it
a particular type. If the person 'pointed to' (or the present speech situation) is not of
the type, the speaker's utterance becomes inappropriate. If, for example, the speaker
utters the sentence in (36d) in friendly gathering and Yamada is his colleague of the
same rank to whom he is close, his utterance is inappropriate. The type of social
relation (or speech situation) correlated with the sentence in (36d) cannot be obtained
in actual social parameters in the relation between Yamada and the speaker (and actual
social parameters in the present speech situation).
5.4.2.1 Relative honorifics
Describing a referent's action to another participant by an honorific verb is correlated
with a type where a referent is socially higher than another participant. Consider the
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following example where the speaker uses the honorific verb kudasat ('give') for the
action of the teacher (agent) to the child (beneficiary):
(41) sensei ga sono kodomo ni hon wo kudasat la,
teacher that child to book give past
'The teacher gave a/the book to that child'
The following is the diagram which shows the meaning of the sentence in (41):
Describing a referent's action to another participant by a humble verb is correlated with
a type where a referent is lower than another participant. The following is the case
where the speaker uses the humble verb sashiage ('give') for the action of a child
(agent) to the Emperor (beneficiary):
(43) kodomo ga tennooheika ni hana wo sashiage ta.
child emperor to flower give past
'A child gave flowers to the Emperor'









Using these conventions, the speaker specifies the social relation between the person
'pointed to' and another participant in the historic situation. In doing so, the speaker
expresses a differentiated social relation in the historic situation, together with a fact in
the historic situation. If the social relation in the historic situation is not of the type the
speaker assigns to it, the speaker's indicating is inappropriate15.
5.4.3 The cases where the social relation in the speech situation
coincides with that in the historic situation
As we discussed 5.2.1.4, when a speaker 'points to' himself or a hearer, the social
relation in the historic situation for which the speaker uses shi honorifics coincides
with the social relation in the speech situation for which the speaker uses ji honorifics.
Consider the following examples:
1 -^Let us mention the scope of tense. In the diagrams in (42) and (44) the circle which stands for the
social relation between a referent and another participant is in the square which stands for a historic
situation in the past This does not mean, however, that the scope of tense is over the social relation
between a referent and another participant. As we have claimed repeatedly in the present chapter, the
social relation in the historic situation is in a different layer from the factual layer of the historic
situation. 'Pointing to' a historic situation at one point in time and place and describing it by
assigning a type to it is independent of assigning a type to the social relation between a referent and
another participant, and vice versa.
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(45) a. ore ga soko he iku.
b. boku ga soko he iku,
c. watashi ga soko he mairi masu,
I there to go
'I('ll) go there
A male speaker has a choice of 'pointing to' himself by ore, boku, and watashi, each
of which is correlated with a different type of (in)formality of speech situation, as we
discussed in Chapter 4 (4.3.2.1.2). The speaker also has a choice of describing his
own action by a humble verb or a plain verb, each of which is correlated with a
different type of social hierarchy or social distance between a speaker and a hearer, or
(in)formality of speech situation, as we described in 5.2.1.4.
Describing one's own action by an honorific verb, which is potentially correlated with
one's social superiority over a hearer or social distance from a hearer, is not
conventionalised. The following example, where the speaker describes his own action
by an honorific verb irassharu ('go') sounds strange unless it is uttered as a joke:
(46) lore ga soko he irassharu.
I there to go
'I('Il) go there'
By 'pointing to' himself by a particular pronoun and describing his own action by
either a humble verb or a plain verb, the speaker presents himself and his action to a
hearer in a particular way. This has almost the same function as that of ji honorifics; to
indicate that the present speech situation is of a particular type. For example, to present
himself formally to the hearer in the speech situation by a pronoun watashi is almost
the same as to indicate, by the ji honorific auxiliary masu, that the social relation
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between the speaker and the hearer is formal. To present his own action by a humble
verb, indicating that (i) the speaker is socially lower than the hearer, (ii) the speaker is
socially distant to the hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is formal is the same as to
indicate, by the ji honorific auxiliary, that (i) the hearer is socially higher than the
speaker, (ii) the speaker is socially distant to the hearer, or (iii) the speech situation is
formal.
Let us show the meanings the speaker expresses by uttering the sentences in (45a),
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When a speaker 'points to' the hearer by a pronoun and describes her action by a
humble, plain or honorific verb, the social relation the speaker indicates by shi
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honorifics also coincides with the social relation the speaker indicates by ji honorifics.
'Pointing to' the hearer by omae is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially
much lower than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially very close to a hearer, or (iii) a
speech situation is very informal. 'Pointing to' the hearer by kimi is correlated with a
type where (i) a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker or (ii) a speaker is
socially close to a hearer (formality or informality of the speech situation does not
seem to be correlated with 'pointing to' the hearer by kimi). 'Pointing to' the hearer by
anata is correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a
speaker is socially distant to a hearer, or (iii) a speech situation is formal.
Describing the hearer's action by a humble verb is correlated with a type where a
hearer is socially lower than a speaker. Describing the hearer's action by a plain verb is
correlated with a type where (i) a hearer is socially lower than or equal to a speaker,
(ii) a speaker is socially close to a hearer, or (iii) a speech situation is informal.
Describing the hearer's action by an honorific verb is correlated with a type where (i) a
hearer is socially higher than a speaker, (ii) a speaker is socially distant to a hearer, or
(iii) a speech situation is formal.
Let us show the meanings of the following sentences in (50a) with a humble verb
mooshi ('say'), (50b) and (50c) with a plain verb it, and (50d) with an honorific verb
osshai in the diagrams in (51), (52), (53) and (54) respectively.
a. omae ga soo mooshi ta,
b. omae ga soo it ta,
c. kimi ga soo it ta,
d anata gd soo osshai mashi ta.




Meanings of social closeness and informality which are potentially expressed by the
pronoun omae and the absence of the honorific auxiliary are denied by the use of the
humble verb, mooshi ('say').
(52)
■Past
Because 'pointing to' the hearer by kimi is not correlated with either a formal type or
an informal type of speech situation, the possible meaning of informality of the speech




By a particular first-person or second-person pronoun, the speaker can indicate the
type of the social relation between him and the hearer or the present speech situation
very directly and strongly. This is because 'pointing to' himself or the hearer by a
particular first-person or second person pronoun is a part of the speaker's assertion to
the hearer. This is good when the speaker creates a comfortable speech situation for
the hearer. However, if he doesn't, the speaker might endanger the communication
between him and the hearer. For example, if the speaker 'points to' the hearer by
omae, the hearer might accept it positively as a sign of the speaker's strong intention to
build an informal, close relationship. But it is also possible that the hearer takes it as an
insult believing the speaker means that the hearer is socially much lower. If the speaker
'points to' himself by watashi, the hearer might accept it positively as a sign that a
speaker is formal and non-intruding, or take it as the speaker's indifference about
building a friendly relationship for communication.
It seems that Japanese speakers tend to avoid 'pointing to' themselves or the hearer by
pronoun. They often drop a subject. If there is no other person introduced in the
discourse, it is not difficult to guess that the speaker talks about himself. When a
speaker is putting a question to the hearer, it is a reasonable guess that the speaker
talks about the hearer. Or a speaker 'points to' the hearer by first name or last name
plus san, or his position or vocation, which are usually used for 'pointing to' the third
person. For example, a speaker 'points to' a hearer by Yuko san (first name plus san),
Suzuki san (last name plus san), shachoo ('president') (the hearer's position), and
sensei ('teacher') (the hearer's vocation). We need a socio-linguistic survey to
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conclude that there is a correlation between the speech-situation-sensitive nature of
'pointing to' the speaker himself or the hearer by a pronoun and dropping a subject or
using other referring expressions. This is, however, strongly implied.
5.4.4 The cases where the insider-outsider distinction overrides
honorifics
As we suggested in 5.2.1.4, when a speaker 'points to' a member of her family to an
outsider, the speaker identifies him/her with him/herself. That is, just as a speaker
'points to' himself and describes his action humbly or non-humbly, indicating the type
of the social relation between him and the hearer or the type of the present speech
situation, the speaker 'points to' a member of his family and describes his action
humbly or non-humbly. In doing so, the speaker indicates that the social relation
between the speaker and the hearer, not the social relation between the speaker and the
member of her family, is of a certain type. In the following examples, whether the
speaker uses haha, a formal word for 'mother', or an informal one okaasan, and
whether the speaker describes her mother's action by a humble verb mairi or a plain
verb ki depend on the social relation between the speaker and the hearer.
(55) a. haha ga tookyo he mairi mashi la
b. okaasan ga tookyo he ki ta.
mother Tokyo to come past
'(My) mother came to Tokyo'
'Pointing' one's mother by haha is correlated with a type where a hearer is an outsider
to whom the speaker is formal. And 'pointing to' one's mother informally by okaasan
is correlated with a type where a hearer is an insider to whom a speaker is informal.
For a speaker to describe the action of the member of his family by a humble verb is
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correlated with a type where a hearer is an outsider to whom a speaker is formal. For a
speaker to describe the action of the member of his family by a plain verb is correlated
with a type where a hearer is an insider to whom a speaker is informal.
Let us demonstrate the meanings the speaker expresses by uttering the sentence in
(55a) and that in (55b) in the diagrams in (56) and (57) respectively:






T(H,S)"' means that the hearer is an insider of a speaker's social group.
If I utter the sentence in (55a) to my brother, my indicating is inappropriate. Since
'outsiderness' cannot be obtained in the actual social parameters in the present speech
situation, the hearer, i.e., my brother cannot understand why I 'point to' my mother,
who is also his mother, by haha and describe her past action by the humble verb mairi.
The insider-outsider distinction is also expressed when the speaker 'points to' a
member of the organization he belongs to, and whether the hearer is an insider or an
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outsider of the organization is marked by shi honorifics. Let us compare the following
sentences:
(58) a. Yamada san wa odekake-ni-nari mashi ta,
b. Yamada wa dekake mashi ta.
go out past
'(Mr) Yamada went out/has gone out'
If the speaker communicates with his colleague about another colleague of him who is
senior to him, he might utter the sentence in (58a): he 'points to' the person Yamada
by his last name plus san, and describes his action by an honorific verb, odekake-ni-
nari ('go out'). When the same speaker communicates with an outsider of the
company about the same person, Yamada, he utters the sentence in (58b). Identifying
Mr Yamada with himself and talking humbly about him, the speaker 'points to'
Yamada by his last name only and describes his action by a plain verb16. By doing so,
the speaker indicates that the hearer is an outsider.
One can also utter the sentence in (58b) to indicate that the person 'pointed to' is
socially lower than the speaker or the speaker is socially close to the person (the
possibility of the speech situation being informal is excluded because of ji honorific of
mashi). So if a bystander overhears someone uttering the sentence in (58b), he does
not know which social type the speaker indicates. This means that some shi honorifics
are not specific enough to distinguish the indication of a type of social hierarchy or
distance between a speaker and a referent from the indication of 'outsiderness' of a
hearer.
16There isn't a humble verb for 'go out' which is commonly used.
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5.5 Conclusion
In the present chapter, we have described (i) how Japanese honorifics are correlated
with types of social relation between a speaker and a hearer, and a speaker and a
referent and a referent and another participant, and types of speech situation, and (ii)
how a speaker by means of those conventions creates a particular type of speech
situation or specifies a social layer of the historic situation. Ji honorifics stand for
grammaticalisation of the correlations between the presence or absence of honorific
auxiliary and types of social relation or distance between a speaker and a hearer in the
speech situation or formality or informality of the speech situation. By using
conventions of ji honorifics, a speaker creates a particular type of speech situation
between him and the hearer in specifying the present speech situation as a particular
type.
Shi honorifics represent grammaticalization where honorific and non-honorific
referring expressions, and humble, plain, and honorific verbs are correlated with types
of social relation between a speaker and a referent, and a referent and another
participant in the historic situation, and types of speech situation. By using
conventions of shi honorifics, the speaker specifies the social aspect of the referent in
terms of his relation to the speaker or another participant. As a result, social relations
in the world are expressed together with the facts in the world which are expressed by
the speaker's act of'pointing to' a person and describing his action or state. By using
shi honorifics, the speaker reinforces existing social relations in the world or
emphasises a certain element of those social relations. We have also discussed the
interrelations ofji and shi honorifics when the speaker 'points to' himself, the hearer,
or a member of his or the hearer's social group.
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Japanese is one of the languages which are equipped with fully systematic devices to
mark social aspects of the world and communication linguistically. Using this device,
a Japanese speaker expresses social meanings independently of expressing meanings
about a factual aspect of an entity or historic situation, and creates a particular type of
speech situation, or reinforces existing social relations in the world or emphasises a
certain element of them. By applying Austin's concept of the demonstrative and
descriptive conventions to them, we have succeeded in describing these social
meanings and meanings about a factual aspect of an entity or historic situation in a
coherent manner: just as the speaker 'points to' an entity or situation (by means of the
demonstrative conventions) and describes it by assigning it a type (by means of the
descriptive conventions), the speaker specifies the social relation by highlighting it (by
means of the demonstrative conventions) and assigning it a type (by means of the
descriptive conventions). In doing so, we have added a social layer of the picture of





In the present thesis, we have shown that the speech act approach to meaning gives
richer explanations for various types of meaning, from referring and predicating to
honorifics. When interpreted in a wider sense, the speech act theory represents a
semantic theory where meanings are described as conventional acts which the speaker
performs to the hearer about the world using linguistic conventions. In this theory of
meaning, to describe meaning is to describe those linguistic conventions, some of
which are universal and others of which are language-specific. Our final goal is to give
a full description of language as a complex system of linguistic conventions which are
interrelated.
We defined conventionality of meaning in terms of independence from a particular
context: a particular meaning is conventional if it can be interpreted without any
information from a particular context. This is the definition we give to semantic
meaning in this thesis. By this definition, grammatical meanings, lexical meanings,
and socially established meanings (such as referring forms) are included in the
semantic domain, leaving context-specific meanings and meanings which are not fully
conventionalised such as conversational implicature and inferences based on
conversational structure in the pragmatic domain. In the proposed dichotomy, some of
the meanings which are defined as pragmatic meanings in the Gazdar-Levinson
definition of semantics and pragmatics are in the semantic domain.
In the present thesis we have described two types of semantic meaning. One is truth-
conditional meaning and the other is what we call meaning of CONTEXTc- We
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explained what aspect of meaning philosophers and linguists have been trying to
capture as truth-conditional meaning, and have shown that it can be described
successfully in the theory put forward in the present thesis: truth-conditional meaning
can be seen as a type of conventional meaning which concerns the factual aspect of the
entity or situation in the world. Following Austin (1950), we have hypothesised two
types of linguistic conventions: the demonstrative conventions and descriptive
conventions. Demonstrative conventions correlate words with a particular entity or
historic situation, and descriptive conventions correlate words with types of entity or
situation. Using these conventions, a speaker expresses different types of meaning
about entities or situations in the world. Following Austin (1952), we have
hypothesised four types of speech act the speaker can potentially perform by uttering a
sentence with subject-predicate structure. Truth-conditional meaning is a type of
meaning the speaker expresses in performing one of those types of speech act: the
speaker 'points to' a particular entity or situation by means of the demonstrative
conventions and describes it by assigning it a type by means of the descriptive
conventions. We described the other types of act correlating them with linguistic
factors such as generics, referential and attributive use of the definite expressions, and
A-type and B-type utterances. By describing meaning the speaker expresses by
uttering a sentence with subject-predicate structure as the speaker's conventional
speech acts about the world, we succeeded in analysing sentence meaning with wider
scope than that of straightforward truth-conditional meaning.
By the concept of meanings of CONTEXTc, which concern types of social relation
between a speaker and a hearer in the speech situation, types of speech situation, and
types of social relation between a referent and a speaker or another participant in the
historic situation, we have clarified the other important semantic meaning. That is a
type of meaning where social relations in the world are recognised and linguistically
expressed, whilst meanings about entities or situations which include truth-conditional
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meanings are a type of meaning where entities or situations in the world are recognized
and linguistically expressed. Meanings of CONTEXTc can be appropriate or
inappropriate whilst meanings about entities or situations in the world can be true or
false (or correct or incorrect in our terminology). We have described both types of
semantic meaning in a coherent manner by applying Austin's two types of linguistic
conventions to the description of meanings of CONTEXTc. Just as the speaker 'points
to' an entity or situation by means of the demonstrative conventions and describes it by
giving it a type by means of the descriptive conventions, the speaker highlights, say,
the present speech situation between him and the hearer by means of the demonstrative
conventions and, at the same time, specifies it by giving it a type by means of the
descriptive conventions. In other words, whilst the speaker asserts that a particular
entity or situation is of a certain type, the speaker indicates that the present speech
situation is of a certain type. Asserting and indicating are independent of each other,
as they are associated with different layers of meaning.
In the final part of the present thesis, we described Japanese honorifics, which are
grammatical devices to express meanings of CONTEXTc. Under the Gazdar-LeVinson
dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics, Japanese honorifics are 'miscast' as a
pragmatic meaning. Since the honorifics are analysed as pragmatic meanings, context
independent meanings the honorifics express as grammatical devices are not fully
described. Japanese honorifics strongly suggest the necessity of a criterion of semantic
meaning which is wider than truth-conditional meaning, by which grammatical
meanings which concern non-factual aspects of the world are included as semantic
meanings. We give the conventionality of meaning as a new criterion, and we have
proved that Japanese honorifics are successfully described in the theory where
semantic meaning is what the speaker expresses by conventional devices about states
of affairs or social relations in the world. In such a theory Japanese honorifics are a
conventional device which correlates words with types of social relation, by which a
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Japanese speaker specifies the social relations. We have shown that there are two types
of honorifics in Japanese;.// honorifics and shi honorifics. In ji honorifics the presence
and the absence of the honorific auxiliary are correlated with types of social relation
between a speaker and a hearer, and using ji honorifics, the speaker highlights the
present speech situation and specifies its type. In shi honorifics, referring expressions
and verbs are correlated by convention with types of social relation between a speaker
and a referent or a referent and another participant. Using shi honorifics, the speaker
highlights and specifies the social relation between him and the referent, and the
referent and another participant. By indicating that the present speech situation or the
social relation between him and the referent or the referent and another participant is of
a certain type, the speaker creates a particular type of speech situation or enforces
existing social relations in the world.
Meanings are multi-layered. In the present thesis, we have clarified two layers of
meaning, a factual layer and a social layer, and described the linguistic conventions by
which the speaker expresses meanings of those layers. Using these conventions, a
speaker describes an entity or situation in the world and, at the same time, specifies the
social relation between him and the hearer, him and the referent, or the referent and
another participant. Languages might be also equipped with lexical or grammatical
devices by which the speaker expresses meanings of other layers, which include
possibility/probability or negativity/positivity. These will be topics of my future
research. Other areas ofmy interest include extended research on (i) genericity in terms
of the act of placing, and (ii) correlation between referring expressions and the
speaker's understanding of the hearer's background knowledge. Although we have
not mentioned the diachronic aspect of meaning, the convention-based theory of
meaning put forward in the present thesis can well incorporate diachronic changes of
meanings: such changes can be analysed simply as changes of conventions. When
linguistic conventions change, some semantic meanings which existed in one time in
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history cease to exist at another time, or some meanings which existed as context-
dependent pragmatic meanings at one time become semantic meanings at another time.
Analysing diachronic changes of meaning will be also one of the topics of my future
research.
To describe the multi-layered nature of meaning, it seems very promising to adopt the
theory where meanings are analysed in terms of speech acts the speaker performs to
the hearer using linguistic conventions. In such a theoiy, we have a broader picture of
semantic meaning than the picture truth-condition semantics offers, and we can
describe different aspects of meaning the speaker expresses by uttering a sentence.
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